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CHRISTIANITY A RELIGION OF HOPE.

THE truths of God forever shine
Though Error glare and Falsehood rage ;
The cause of Order is divine,
And Wisdom rules from age to age.

Faith, Hope, and Love, your time abide !
Let Hades marshal all his hosts,
The heavenly forces with you side ;
The stars are watching at their posts.

F. H. HEDGE.

The Christian religion, rightly apprehended, is preëminently the religion of hope. Its chief message to the world is the declaration of God's good intention toward men, and its chief representation is the person of Jesus of Nazareth, whom God anointed "with the Holy Ghost and with power ; who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil ; for God was with him."

In forming our judgment of Christianity, we must discriminate between what is accidental and transient on the one hand, and what is essential and permanent on the other. The discriminating process must be carried not only through all the organizations and institutions and theories and history that are loosely grouped under the term Christianity, but also through the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. In these Scriptures is given us a revelation of God. This is the chief but not the only revelation, for there are revelations of God in nature and in man which from one point of view are preparatory for the revelation in the Bible, and from another point of view are both supplementary and

confirmatory of it. Indeed, were it not for the revelation of God within man, any revelation to him from without would be impossible. The Biblical revelation is progressive, exhibiting a distinct and great advance from the naive monotheism of Abraham, with its predominant anthropomorphic elements, to the profound and pure spiritual Theism of Jesus. Because revelation is progressive, corresponding to man's growing power of apprehension, and depending upon it, there are many features of the revelatory process that are incidental and transient. Learning is in part a process of discarding. Low ideas of the divine nature are continually replaced by higher. New points of view necessitate an abandonment of the old. Imperfect symbols are dropped as their defects become apparent, and better symbols take their place. The prophets, for example, show a marked advance in their conception of God upon the conceptions of the patriarchs, and Jesus occupies a higher level of spiritual view than the prophets. But the progress is not mechanical, nor a mere process of sequence. It is vital, and has an indestructible continuity. Much is left behind, but something is steadily carried forward. The new is in a true sense the outgrowth of the old. The plant is the evolution of the seed; but the process of development is also a process of increment. In order to get, therefore, a true idea of the Biblical revelation of God, we must take our stand on the highest point reached in the revelatory process which has its record in the Bible; that is, the point afforded us by both the teaching and the personality of Jesus. From this point we may trace the slowly ascending and slowly brightening path that leads up from the primitive age to the time when, with a boldness of utterance and a depth of spiritual insight which we do not yet fully comprehend, Jesus declared at once: "God is spirit," and "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." Manifestly, to take our position at any point in the process of Biblical revelation short of the summit on which Jesus stands, and to say of the view obtainable from that point, "this is the vision of God," is to misunderstand and to misrepresent the Bible.

The same is true with reference to the idea of Christianity of which the revelation that culminates in the Son of God is central. No book of the Bible preceding the Gospels truly represents or defines Christianity. Only in Him of whose spirit Christianity is the effluence do we find a true exponent of what essential Christianity is. But there is also a prophetic element in the Biblical revelation of God. What Jesus gives to the world is

than another and higher stage in the revelatory process than that which is given successively by patriarchs and prophets. The singularity of his communication is partly in this, that his revelation of the Father is not only complementary, but also prophetic and ideal. The value of the New Testament is chiefly in the fact that it is far more than a high-water mark of the generic spiritual perception of men. It sets a standard toward which the world still strives, and communicates a thought which the world has not yet wholly grasped. The spiritual progress of so much of humanity as has come within the circle of Biblical communication is a progress, not beyond the point reached in the New Testament, but toward that point,—that prophetic revelation which Jesus, the chiefest of all the prophets, or speakers for God, both gave and was. All the advance of philosophical thought toward the true and perfect idea of God has been an advance toward the thought of Jesus. All the progress of that spiritual life which is the expression of spiritual thought is a progress toward the life of Him who “came from God and went to God,” the “Son of Man” who was yet “the only begotten Son of God.” So, too, and necessarily, there is a prophetic and ideal element in the idea of Christianity which Jesus gives. The religious thought and life of to-day are far higher and purer than the religious thought and life of the early Christian centuries. This is a truth which no careful student of Christian history can for a moment doubt. Both the intellectual apprehension and the practical application of Christian principles are broader and juster and more thoroughgoing to-day than at any time in the past. Yet, when we succeed in clearly discriminating essential Christianity from all that is incidental and adventitious; when we carry this process not only through historical and institutional Christianity, but even through the New Testament, until we discover the fundamental and enduring elements of the Christianity which Jesus embodied in his person and manifested in his spirit and expressed in his authenticated teachings, we can understand the real meaning of Lessing’s extravagant yet not altogether untrue saying: “The religion of Christianity has been on trial eighteen hundred years; the religion of Christ is yet to be tried.” We shall understand, also, and approve, the statement of Fairbairn, that true Christianity is “an ideal for the whole of humanity, and a great method for its realization.” The revelation which Jesus makes of the divine interest in man, and the divine purpose to be realized in man, discloses also the forces and motives by which man is to achieve a spiritual des-

tiny in the unfolding of the kingdom of God. The fundamental element in the Christianity of Jesus is the love of God for humanity. This love lies at the base of all supernatural manifestations, is the law of all Providential discipline, the spring of all ethics, and the ground of all hopes. No communication takes rank with this communication. No principle limits or conditions this principle. As high as heaven, as deep as hell, as wide as space, is this truth which Jesus utters and embodies, — the love of God for men. Essential Christianity is the declaration and concrete expression of this love through the archetypal divine sonship and self-sacrifice of Jesus. All the manifold process of salvation in its widest sense flows out of this elemental truth thus expressed in an unique yet universally related and all-relating personality. The revelation which Jesus makes of divine Fatherhood and human sonship discloses the ideal toward the full realization of which the moral and spiritual life of man is a progress. This divine-human relation involves in itself the perfect good of the individual and the perfect good of society, that is, collective humanity. On the fundamental principle of man's moral relation to God — a relation exhibited and confirmed by the Christ — rest all the principles, and out of it rise all the forces, of that great upward movement of humanity to which history, with increasing clearness, witnesses. All that is best in our individual characters, as well as in our social morals, sciences, arts, industries, politics, and religions, has its primal spring in that relation. Ignorant as he may be, blind and bestial as he often is, man is the child of God; therefore he is the object of the divine love, the subject of the divine tuition and discipline, and, in the attainment of his true destiny, the fulfillment of the divine purpose. The revelation of God to man and of man's true relation to God, which Jesus makes, involves all that is essential in his teaching and in his experience. It involves the Cross, not as a necessary material fact, but as a symbol of spiritual fact, — the fact of supreme self-sacrifice for moral ends. There is much of form and organization and theory that has got itself named Christian which, at the best, sustains but a loose and accidental relation to essential Christianity. There is much, also, which essential Christianity has created as instrument for the realization of its ends. All this, for the present, may be left aside. Nor shall any detailed elucidation of the spiritual contents of essential Christianity be attempted now. A single point claims our present attention. Christianity as a revelation of divine

Fatherhood and human sonship, and of divine love seeking the full realization of truth and love in human experience and character and destiny, is preëminently a religion of hope.

In a deeper sense than ever any other teacher personally represented what he taught, Jesus was and is essential Christianity. For let it never be forgotten that Christianity is a spirit and method of life. It is not primarily a church, nor a creed, nor a ritual, nor even a religion, but a life of God and in God, which life has its supreme embodiment in the Christ. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find any truth or precept given by Jesus which had not been given to men before. The unity of God, the providence of God, the Fatherhood of God, the ubiquity of the divine spirit, the mercy of God, man's duty of repentance, faith and charity, and the hope of immortality, — all had found utterance in some form before Jesus came. But the whole of truth expressed in a life the world had not seen till Jesus came. What men had apprehended only in detached fragments of spiritual truth and beauty, and, for the most part, in the form of precept or proposition, Jesus exhibited in the harmony and fullness of a living incarnation. Thus embodied, all truths took on a new meaning, or rather now first disclosed their real meaning. To see one who loved God with all his heart and soul and mind and strength, and his neighbor as himself, made the old precept a new communication. To see in the clear face of the Son the unmarred reflection of the perfect Father, made the revelation of God a new revelation. To see faith and obedience and holy love perfectly realized in a person who

“wrought
With human hands the creed of creeds
In loveliness of perfect deeds,
More strong than all poetic thought,”

was to have a new sense of what faith and obedience and holy love are. In Jesus all the scattered rays of truth were gathered up into the glowing centre of a divinely human personality. He justified, therefore, as well as inspired, the testimony that “God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions, and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in a Son.”

Jesus Christ, then, in his person and teaching and deeds, is the gospel, — the good tidings of God to men. His function, as well as his person, is thus, in a true sense, unique. Neither prophet nor apostle, neither Isaiah nor Paul, but Jesus only, adequately

expresses and defines essential Christianity. The real progress of Christian thought is advance in power to understand and interpret Jesus. A book may be exhausted, for the capacity of "the letter" is limited; but a personality, such a personality, is inexhaustible. "The letter" is form, and easily becomes fetters; "the spirit" is life, and has no bounds. Men are perpetually trying to put Christianity into dogmatic systems which they label Calvinism and Arminianism, Old Theology and New Theology; but they are perpetually baffled by the fact that Christianity, as the effluence of the living Christ, overflows all boundaries, transcends all forms, and convicts all definitions of inadequacy and error. Everything is transitory save the spirit. Jesus as the revelation of God and the manifestation of the life of God, realized and individualized in the life of man, is the secret of the power which Christianity possesses of perpetually renewing itself. Institutions, theories, and forms become decadent and effete. Then men say Christianity is moribund. But while they are brooding over the death of a faith, behold! that faith is rising in fresh power, putting forth new energies and creating new instruments to serve its ends. A clear apprehension of Christianity as a spirit of life, having its supreme manifestation in the Son of God, makes argument to prove that it is a religion of hope seem almost superfluous.

But let us proceed to explicate this truth somewhat in detail. The message of Jesus to the world was one of hope, for it was a message of salvation. He declared that "God so loved the world that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever trusteth in Him might not perish but have life eternal;" and He presented himself as the embodiment of this love and the executor of this purpose. He took to himself as definitive of his mission, in a broader sense than the prophet understood, the words of Isaiah:

"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me,
Because He anointed me to preach good tidings to the poor:
He hath sent me to proclaim release to the captives,
And recovering of sight to the blind,
To set at liberty them that are bruised,
To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord."

He came not to rebuke, but to encourage men. His message was one of cheer, and not of condemnation: "For God sent not the Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through Him." His words were continually provocative of hope. His ministry of healing was in a large, sweet

way illustrative and symptomatic. His practical helpfulness reinforced, in a manner that men could feel and in some sense understand, his declarations of divine purpose. Of old, men were ever more ready to credit God with the purpose of smiting than they were to believe in his disposition to heal. Jesus declared the love of God to men, and, avowedly fulfilling the will of God, put the message into a palpable gift of health to diseased and tormented bodies. Thus He dissolved that ignorant fear of God which was a main hindrance to the reception of his message. He declared the law of love between man and man, and illustrated the declaration by his invincible goodness and his utter unselfishness in helping the needy of every class. Thus He dissolved the antagonisms that thrust men apart and made them mutual hurters instead of mutual helpers of each other. He uttered and embodied the divine principle of love which is at once the motive of true worship and the law of right action. This was lifting life to a new level. His purpose was but dimly apprehended then, and is far from being clearly apprehended even now. Still, despite their little apprehension of Jesus, many of those among whom He lived and taught awoke to a new hope, and the impulse of that hope created the new life which dates from the first Christian century.

What Jesus did, He does still. The material circumstances of his ministry, for example his works of healing, as to their form, are incidental. In essence the ministry of Jesus continues, and not as the prolonged impression of historic events simply, but as the ever fresh impression of his spiritual force, — his transcendent personality. Treating his life historically, we must say, "He was," and "He did," but treating his life on the higher plane of his essential mission to the world, we instinctively drop the past tense. The Christ belongs to all time, and is the contemporary of every age. His message is not a mere reminiscence of a past event; it is a vital communication of the present and dateless gospel of God. The world has greatly changed in the nearly two millenniums that have passed since Jesus of Nazareth began his ministry in Palestine, but it has not changed in its essential relation to Him. He is better understood, but He is still preëminent. The force of his teaching is more widely felt, but it is still unexhausted. Man is less abject and bestial, less ignorant and superstitious than he was, but he is still dependent upon "Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

In a true sense, then, what Jesus did He still does; only the

scope of his ministry ever widens as man's capacity to apprehend the meaning and end of that ministry increases. Jesus' message of hope to men was not simply a promise of "something better by and by," that is, in eternity, conceived as a condition of being to be entered upon by humanity collectively at the end of time. He did not say, "Life is evil and irremediable here and now, but in the hereafter it will be wholly good." He had little to say of "the hereafter" in the sense in which we commonly use that term. He said enough. He gave the fruitful germs of thought that grow with the growth of man's spirit into ever enlarging spiritual conceptions of humanity's future. But He did not speak as fully and as explicitly of "the hereafter" as many have thought. The promise of the better by and by which men needed to hear was implicitly in all his teaching, but the pledge of its fulfillment was in a bettered present. If the seed of the better age is not in to-day, its flower and fruit will not appear in the distant to-morrow. Jesus did not leave men in their misery simply enriched by a hope. He began in their minds and hearts the process which, making the present better, brightens all the future. Man himself must be improved if there is to be any permanent improvement of his environment. Civilization is first subjective. Jesus gave to men a revelation of God that awakened trust in the divine goodness. This trust was itself at once a ground and spring of hope, and a powerful motive to righteousness. To deepen one's faith in the good is to generate rational hope and to elevate character. He taught men the meaning of love, and planted in them the root of that divine affection which must grow from heart to heart until all humanity is bound in living, holy brotherhood. The man who loves to-day, even feebly, gives promise in himself of the day when he will love his neighbor as himself. What Jesus did *for* man was, most of all, what He did *in* man, and *in* man He began the process of which "the new heaven and the new earth" will be the natural and divinely ordained culmination. The leaven in the meal is the finest symbol of Christ's method. The spirit works within, and from within outward.

The character of Jesus' work *in* man is the best answer to the pessimism of much "Christian theology," as well as of unchristian philosophy. He gave to human life an impulse toward the good that strengthens and broadens with every passing century.

In giving that impulse He discloses at once both the actual and the ideal of human life from the moral point of view. What life

is He shows less by any denunciation of evil than by the light which He sheds upon it from the height of his own excellence. His pure spirit inevitably reveals and condemns the grossness and sordidness of men. His utter truth exposes and judges their deep insincerities. His absolute goodness unmasks and rebukes their manifold selfishness. No words can represent the deformities and deficiencies of human life from a moral point of view as those appear in the light of his character. This disclosure of the actual Jesus made, and this disclosure He still makes. To-day, as truly as when He walked in Judea, He lays bare the sin and folly of men. Uttering no audible word, He stands in our market-places and shows the immoralities and selfishnesses of our trade; He stands in our churches and uncovers our miserable insincerities and slavish idolatries. When we look at Him with honest, open eyes, our conceit shrivels, and our petty proprieties and conventional moralities refuse longer to hide from us our real defects and positive sins. This disclosure Jesus inevitably makes, because in Him is the reality of truth and righteousness.

But while He thus discloses the actual, He also discloses the possible, — the ideal. What He is in spirit shows men what they may be. His stainless purity, his boundless charity, his invulnerable sweetness and patience, his unbroken, intimate communion with the Father, his loftiness of mind, his perfect righteousness, his wonderful peace, — that peace which we most admire and covet and so perpetually fail to attain, — that peace which, when every one else was torn by passion, or fretted by care, or shaken by fear, or harassed by doubt, enveloped Him in an atmosphere of beautiful, holy calm, — all this reveals to us our possible attainments as children of God. And the revelation kindles hope, and hope passes into aspiration and impulse. "Looking unto Jesus" becomes a striving toward "the perfect man," — toward "the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ." All spiritual progress in the individual life witnesses to the presence and illustrates the power of the hope that Jesus awakens. But the ideal disclosed is more than an ideal of individual life. There is a great prophetic suggestiveness in the life and teaching of Jesus. In himself He prophesies not only the coming man, but also the coming order, the coming reign of love, the coming health of the world, and the coming peace. The ideal is not sharply defined in words. It is hinted rather, and the hints, at first vague, grow clearer and clearer with the growth of men in the power to see and to lay hold of the spiritual meaning of life. Explicitly Jesus did speak of

the kingdom of God, but the conception was too great to be grasped at once, as it is too expansive to be exhausted at any point in subsequent history. But it was definite enough to constitute an ideal grand and sweet, if vague, and from that ideal sprang the hope which works perpetually toward a higher civil organization of human society, and purer government, and larger liberty. So, in this twofold disclosure of the actual and the ideal, Jesus begets hope in man's heart. Indeed, the very disclosure of the actual and the possible, in connection with each other, generates in man the unquenchable desire to pass from the one to the other. Hope is the reaching forward of the soul from the actual to the ideal. An apostle said, "We are saved by hope."

But the self-revelation which Jesus gives — the exhibition of himself as Son of man and Son of God, in his function of lover and Saviour of the world — is central, because the highest power among men is personal. It is not the touch of precepts or ideas or theories, but the touch of a personality, that moves us, that imparts the vital impulse. The love of Christ, the love which He awakens in our hearts, is the great spring of hope, because that love makes us sharers in his aspirations, his ideals, his faith, and his enterprise. That love binds us to Him in his entire mission. Amidst a world seemingly tottering to its ruin He stood and saw the salvation of the world and the triumph of good, — saw it through the shadow of the cross that fell darkly athwart his path. Surrendering himself to the sharpness and apparent utter defeat of death, even while dying He triumphed in the vision of a completed redemption. Loving Him, man shares in his power of forecast and triumphant anticipation. Under the influence of this transcendent personality, man strives to realize in himself and in the world the ends toward which Jesus wrought, and so becomes missionary and martyr of the gospel. Hope passes from a sentiment into a principle. It incorporates itself into character. It becomes an element of righteousness, because it is rooted in the soul's faith in God and conviction of the reality and permanence of the good.

This hope which Jesus awakens and sustains and broadens continually is the pledge of the salvation of the world. It is a force that works beneath all our organizations and through all our instruments. Often repudiated in theories of human life, and denied in the actions of men, and dishonored by feeble utterance in the creeds of the church, it persists in all hearts that Jesus has touched and quickened into the life of the spirit. It is the real

force of human progress. It is the silent but most true witness to the divinity that shapes the course of human history, and to the real divineness and immortality of the human soul. In "the hope of the gospel," that gospel which Jesus is and perpetually imparts, the salvation of the world is prophetically achieved.

The Christian hope, then, is not a matter of mere sentiment or of a happy temperament. It is allied not with weakness, but with strength; not with airy dreams, but with clear knowledge of the truth; not with fond and foolish fancy, but with solidest loyalty to Jesus Christ; not with baseless speculation, but with vitalest faith in God. To hope for the supremacy of the good is among the finest and most rational exercises of Christian virtue. It is doubt that is weakness. It is pessimism that is the real denial of the faith. It is want of large, tenacious, and triumphant hope that often turns the nominal church of Christ into a half-hearted army fighting a battle in which defeat is a foregone and accepted conclusion.

To cultivate hopefulness is a duty as much as to cultivate morality is a duty. It belongs to the Christian's discipline in righteousness. Rational optimism is grounded in the reality and perfection of God. It is the irrefutable deduction from the gospel of the Son of God, which is the gospel of sovereign law and sovereign love.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MODERN CRITICISM.

IN his essay on "The Study of Poetry," Mr. Arnold warns us against permitting the true estimate of poetry to be superseded by the historic estimate or the personal estimate. The final test of poetry is neither its relation to the development of a nation's language and thought, nor its interest and importance to us by reason of its affinity with our personal tastes and experiences; but the soundness of its substance and perfection of its form. This statement may be so extended in its application as to make it inclusive of all literature. In the nature of things, the highest test can be neither historic nor personal, but must be universal; a test, that is, which involves primarily truth neither to historic nor to personal relations, but truth to something common to all men in whom the literary instinct has found normal development.

When the highest court in Christendom — the consensus of the educated opinion of the world — assigns their relative places to the great writers, this supreme test must always be applied; but it is only on rare occasions that this supreme tribunal pronounces judgment. Writers of world-wide import, whose work sustains the application of the very highest test, do not come to the judgment seat of this high tribunal oftener than four or five times in a century. For the most part, it is with the men whose inferiority to Homer and Dante, to Shakespeare and Milton, is clearly apparent that criticism concerns itself. These illustrious shades have received but a single comrade into their immortal fellowship during the present century. Below these foremost names there are written those of a noble company who, if they have failed of the highest places, have come near the shining goal; it is with these that criticism chiefly concerns itself. And with these its most useful office is not so much to determine absolute quality and rank as to comprehend clearly and to interpret impartially the truth and beauty that are in them.

The supreme test separated from all other tests is rarely applied; the supreme test associated with other and lesser tests is in constant use. Literature is an art, and therefore submits itself to the law of beauty which supplies the test of art; but it is also a revelation of the spirit of man, and there is to be found in it something more than the perfect felicity and unbroken serenity of the most finely tempered souls. The buoyancy of Homer is one of our great possessions, but there is something to be learned also from the despondency of Leopardi; the mastery of Shakespeare over all the materials of his work is inspiring, but there is something significant also in the turbulence of Byron; the amplitude of culture opens the heart of the modern world in Goethe, but the provincial sincerity of Mistral has something to teach us; Dante's majestic strength makes us feel the identity of great living and great art; but there is something for us in the pathetic felicity of De Musset and the often unavailing beauty of Shelley. In each writer of any force and genius there is not only the element which makes him amenable to the highest law of criticism; there is also something which appeals to our individual consciousness and is distinctly personal, something which is the impress of the inheritance and larger circumstance of the time, and is therefore historic, and something which lets us into the soul of a generation of men, or of a period of time, or a deep movement of faith and thought. A great piece of literature may be studied

from each of these points of view, and to get to the bottom of its meaning it must be so studied. Every enduring literary work not only affords material for, but demands, this comprehensive study, — a study which is at once critical, historic, and personal.

The "Divine Comedy" has been potent enough to give birth to a large literature of secondary and derivative books; its philosophy, its theology, its cosmology, its politics, its history, its art, have each in turn been subjected to the most searching investigation. We know the rank of the great poem as literature; we know its historic position in the development of the Italian mind; we know its profound analysis of the soul and its experiences; we know what a marvelous revelation of life lies in the heart of it as the supreme and final reward of patient and sympathetic study. No account of Dante's work would be adequate which failed to take into account all these elements of its power. It is something more than a noble substance of thought encased in a noble form; something more than a deep glimpse into experiences which under different names are common to all men; something more than a chapter of history written in fire and blood. It is all these and it is something greater. Dante was a man of genius; a man of wonderful perceptive and receptive power; a man to feel even more profoundly than he thought, and to speak even wiser than he knew. Humanity, under the pressure of that education which we call history, revealed the unfathomable depth and wonder of its life through him. We find this same quality of revelation in Homer, in Shakespeare, in Milton, in Goethe; we find it in the work of all men of genius who have written in prose or verse; we find it in Plato, in Marcus Aurelius, in Bacon, in Lessing, in Carlyle, in Newman, in Emerson. And we find it in all the great forms which literature takes on; in poetry, the drama, fiction, history, essay, criticism. Every expression of life is not literature, but nothing which possesses the indefinable quality of literature fails to tell us something about that all-embracing fact. Forms, standard, methods change; but the unchangeable element in all literature is the presence of some aspect of life reflected, reported, interpreted, with more or less fidelity and power.

Now the study of literature in these larger relations, these multifarious aspects, has never been so earnestly pursued as during the present century. Never before has such a vast amount of material been accumulated; never before have there been such opportunities of using on a great scale the comparative method. This

pursuit has become a passion with many of the most sensitive minds, and we have as a result a body of literary interpretation and philosophy in the form of criticism so great in mass and so important in substance as to constitute one of the chief distinctively modern contributions to the art of letters. For this study of books and the men who made them is not the pastime of professional Dryasdusts; it is the original and in a large measure the creative work of those who, in other literary periods and under other intellectual and social influences, would have illustrated their genius through the epic, the drama, or the lyric. Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Coleridge, Carlyle, Sainte-Beuve, Arnold, Amiel, Emerson, have not been students of the work of other men simply from force of the scholarly impulse; they have been irresistibly attracted to the study of literature because literature has disclosed to them the soul and the laws of life and art. The passion for contact with the great and inexhaustible impulses which unify human life under all conditions has led these diligent explorers from one continent to another until a new world lies within our ken. Each literature in turn is yielding its secrets of race inheritance, temperament, genius; each related group of literatures is disclosing the common characteristics of the family of races behind it; each literary epoch is revealing the spiritual, moral, and social forces which dominated it; each great literary form is discovering its intimate and necessary relation with some fact of life, some stage or process of experience. We know the Greek race in large measure through the Greek literature; we know the unspent forces which stirred the Elizabethan age through the Elizabethan writers; and we know why, at intervals, the greatest literary minds have used the drama, the lyric, the novel as forms of expression. All this we owe to the modern critical movement, — a movement not so much of study and comparison for the purposes of judgment by fixed standards, as of investigation for the purpose of laying bare the common laws of life and art; of making it clear to us that literature is always the vital utterance of insight and experience.

The earliest development of criticism on any considerable scale — the criticism of Alexandria and of the later stages of the revival of classical learning in Italy, for example — was largely textual; it concerned itself chiefly with the settlement of questions of variant versions; it was mainly and necessarily absorbed in a study of words and phrases. Criticism of the higher order — criticism which searches for the laws of beauty in the crea-

tions of art — is not possible until there has been a large accumulation of material upon which it can work. The drama must pass through the entire period of its development, from its rudimentary form in the chorus to its perfection in the plays of Sophocles, before Aristotle announces its laws and defines its aims. Not until a literary form has been completely worked out does it disclose the law of its interior structure and its resources of expression. Nor can any single work of literary art furnish the elements for æsthetic criticism; there must be kindred works with which comparison may be made and resemblances or contrasts noted. When æsthetic criticism is fully equipped and developed, there remains still another stage in the evolution; the criticism which deals with literature as a whole, which studies the large conditions under which it is created, which takes account of race, time, circumstance, which discerns in the detached works of a man or a generation or race an adequate expression of human experience and an authentic revelation of human life, is still to come; and this larger criticism is not possible until universal literature is open to the critic. It is true that these different and progressive stages are not always clearly defined; they shade into each other, as do the various forms of animal and vegetable life. They are often contemporaneous in the same piece of critical work; comment on questions of text, illustration of æsthetic quality, and recognition of rank and significance in the general movement of history, often go hand in hand in the work of a critic of the first rank. Nevertheless, these three stages of the development of criticism are distinctly and unmistakably marked. Textual criticism may begin with the first study of a literary work, since it concerns that work alone, and has no relation to literature at large. Textual criticism of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* began, doubtless, with the attempt, in the time of Pisistratus, to collect these wandering stories. Æsthetic criticism was only possible when the beauty and truth of these great works had so penetrated and enlightened the Greek mind that soundness of substance and perfection of form were recognized as the tests of a genuine work of art. The laws of art have always been discovered by the process of induction; no race has ever thought much about art in the abstract until it has been educated by contact with works which, by their revelation to the eye, have made the mind conscious of its own affinity with the ideals of beauty. The discovery of the same laws in the works of literature has followed a similar order. The lyric must sing in the hearts of

men before the secret of its form is discerned and disclosed; the drama must unfold the iron creed of fate, or the indissoluble union of character and destiny, before the laws which shape it are announced. *Æsthetic* criticism follows, therefore, those productive periods which, by enlargement and enrichment of the scope of actual achievement, disclose new sources of power, larger sweep of ideas, different or higher possibilities of execution. When Euripides completed his work, the Greek had all the materials for an intelligent, if still incomplete, study of the drama at hand; *Æschylus*, *Sophocles*, and Euripides had wrought with such power on so great a scale that they had made clear the construction and the peculiar force and significance of the noble literary form which they fashioned. There was no need, for the purposes of *æsthetic* criticism, to hold judgment in suspense until *Lessing*, *Corneille*, *Calderon*, and *Shakespeare* had spoken. *Aristotle* was amply justified by the scope and splendor of the drama of his own race in declaring the purpose of all dramatic representation. But as a disclosure of the full possibilities of the drama as an instrument of human expression, even the *Attic* stage was incomplete; other races must endure and suffer and translate experience into art, before the full compass of this magnificent literary form could be understood. And when the drama has been brought as near perfection as the genius of man can carry it, there are still other elements which must enter into a final and adequate comprehension of its significance. It must be studied in the light of a complete literary development; it must find its place in the large movement of history. To a real mastery of the drama as a form of art and an expression of experience, there is necessary, therefore, full development of the drama under many diverse conditions and at many hands, familiarity with literature in all its forms, and clear perception of the historic life behind the work of art. And what is true of the drama is also true of the epic, the lyric, the ballad, the novel; in a word, of literature as a whole.

The conditions which make possible this comprehensive study of literature as an art, and as an expression of human life, have not existed until within comparatively recent times. There are glimpses here and there in the works of the greatest minds of the unity of knowledge, glimpses of the range and significance of literature as the vital outcome of all human experience; but the clear perception of these truths has been possible only to modern men. It is one thing to glance at a great truth in the swift vision of prophecy;

it is a very different thing to discern it as the result of deliberate searching, and to hold it within the field until it is clearly understood in its import and large relations. So long as knowledge and art were abstractly conceived, — thought of as existing apart and isolated from human development, — there could be no conception of their harmony and interdependence, of their vital relation to the development of men as individuals and as a society. It was reserved for the Germans of the last century to comprehend and formulate that idea of the unity and vital interdependence of all the forms and forces of civilization which lies at the foundation of all our modern thinking; which has, indeed, transformed and reconstructed all knowledge. What the Humanists did in a partial and provisional way towards a true and real insight into the antique world, the great German critics of the middle of the last century — Winckelmann, Herder, Lessing, and Goethe — did fundamentally and permanently, not only for classical art and life, but for all knowledge and history. The Humanists destroyed the mediæval tradition of Virgil, and brought back the living man; brushed aside the cobwebs with which centuries of monkish teaching had obscured the great poem, and made clear once more its human tenderness and beauty. The German thinkers destroyed the abstract idea of knowledge which divided it into separate departments, isolated from each other and detached from the living experience of men, — the formal, academic idea of art as a set of rules, a fixed and conventional practice unrelated to national character. Rejecting the dry and arbitrary definitions and abstractions of his time, Winckelmann discovered the totality of Greek life, and saw, therefore, what his predecessors had failed to see, that simplicity, elevation, and repose were the common qualities of the dramas of Sophocles, the marbles of Phidias, the speculations of Plato, the orations of Pericles; that literature, sculpture, philosophy, and oratory were, therefore, the vitally related parts of a harmonious and complete expression of Greek life; and that the common root whence all these exquisite flowers drew their loveliness was the Greek nature. Many of the marbles in the Vatican were recovered as part of the great work of the Renaissance, but they were first really seen by Winckelmann and his contemporaries. He discerned the noble idealism shared alike by Plato and the sculptors of the Periclean age; that idealism which found in the Greek mind so congenial a soil, and in the Greek hand and the Greek speech such sure and marvelous interpreters. Winckelmann "first unveiled the ideal

beauty of Greek antiquity," and disclosed those qualities of Greek art which make it one in all its splendid forms; so that whether we study the trilogy of Agamemnon, the structure of the Parthenon, the statesmanship of Pericles, or the "Phædrus," we are conscious of but a single creative personality. In its magical beauty each work remains a perpetual type; but the genius of the lamp by which these wonders were wrought was one. Behind all these beautiful masques there was a single face. Winckelmann saw that art had a natural history of its own, and that its birth, its successive stages of growth, its decay and death, could be clearly traced; he saw that religion, political development, race, climate, soil, character, furnished the conditions of its life. He perceived, in a word, the unity of Greek life and history, the organic and historic development of Greek art. For an abstract idea, he substituted a living organism; for a conventional system, a vital process; for an isolated skill, the splendid expression of the deepest human experience and the loftiest human ideals.

By very different methods, and with a very different mind, but in the same vital spirit, Herder approached the study of literature. French influence was still dominant in Germany, where the absolutism of Frederick in the state was reproduced in letters in the tyranny of artificial tastes, conventional models, and a dead formality alien to the German mind, and powerless to touch the German heart. Boileau's "Art Poétique" was the final word concerning literature; while the sovereignty of fact and the supremacy of common sense, incarnated in the "Encyclopædia," barred out the visions of the imagination and the insight of intuition. In this formal world, from which all natural primary impulses were shut out, Herder appeared fresh from contact with the living sources of literature. He was saturated with the poetry of the Bible; he had drunk deep at the springs of Homer, Shakespeare, and the English ballads. He was under the spell of the freshest and most creative spirit ever expressed in literature; a spirit instinctively artistic in every expression of itself, and yet without a touch of self-consciousness. Nowhere has the soul of man spoken with such perfect simplicity and sincerity, and consequently with such sublime eloquence, as in the pages of the Bible, of Homer, and of Shakespeare. Herder exchanged the old-fashioned French garden, with its deformed trees and intrusive orderliness, for the bloom of the open field. Literature was no artificial product to him; it was a natural growth; its roots were in the heart of man; it was the voice of man's need and suffer-

ings and hopes. From the conventional ideas and standards of his time he turned to the profound conception of literature as a growth, an unforced and authoritative utterance of the soul. He returned to nature, in the well-worn phrase; to nature as he found it in primitive ages, and in men whose simplicity and sincerity were still untouched by conventionalism. "Poetry in those happy days," he declared, "lived in the ears of the people, on the lips and in the harps of living bards; it sang of history, of the events of the day, of mysteries, miracles, and signs. It was the flower of a nation's character, language, and country, of its occupations, its prejudices, its passions, its aspirations, and its soul." The epic was to Herder "the living history of the people;" the *Lied*, or song, was not a poem of the study and the *salon*; it was a natural melody out of the heart of a passion or sentiment. The fable was not a calculated setting of moral truth in story form; it was "the poetical illustration of a lesson of experience by means of a characteristic trait, drawn from animal life, and developed by analogy." "Analogy is the parent of poetry in fables, not abstraction, still less a dry deduction from the general to the particular." Herder opposed to the mechanical conception of literature, then almost universally held, the vital conception; he recognized the distinctive quality of genius, because he emphasized the spontaneous element in all great poetry; he discerned the parallelism between literary and historical development. The significant word with him was "growth;" because growth implies natural process as opposed to mechanical process, spontaneous impulse as opposed to conscious action, genius as opposed to artifice, the individual soul as opposed to abstract ideas. Goethe expressed Herder's fundamental idea when he said: "Everything that man undertakes to produce, whether by action, word, or in whatsoever way, ought to spring from the union of all his faculties." It is this deep, unconscious expression of the totality of man's experience and nature which pervades the greatest works of literature, and makes them the most authoritative works of history we possess. They record the progress of that education of the soul for which the world stands.

Herder performed for literature the service which Winckelmann performed for antique art: he discovered its natural history, and set it in normal relations with the totality of human thought and achievement. And what he had done for literature he did also for history. He substituted a natural and vital for an artificial and mechanical conception. He grasped the great idea of de-

velopment, so familiar to us and so fruitful of fresher and deeper views of things. "Up to this time," says a German writer, reported by Hillebrand, from whom these quotations are made, "the most mechanical teleology had reigned in the philosophy of history. Providence was represented to have created cork-trees that men should have wherewith to stop their bottles." Herder saw that the laws which govern the life of men in the world are written in the very constitution of the soul, and are not arbitrary regulations impressed from without; that history records the unfolding of germs and forces which were within the soul at the beginning, not a series of interferences and interruptions; and that these germs are developed under conditions fixed by law, and part, therefore, of the very structure of nature. "The God I look for in history," he said, "must be the same as the God of nature; for man is but a tiny particle of the whole, and the history of mankind resembles that of the worm, closely connected with the tissue it inhabits; therefore the natural laws by which the Deity reveals itself must reign in man likewise. . . . The whole history of humanity is pure, natural history of human forces, actions, and instincts, according to time and place." If Herder meant in these words to shut out the constant inflow of spiritual influences into human history, we may well part company with him; but the emphasis of his statement and its deep significance are to be found in the fact that he vitalized history, as he had vitalized literature, by putting a natural process of growth in the place of a mechanical process; thus making history a living expression of the character of man, — a continuous revelation of the laws and forces of life.

Those only who understand how widespread and deep-rooted were mechanical and arbitrary ideas in the last century can understand how tremendous a revelation was implicit in the changes of thought thus rapidly sketched, — a revolution which has affected every department of knowledge, and has reorganized it along new and deeper lines. Carlyle once said to Bayard Taylor that Goethe had been his saviour. There was a characteristic exaggeration in the statement; but it had this truth at the bottom, that at a time when the young Scotch thinker found himself forced to part company with the narrow and arid conception of life and humanity, as so vitiated by corruption as to be not only entirely untrustworthy, but dissevered and broken into fragments, the buoyant naturalism of Goethe, affirming the divine origin and destiny of all created things, the soundness and healthfulness of nature and

man, the unity and dignity of history and knowledge, and consequently the authority of history, literature, and art as a revelation of both human and divine, put solid ground under him, and gave him a rational and harmonious view of things, — a view which included and made room for every form of human activity. It is very interesting to the reader of Goethe to-day to discover how generally the intellectual movement of this century is reflected in his pages, and how profoundly sympathetic his mind was with the broad and within certain limits healthy and fruitful naturalism which pervades contemporary thought. The nature of man was to Goethe the one authoritative and authentic revelation, and he refused to reject any part of that revelation. History, literature, art, religion, — these all expressed what man has been and has become by virtue of the evolution of his personality under the established conditions of life. The natural history of man is written in his works, and together they form the trustworthy record and disclosure of his nature.

It will be seen, from this brief statement, that Winckelmann, Herder, and Goethe held certain fundamental ideas in common, and these ideas will be found to be fundamental in modern criticism. The perception of the truth that literature is, in large measure, conditioned on the development, the surroundings, and the character of the men who create it; that the vast and varied movement of humanity recorded in history is a development, a progressive unfolding, a coherent expression of man's nature; and that literature, as a part of this vast movement, represents a growth, a vital process, and is, therefore, a part of the discovery of himself which man is making as his supreme achievement in life, — these are the informing ideas of the modern critical movement. The epoch of purely textual criticism has long passed away; that work has been transferred mainly, if not entirely, to the scholars. Æsthetic criticism, on the other hand, has been immensely enriched and stimulated by the application to literature of the ideas which have been set forth; never in the history of letters has there been so much criticism of the highest order as during the present century. When it was seen that no literary work is detached from the totality of human achievement; that no work represents individual gift, skill, or experience alone; that in every real book humanity speaks out of and to its own heart, — the feeling toward literature was immensely deepened and freshened. Æsthetic criticism formerly concerned itself wholly with the fidelity of a work to standards already set up by the creations of acknowledged masters; this

was the kind of criticism which was practiced in England and on the continent at the close of the last and the beginning of the present century. It was assumed that the last word had been spoken concerning the art of writing ; that the final canons had been announced, and the final standards and models given to the world. A new work must conform to these standards or suffer condemnation ; lack of conformity meant lack of art. Now, the very idea of literature as a growth, as an expression of the continually unfolding life of man, involves not only the possibility, but the certainty, of change and expansion. New forms of expression must be born with the new thoughts and experiences which they are to clothe. The permanent element in literature is not form but spirit ; not a particular manner, but perfection of manner ; not uniformity of execution, but endless variety, stamped always with supreme excellence. There are flawless models, but they are for inspiration, not for imitation ; they fix the standard of quality, but they liberate the hand which they inspire.

This was, perhaps, the first great change effected by the modern way of looking at literature, and the extent and significance of that change can be seen by comparing the criticism of Voltaire with that of Sainte-Beuve ; the criticism of Dr. Johnson with that of Matthew Arnold. The older view of literature involved the idea of a fixed and formal set of laws constituting an art ; the later view involves the growth of literature with the growth of man, the essential element being, not conformity to a rigid order of form, but soundness and veracity of thought, and beauty and flexibility of expression. Dr. Johnson could understand Dryden because Dryden was a conformist, in letter if not in spirit ; but Shakespeare belonged to another order, and demanded a breadth and catholicity which Dr. Johnson could not bring to his magical pages. Mr. Arnold, on the other hand, can perceive the literary quality shared in common by men as diverse as Wordsworth and Shelley, as Byron and Tolstoi. The criticism represented by Mr. Arnold, even when it limits itself to æsthetic quality alone, is informed with modern ideas ; with the ideas which Herder and his contemporaries were the first to see clearly and to apply profoundly. No man studies a star as a solitary world ; though he shut all other stars out of the field of observation, the heavens still move about the shining point which he has isolated. A modern critic approaches a work of literature with certain ideas which are a part of his intellectual life. He cannot, if he would, detach a writer from his age, his race, humanity : all these are present in

every study which he makes ; they are involved in every conclusion which he reaches ; they contribute to every judgment which he pronounces.

The older criticism, the criticism based on standards which were supposed to be exact and final, must in the nature of things have continued to be a derivative and secondary growth ; a body of writing related to the original work of which it treated, very much as the parasite is related to the trunk from which it draws its life. But for the development of the ideas which have been emphasized, criticism as we know it could never have been. For when we study this criticism as a whole, we become aware that it is originaive and not secondary work ; and that criticism as a literary form has as deep a root, and is as clearly related to human growth and experience as the epic, the drama, or any other form of distinctively creative work. The extent to which this form has been used by men of literary genius of late years, and the perfection to which it has been brought, indicate clearly that there is behind it a primary impulse, — an impulse which seeks it as something normal, adequate, and akin to the spirit and thought of the day. It is sometimes said that the great place in contemporary literature occupied by criticism is evidence of the decline of the creative impulse, and that the originaive forces are evidently spent. This class of comment is familiar to all students of literature, who have read again and again the announcement of a similar decay of art because some new form of expression had begun to press hard upon the old in importance and influence. The literary instinct, like every kind of artistic instinct, is characterized by the greatest sensitivism ; men select forms of expression rarely as the result of deliberation ; the form comes generally with the message which it is to contain, or the significant fact which it is to express. If a literary form attracts a great number of fine minds at a given time, this fact of itself raises the presumption that the attractive power lies in some deep and real affinity between this particular form and the intellectual and spiritual conditions of the time. Without consideration of the contents of modern criticism, the fact that so many minds of the highest class have made it their chief means of self-expression ought to put us on guard against any conclusion involving its rank as an original contribution to literature. That men of the order of Coleridge, Carlyle, Sainte-Beuve, and Arnold have chosen criticism as the method of expression best fitted to convey their convictions and conclusions is a sufficient answer to those who regard it as a sec-

ondary form, and refuse to recognize it as original and first-hand work. Not exhaustion of creative impulse, but change of direction, is indicated by the attractiveness of criticism to modern minds; not a decline of force, but the application of force through a new instrument.

The inductive method has proved too fruitful and become too familiar to be limited in its uses to the natural sciences; it has affected all our thinking, and has become part of the intellectual inheritance of the man of letters. The scientific spirit has invaded literature to the extent of emphasizing the importance of a clear comprehension of all the elements that enter into a work of literary art so far as they are discoverable. The secret of the splendid vitality of the *Odyssey* eludes all search, but we recognize it the more clearly now that we have learned so much about the Greek life and character out of which it issued and in which it was embosomed. But this spirit, in its devotion to reality and its instinct for getting to the bottom of things, could not rest in any isolated study of literary works; it must study literature as a whole, determine its rank and place, and interpret its significance in the totality of human development. It is in the body of modern critical writing that we discover the response of the literary mind to the methods and spirit of science. The absorbing search of science is for the fact, and the law behind the fact; it fashions nothing; it waits with infinite patience on discovery. Now, the end of criticism is, to this extent, identical with the end of science; it is to discover and lay bare the fact and the law behind it. Is this work true to the fact, the law? is its first question; and the answer involves a clear discernment of the truth of idea or experience which the writer has sought to represent under the form of art, and also a clear perception of the law of beauty to which it must conform if it contain the indefinable quality of art. Thus, as its most immediate and direct result, criticism discovers the presence or absence of soundness of substance and perfection of form.

But there is another and more comprehensive question which criticism asks. The work which it studies must conform to something, but it must also reveal something; it must disclose a certain order and beauty of workmanship, but it must also discover its connection with an ultimate order to which every real expression of man's soul bears witness. When Matthew Arnold defines poetry as a criticism of life, he indicates that which is behind all literature, whether in verse or prose; that which supplies its in-

spiration and furnishes its unfailing test. What is soundness of substance but fidelity to the fact and law of life? A work of art is sound only when it is true to nature and experience; it may possess the very highest beauty, but if, like some of Shelley's longer poems, it lacks reality, truth to experience or to ideals which are the projection of experience, we are compelled to assign it a lower rank. It is defective in that quality which is, so far as substance is concerned, the supreme quality of the really great work of art. And what is perfection of form but fidelity to those laws of art never put on tables of stone, but indelibly written in the soul by the hand whose vast creation follows ever the line of beauty? The fact and the law of life and art, — these are the realities for which criticism, consciously or unconsciously, is always searching. These form what Fichte called "the divine idea of the world," which "lies at the bottom of all appearance." Herder, Goethe, Hildebrand, and Grimm; Sainte-Beuve and Scherer; Coleridge, Carlyle, Arnold, Dowden, and Hutton; Emerson and Lowell; the great company of those who have pursued criticism for the highest ends, — have each and all disclosed the power of these ideas upon their work. They have fashioned a new form of literature, and one perfectly adapted to the intellectual methods and tendencies of the age, — a form through which the creative impulse, following the scientific method, but in the truest literary spirit, works with a freedom and power which attest the adaptation of the instrument to the task. Perfection of form is nowhere more perfectly illustrated than in the best critical writing; in which the more imposing qualities of order, proportion, gradation, are combined with marvelous delicacy of touch, refinement of characterization, subtlety and keenness of insight. While for soundness of substance, loyalty to law and fact, where shall we find nobler examples of intellectual rectitude, veracity, and wholesome reliance on the authority of truth? *Æsthetic* criticism was never more widely and disinterestedly practiced; the element of art in every literary product was never more strongly emphasized; but behind all this a larger truth is always in view. Modern criticism has given us a new conception of literature. Studying comprehensively the vast material which has come to its hand, discerning clearly the law of growth behind all art, and the interdependence and unity of all human development, it has given us an interpretation of literature which is nothing less than another chapter in the revelation of life. This is its real contribution to civilization; this is the achievement which stamps it

as creative work. The epic described adequately and nobly the stir and movement of an objective age; the drama represented the relations of men to the powers above them, and to the organized social and moral forces about them; criticism, in the hands of the great writers, discloses the law and the fact of art and life as these final realities are revealed through literature.

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NEW YORK CITY.

THE PRESENT RELIGIOUS CRISIS IN JAPAN.

"CHRISTIAN work in Japan," wrote a missionary, "is more difficult now than it was a few years ago," and such is a common experience among the Christian preachers who have labored in the field for the past few years. We see that, notwithstanding the increase of the Christian workers by forty-six, the total number of the converts of last year was less by almost one thousand than that of the preceding year. Again we see that, while the preaching was more successfully carried on in the more recently started places under the junior preachers, the older preachers, generally speaking, were rather dull and sleeping. And again we see that even some missionaries felt obliged to take up the indirect work of education, as their direct work of preaching the gospel was circumscribed by both external and internal circumstances. These, and many other facts of a similar nature, seem to confirm the statement made by a missionary in that field when he wrote, "The work of missions is on the eve of a crisis in Japan."

The present difficulty in the Christian work in Japan is almost universally recognized; and I see no reason why this difficulty will not increase, if something is not done to prevent it. Missionary work is on the eve of a crisis. No! we are already in the beginning of the crisis itself. What is the nature of this crisis? What are its causes? Why has it come now instead of some years ago, or some years later on? What are the best means with which to meet this crisis? As to its causes, I think there are many, and in the following pages I will attempt to present some important ones as well as I can.

I. The causes of the present religious crisis, which are common to all the Christian workers.

If more minutely investigated, there may be many more, but I will content myself with six causes, and of these, the first four have been more or less considered, but the last two, which are really much stronger, seem not to have been duly noticed.

1. The first cause of the difficulty in preaching the gospel at present in Japan is the fact that the general attention of our countrymen is engrossed by the interest in politics. If anything is important in the history of our country, it is the formation of the constitution and the organization of the parliament. The former was promulgated in the spring of 1889, and the latter met for the first time in November, 1890. The people were busy in discussing the nature and interpretation of the new constitution, in the election of delegates to the House of Representatives, and in reading reports of the parliamentary debates. It is natural that such occupation should divert the attention of our countrymen from religious questions. But this trouble is not very serious. Soon we will get over it.

2. The second cause is the general anti-foreign spirit aroused by certain events occurring before and after the delay of the treaty revision, which may in itself be regarded as the exciting cause of this strong feeling. I can here only allude to these circumstances. As to the delay of the treaty revision, this cannot but strengthen the anti-foreign spirit. Christianity is the religion of foreigners, in the thought of the common people. In spite of the effort of some missionaries for the favorable result of the treaty revision, they were said to be acting against it, or meddling with the things with which they have nothing to do. The result is the difficulty of getting men to listen to Christianity, the gospel of the common brotherhood of mankind. But this also is a mere temporary feeling, and there are already some symptoms of its subsidence.

3. The third cause is the misunderstanding and misapplication of the Emperor's Rescript on morals, which was proclaimed last November. It cannot be denied that this Rescript¹ implies some Shintoistic element, and also that it has some phraseology of the Confucian morality. From the nature of the case, this is natural and inevitable. But this fact led some Shintoists to conjecture that it is a sign of the establishment of Shintoism as the state religion, and also led some Confucian scholars to infer that it means the adoption of the Confucian system as the standard of national morality. Such a misunderstanding made a wrong im-

¹ Translated in *The Missionary Herald*, Boston, April, 1891.

pression upon the popular mind, namely, that the government is going to adopt the anti-Christian principle. But this is a great mistake. All that the Rescript can and does mean is nothing more or less than the importance of moral education emphasized. The freedom of faith is the guiding principle of our government, and is positively guaranteed in our constitution. As to the question why this Rescript was proclaimed at that time, I can only offer this explanation, that the introduction and gradually felt influence of Western institutions, both good and evil, were in danger of overturning the existing state of things, together with a relaxation of national morality. To prevent this, the Rescript was passed. It can never mean anything else. Still it is a real fact that its misunderstanding is unfavorable to the cause of the Christian ministry.

4. The fourth cause is the growing effort on the part of Buddhists to hinder the advancement of the Christian cause. It may be strange to those who do not know the real state of things that Buddhism has such a strong influence against Christianity, whereas nothing whatever of its influence is recognized in the Emperor's Rescript. Shintoism and Confucianism have some reason to make a claim in their favor from this Rescript, while Buddhism has nothing in it. But Buddhists are not anxious about it, and Shintoism and Confucianism do not consider it to be a disregard of Buddhism at all. The existence and influence of Buddhism is taken for granted, and there is no need of referring to it. It is the popular religion, although no one can deny that it is losing its influence as a religion among the educated people. As it is a religion, it is not even referred to in the Rescript, the object of which is only to enforce the importance of moral education; and again, as it is a religion, it offers a strong opposition to Christianity. The increase of Christians is so far the decrease of Buddhist believers. The prosperity of Christianity in Japan means the decline of Buddhism. Thus Buddhist priests are resorting to every means to hinder the spread of Christianity, and to maintain the supremacy of their religion. They publish newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets. They establish schools both for boys and for girls. They go out preaching, and try to dissuade those who are in danger of embracing the new, foreign faith. They prohibit burying the bodies of Christians in their graveyards, which often causes a great inconvenience. With the progress of Christianity, these efforts of Buddhists also seem to increase. Thus this cannot but be another reason for the difficulty of Christian work.

5. The fifth cause is the underlying and far-reaching influence of the anti-Christian attitude of those who stand in prominent and very influential positions in our Empire. There are various classes among them. (a.) The first class includes those who are learned in Buddhistic philosophy, who are found both among Buddhist priests and also among the laity. Some of them are teachers in our Imperial University, some are standing in high official positions, and others are influential leaders in our political world. (b.) The second class includes those who follow the moral and philosophical teachings of Confucius and other Chinese sages. This is a very numerous class. In fact, the most of those who are over forty years of age, and are said to be learned, are learned in nothing else than in this Chinese learning. Among officials as well as among teachers, this class is more numerous and more influential even than the first class. (c.) The third class is composed of those who studied the Western sciences and philosophy, and were influenced by the materialism of J. S. Mill, the positivism of Auguste Comte, the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer, the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and by many other *isms* of other masters. Under this class also may be included those who were unfavorably influenced by certain ceremonies or certain dogmas of some Christian churches. Of course this sort of men is not very numerous; still their influence on the mind of the younger and educated class of the people is very strong indeed. From the nature of the case, the direct influence of the positive anti-Christian attitude of these several classes is very injurious to the cause of Christianity. (d.) Moreover, there is still another large class of eminent men who profess to be entirely indifferent to any religious matters. Indirectly, the influence of their indifferentism is often as strong as the direct preaching against Christianity.

6. The last but not least of the causes of the present crisis is the general doubt among the common people whether Christianity is worthy and substantial enough to be adopted. What produced this general doubt? I answer, Christianity itself, or, more properly, the different forms or sects under which it has appeared in our country. (a.) We have the three great divisions of Christianity: Romanism, Nicholaism, and Protestantism. At first, even these grand distinctions were not recognized, and Protestantism was often reproached with the defects and mistakes of the two Catholicisms. But gradually this trouble was passed over. (b.) The second trouble was about the many different sects of Protestantism itself, which now numbers some thirty. Each sect has its

peculiarities, and the people, even the Christians, were perplexed by the abundance and differences of these sects. But the thoughtful mind soon came to see the point, that although these sects differ in some minute details, still most of them agree in the essential doctrines and practices. (I say still there are many who have not reached this conclusion. Indeed, there are many who do not know even the difference between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, just as here in America many people do not know that Japan is an independent country distinct from China.) (c.) But the third and fatal trouble was caused by the introduction of the New Liberal Theology from Germany, and Unitarianism and Universalism from America. The Orthodox churches teach Christianity in one way, the German missionaries teach it in another way. Unitarians and Universalists teach it still in another way. Not only do the teachings of these different bodies differ from each other, but often they contradict even the doctrines which were hitherto supposed to be essential and immutable. The natural consequence of such fatal contradictions upon the popular mind is the conclusion that, if Christianity is so disputable and unsettled even in its central doctrines, it is probably not worthy and substantial enough to be exchanged for the religious systems which our fathers and grandfathers used to believe. This conclusion is quite natural, and also, to some extent, excusable, on the part of the people who do not know anything about Christianity. But such a conclusion is very unfavorable for Christianity. Conservatism as well as Liberalism is much obstructed by this widespread prejudice.

II. The causes of the present religious crisis, which are special to the Orthodox theology of the conservative bodies. For the sake of convenience, let me classify all that I have to say on this subject under four headings.

1. The first cause of this special difficulty encountered by the conservatives is the New Liberal Theology of the German missionaries. The first missionary of this body arrived in our country in the autumn of 1885, and in the autumn of 1887 its first church was organized. The next year its theological school was started, and in November, 1889, its magazine, the "Shinri" (The Truth), was begun. This magazine is widely circulated among both Christians and those interested in Christianity. It is able, learned, and influential. Its writers are the German missionaries and some of their converts. Although this body was opposed as

radical or heretical, yet its preachers were calm and cautious. They were attacked, but they did not attack others. They knew and adhered to their primary mission to preach the gospel of Christ. They avoided theological discussions as long as possible, for they were not willing to disturb the Christian work of the other denominations. This noble and wise spirit of the German missionaries ought to be acknowledged, if one knows the peaceful method of preaching they have followed, and the generous attitude which the articles of its organ clearly show forth. This body is gradually getting strength. Although its theological school has only half a dozen students, yet the influence of the school, the magazine, and the preaching is powerful. Now there are more than two hundred converts. Concerning their theological views, as they are much different from the other Christian bodies, they cannot avoid sooner or later a collision with them. But it is a great mistake to confuse their New Liberal Theology with rationalism, or to regard them as mere followers of the Tübingen school. In a word, they are more constructive than destructive. The reasons why these missionaries are influential and successful are, first, because they have the knowledge of comparative religion, and thus the knowledge of the real points of the superiority of Christianity over other existing religions; secondly, because their theology represents the critical and historical investigation of the philosophy of religion in Germany for more than a hundred years; thirdly, because their intellectual ability, their noble attitude, and their religious spirit command the love and admiration even of their opponents.

2. The second cause is the introduction of Unitarianism and Universalism from America. The former was introduced in the autumn of 1887, two years after the introduction of the New Liberal Theology from Germany, while the latter was introduced in the spring of 1890. In the March of 1890, the Unitarians started their magazine, "The Unitarian," and their first church was organized in the autumn of the same year, which now has about forty members. It has no school of its own, but some say it has something to do with one of the most influential schools (politically) in Japan. On the other hand, the Universalists are laying the foundation for their theological school; and the dedication of their first new church building was celebrated last Christmas, if the report is reliable; but they have no organ, as far as I know. As to the nature of these two liberal denominations I would not say much, for they were imported from this country,

and their nature and differences are better known here than in Japan. But I feel that I ought to add a few words concerning their relation, especially that of Unitarianism, to the Orthodox denominations. At any rate, they are different from, and often contradictory to, the theological opinions of the evangelical churches. They are more liberal, or more radical. A writer in the "*Shinri*" says: "Men often identify our (the German missionaries') position and Mr. Knapp's Unitarianism, but this is a mistake. Mr. Knapp teaches the old Rationalism, while we teach the New Liberal Theology. We do not aim at destruction, but our greatest object is construction." And the same writer says again: "Mr. Spinner (one of the German missionaries) and others make the New Liberal Theology their foundation, but Mr. Knapp teaches Rationalism (compare Mr. Schmiedel's article), and also the relation of his position with Atheism, Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism seems not to have been sufficiently clear." In the article referred to in this quotation, we find the distinction between Rationalism and the critical New Theology clearly and philosophically discussed. Let me translate a few passages out of this article. "Rationalism," says Mr. Schmiedel, another of the German missionaries, "makes Christ a teacher of morality, a man of wisdom and virtue, a saint or sage, as Socrates or Confucius. But the Liberal Theology makes Christ the unparalleled revelation of the love of God, for the history of the world made a great advancement with Christ, and the feeling and will of Christ reveals God as perfectly as possible to man. Rationalism makes religion only a human matter, and regards it as a relation originated by God, who is outside of the universe; but the Liberal Theology makes religion, which is in the human heart, to originate by the revelation of God and caused by the inspiration of the Divine Spirit. In a word, Rationalism makes religion a purely human relation, while the New Liberal Theology makes religion a mutual relation of God and man." And in his conclusion he says: "Rationalism does essentially negative and destructive work, while the Liberal Theology proceeds positively and constructively." I am not sure whether or not Mr. Schmiedel means hereby to identify Rationalism with Unitarianism; but the only intention of my quoting these passages is to show just what impression this German missionary got of the Unitarianism of Japan. Unitarianism is more radical and more destructive than the New Liberal Theology. Yet, from another point of view, this progressive attitude of the Unitarians is a benefit in one way or the other to the religious

thought of our people, while at the same time its effect upon the cause of the Orthodox theology is more unfavorable than that of the New Liberal Theology.

3. The third cause is the liberal movement in the Orthodox churches themselves. As to the origin of this movement, we do right if we distinguish its hidden development and its final manifestation. The hidden source of this movement is found in the dissatisfaction on the part of some Christians and preachers concerning the emphasis laid upon the traditional dogmas by the strict Orthodox theology. In one sense, this feeling may be said to be as old as the introduction of Christianity in Japan. Still its power was weak. But with the growth of Christianity this element of dissatisfaction was also gradually growing, though not noticed by every one. This may be shown by the following fact. Two years ago a graduate of our Imperial University attended the summer school which was held in one of the principal missionary centres, and came back in disappointment, exclaiming, "I had expected something better, but to my astonishment I found there only the theology of the seventeenth century." At last the time has come when the influence of the New Liberal Theology begins to be felt; and when the Unitarian preachers announced their radical opinions, the reaction, which was not till then strong enough to take shape without some external impulse, made a bold step to assert itself. The one who first gave voice to this cause, and who is now fighting as its champion, is one of the influential pastors of an Orthodox denomination, and he began this movement by publishing his thoughts in the spring of 1890, right after his return home from a trip of religious investigation in Europe and America. This new movement, as I said above, is very much indebted for its actual appearance to the German as well as Unitarian missionaries, if not for its materials, at least for its courage in self-assertion. And exactly what this movement is, it is not very easy now to say. It claims to be a liberal movement in theology, and some thought it to be more allied in its general spirit with the New Liberal Theology of the German missionaries. In fact this new movement is not fully developed yet. The "*Riku-go-zasshi*" (The Universe) and "*The Christian*" may be regarded as its organs, for they are busy discussing the subject. In a word, this new movement may be summed up in the phrase, "*A Japanese Christianity for Japan.*" To show its general character I will make some extracts here. "As far as Christianity enters into our country," says the champion alluded to, "it must be built

upon the foundation of the existing native civilization and upon the influence of Buddhism and Confucianism." "The view that the Bible is the most important book containing divine truth, but is at the same time a human book, and therefore, like everything else pertaining to men, imperfect, — such a view will gradually be accepted by mankind." Another writer in the "*Riku-go-zasshi*" gives a very interesting article, setting forth the general spirit of this new movement. I will give a digest of some portions of it, for the original is too long for my present purpose: "Whether we regard one God as manifesting himself under three different forms, or the three personalities as existing in one God, this has very little to do with the life of our faith. Whether we regard Christ as God, or as man in whom God was revealed, this has nothing to do with our salvation. Whether we regard the death of Christ as a vicarious offering for redemption, or as the mere proof of God's love, such speculation is not essential to our spiritual life. Whether we are to be punished for the sin of our first parents or not is not as important as the fact that we are sinners, and therefore we must repent in order to be saved. One regards the Bible as an infallible book, while the other regards it as fallible, and yet as containing the truth which leads us to salvation. This makes no difference. All that is important is to observe the commandments given in the Bible, to love God, to love Christ, to die to sins, and to repent of our transgressions. 'Therefore if one sincerely loves God, loves Christ, and loves his brothers, according to the commandments, then, to what sect he may belong, or whatever may be his theological opinions, I will surely call him a true Christian.' " Such seems to me to be the general feature of the liberal movement of the Orthodox Church in Japan. Just how large a proportion of the evangelical churches comes under that movement is not plain. But the fact is clear that some missionaries are somewhat troubled on account of this movement. But, if properly understood, there will be no reason for such anxiety, for the leaders of this liberal movement are generally the men of deep religious spirit, and they will never go astray from their faith in Christ as the Saviour from God.

4. The fourth and last cause of the special difficulty in the cause of the Orthodox theology is the general confusion or embarrassment felt among the Christians and preachers as to the essence of Christianity. I mean by preachers mainly the native preachers, for the foreign missionaries are not, under the circumstances, to be affected by such trouble. These native preachers were preach-

ing the trinity of God, the divinity of Christ, the vicarious redemption, the infallibility of the Bible, and so forth, as the essential, vital doctrines of Christianity, just as they were taught. But now they have found out that these doctrines are altogether rejected, or are regarded as unessential by some other forms of Christianity. What will be the result of such a discovery? Take, for instance, the doctrine of the infallibility of the Bible. This is one of the most essential doctrines of the Orthodox theology, because all other doctrines are, so to speak, founded and built upon the words of the Bible. But this doctrine itself is called in question. Take the doctrine of the divinity of our Lord. This is also one of the most important doctrines of evangelical theology, because the trinity of the Godhead, the sinlessness of Christ, original sin, the miracles and resurrection of Christ, and others, are dependent upon this central doctrine, either as their premise or as their authority. But this is also called in question. Thus the foundation-stones seem to them to be crumbling away. How can the elaborate superstructure of their theology support itself without these foundation-stones? If these preachers had a full Christian experience, and a full knowledge of historical Christianity, as among the Christians of Europe and America, they might stand firmly in their faith. But they have no such backing. Moreover, it is a fact that these doctrines, as such, are not very easy to believe, especially for those who try to see Christianity in its intellectual and moral aspects. If these doctrines are presented in their metaphysical forms, detached from the living religious experience, they are often the greatest stumbling-blocks in getting men to accept Christianity, and after they are believed, this belief is merely formal and mechanical. Our native preachers were in such a condition. Some of them had not yet a full Christian experience, while others felt some difficulties with these doctrines. Then they heard the view that these doctrines are not essential to Christianity. What can be the effect of this but the feeling of relief, on the one hand, on account of the removal of this difficulty, and, on the other hand, the doubt whether there is anything essentially worthy left in Christianity, if all these are removed? Some lose the foundation for their faith. Some do not know what to preach to their congregations. Some cannot preach anything with boldness and confidence. Such doubt and such uncertainty seem to have been one of the strongest causes, if not the strongest, of the present stagnation of the spirit of preaching among many of the preachers of the Orthodox type.

These are the causes which make the task of the evangelical theology specially hard at present. These four special causes, together with the six common causes, are the things to be well considered by those who are working in the field and by those who are preparing themselves for the work, and by those who are interested in the work and supporting it, and by all those who pray for the real success of Christianity in helping men to love God and to love men. Unitarians or Universalists can do a good work there if only they know how to do it. We want them to do some positive work. Sometimes destruction is necessary, but even then that destruction must be for the construction of something. The evangelical preachers and the German missionaries should not attempt merely to impose their own opinions. They ought to have a nobler purpose. Indeed, they have it, and hence they ought to subordinate everything else to that first and last aim of their missions.

III. Thus we have a religious crisis, and I have tried to present some of its important causes. The next question is, How to meet this crisis? What is the best and most successful way? Is there any such method at all? Different persons may give different answers. As for me, I have what I call the *qualification method*, that is, the consideration of the qualifications for those who work in this field of evangelization. It may be said that this method is too indirect and cannot meet the impending emergency, or that it is too difficult, and there is no hope of its realization. I know its indirectness and difficulty. Still, as I see no better method, I will try to present it. According to this, there are three groups of the qualifications, which are not only important but indispensable for the great and successful work, in the future as well as in the present of Japan; and all of these qualifications have been suggested by the circumstances connected with the missionary work of all the denominations existing in our country.

1. The first qualification, or rather the first group of qualifications, essential for successful missionary work in Japan is a sufficient knowledge of comparative religion. In Japan there are many systems of religion and philosophy already existing. Buddhism is the popular religion, and the Hindoo philosophy is, to some extent, taught and studied. Confucianism was the standard of the national morality, and the Chinese philosophy is still one of the most favorite studies of our educated brethren.

Moreover, we have our native religion, called Shintoism.¹ How can one preach Christianity adequately and successfully in a country like Japan, without some knowledge of comparative religion? The importance and necessity of such a study seems to have been made clear by the collision of these existing religions with Christianity, especially after the introduction of liberal Christian denominations. The German missionaries positively declared the importance of this study among Christian preachers, and some of the missionary schools seem to begin to follow this advice. As they say, the study of comparative religion is indispensable for Christian preachers, for the three following reasons: (a.) The first reason is the fact that one cannot know the real superiority of Christianity without the knowledge of the other great religions of the world. To speak of all other religions as false religions simply testifies to one's own ignorance of the history of the philosophy of religion and of the nature of these other religions. They may be imperfect or irrational, but they cannot be wholly false, as they are sometimes called, because they are the natural outgrowth of the religious spirit of those times and countries in which they have flourished. They must be studied fairly and thoroughly. Their characteristics must be investigated. Their good sides must be recognized more strongly and more clearly. To compare their evil sides with the good sides of Christianity is not a fair method for the discovery of the real points of the superiority of the Christian religion above all these other religions. (b.) The second reason is the fact that such a fair comparison and discovery of the real superiority of Christianity is the only thing which can give a firm foundation to those believers who are not prejudiced by circumstances. One may believe such and such to be the essential and distinctive doctrine of Christianity. But if he is told that such doctrine is also found in another religion, it is natural for him that his thought will be more or less disturbed in this respect. If he has an unprejudiced mind, and if what he is told is true, I see no reason why his faith should be affected. The study of comparative religion will give not only the foundation for a firm belief, but also the best means by which one can get rid of his religious prejudices. This is almost an unutterable blessing to an ordinary Christian, and an indispensable equipment for ministers. (c.) The third reason is the fact that only by such a study can one be properly qualified

¹ As to the nature of these systems, see the article, "The Future Religion in Japan," in the *Unitarian Review* for February, 1891.

for preaching Christianity among those who believe in the other systems of religion. Suppose one does not know the fair superiority of Christianity, and tries to preach Christianity among the educated class of the Japanese, who know much about Buddhism and Confucianism. How can he succeed in his preaching? The chance for his success is the minimum, while in all probability his effort to preach Christianity will end in his being disregarded, if not despised, by his hearers. If, on the other hand, the preacher has some knowledge of these other systems, he has the key with which to open the heart of such men from the twilight of the dawn to the bright light of the midday sun. Thus, for the preacher and for the hearer, some knowledge, if possible a thorough knowledge, of comparative religion is an indispensable qualification.

2. The second qualification is this, that the preacher must be familiar with the modern religious and theological tendency of the world, and also with that of Japan. One must be well acquainted with the results of modern scientific investigations and their influence upon theology. One must have a clear knowledge of church history and of the development of Christian doctrines. Again, one must be acquainted with the general history and modern tendency of the philosophy of religion. And, again, one must be familiar not only with the Christian philosophy, but also with the anti-Christian philosophy, if he tries to do a good and successful work among our educated classes, for, as I have said above, the sciences and philosophy of the West have a very strong foothold among them. As these educated people are intellectually and politically governing our nation, if the preachers are powerful and successful among them, they may fairly be said to be powerful and successful among the whole nation. But if the preachers are not honored by the educated classes as to their ability, learning, character, and spirit, their success amounts to very little, although they may have such success among the common people. Of course, I do not mean to say that the preachers must have such and such views in theology or philosophy, for this cannot always be demanded. All I say is, they must be familiar with the modern scientific, philosophical, and theological tendencies. Nothing is more lamentable than narrow-mindedness and ignorance. What I set forth here under this head may seem to some to be demanding too much. Certainly it is demanding a good deal, but without some such qualification there is no lasting success in the missionary work in Japan. In this connection I may add a few

words concerning the positive good which the German, Unitarian, and Universalist missionaries are doing in Japan for the cause of Christianity in general. I have already spoken of their favorable influence upon the growth of the liberal movement among the native Christians. The positive good of which I have now to speak is not such a special one, but is of a far more general nature.

(a.) Among those educated in the Western sciences and philosophy, there are not a few who hold materialistic or agnostic views about God and man. But all these liberal or radical denominations of Christianity unanimously assert the knowability of God and the immortality of the human soul. (b.) Among those who are indifferent to any religion, or who are learned in the Confucian system of morals, religion is often regarded as a useless superstition, morality being all that they care for. But, again, all of these liberal bodies make a positive statement that religious belief is rational and indispensable. (c.) Among those who adhere to the existing systems of religion and morality, it is assumed that these systems are sufficient, and there is no need of adopting any foreign religion. But here, again, the superiority of Christianity, and hence the importance of its introduction, is positively and unanimously asserted by these different representatives of Christian liberalism. (d.) As these representatives are generally regarded as liberal or radical, their assertions usually find more access among the educated, and are very powerful in getting men over to Christianity. This is what I mean by the positive good which is contributed by these liberal denominations in favor of the general cause of Christianity in Japan.

3. The third and last qualification, which is in one sense the most important of these three, is the fact that the first and ultimate aim of the missionary work in view must be to *Christianize* Japan, but *not to foreignize* it. It is a fact that Japan has its own peculiar civilization; but it is also a fact that this civilization is in many respects far behind the Western civilization. Thus the necessity of the introduction of Western institutions was recognized. With other things, Christianity also made its appearance. We need Christianity. We believe and hope that it will become the religion of the whole nation. We are grateful for the self-sacrificing spirit of the missionaries, who for this cause left their homes and comforts. We hope and pray for their success, whether they may be German or Anglo-Saxon, conservative or liberal. But we have one thing to call their serious attention to, and that is this, please *Christianize* Japan, and that only.

It is a historical fact that Christianity has changed with its embracers, to some extent and within a certain limit. The Christianity of Peter is not exactly that of Paul. The Christianity of Greece is more or less influenced by Greek philosophy, while that of Rome was tinged by Latin legalism. The Christianity of Germany is speculative, while that of America is practical. Every nation, as well as every individual, has its own characteristics, while Christianity, on its side, has its peculiar flexibility toward these nation-characteristics, as far as they are not contradictory to itself. We Japanese also have these specific characteristics, and a civilization of our own. We need not cast off all these old garments in order to put on the new clothing called Christianity, for this clothing itself is not new, but has already passed through many countries as well as many centuries. All we want to do is to put on this clothing of Christianity cut in Japanese style as far as possible. We may reject all the Jewish, Greek, Latin, or Protestant traditions, or we may accept them all. This is a secondary question. What we want is the *essence* of Christianity, Christianity in its lowest terms. As to the minute sectarian differences in doctrine and ceremony, the best way is *not to emphasize* them as essential, but leave them to our own choice. It is not proper to force upon one who likes a frock-coat a cutaway, or to compel one who dislikes tea to take a strong cup. The clear distinction between the essentials and non-essentials of Christianity must be always kept in view.

Perhaps one may infer from what I have just stated, and ask, "Is it not sufficient for a preacher to have an earnest and intense zeal in preaching Christ and his gospel, although he may have no knowledge of comparative religion and the philosophy of religion?" Of course, when I say that the knowledge of comparative religion and familiarity with the modern religious and theological tendencies of the world are the indispensable qualifications of preachers, I do not mean that they alone will make good preachers. By no means. Often the reverse is the fact. Sometimes, and in some places, ignorant and unphilosophical men who have full Christian experience make good and successful preachers. This is a fact, I know; and, moreover, when I say that to Christianize must be the first and ultimate purpose of Christian work, I fully admit that this last is the most important of all the qualifications. To make show of one's own cheap erudition in comparative religion, or philosophy of religion, is nothing but a sign of one's own lack of the essential qualification.

To discuss with the believers of the other religions for the sake of discussion, or to attack the doctrines of other denominations simply to destroy their Christian work, is not the purpose for which this knowledge is wanted. But to do good and successful missionary work in a country where many other important religions of the world are existing; where modern science and philosophy are gradually finding their way; where the people in general have hardly any knowledge of what historical Christianity is, and what Christian experience consists of; and where the track must be first cleared of many obstacles to invite one to the truth and peace of Christianity, instead of believing before their removal, — these first two qualifications seem to me to be indispensable in addition to the last, especially to those who intend to carry Christianity among the educated classes of Japan. Still, even here, as elsewhere, the first and ultimate purpose of their whole effort must be to preach Christ and his gospel. The love of God and the love of man, the aspiration to transform this world of sin and sorrow into the kingdom of God, and the desire to preach the gospel of peace and joy to all the people of the world, must be the first and last impulse of those who go out to preach Christianity under the banner of the Lord God of hosts.

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WHAT IS REALITY?

PART XI. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

THE phrase *unconscious intelligence*, as applied to creative skill, is one that looks very much like a contradiction in terms; yet it has played a conspicuous part in the philosophy of our day, and cannot be ignored in a discussion like the present. Not that I have any wish to ignore it. On the contrary, the view of the world, of which it is in part the expression, seems to me to have contributed, in no small degree, to the building up of a real theism. It has been useful in something the same way that smoked glass is useful when we are looking at the sun. It has enabled philosophers to construct a natural theology with a calmness that is generally supposed to be impossible to the advocates of a personal, self-conscious Deity; and the results reached are

in no whit less valuable because unknown quantities have been employed in working out the problem.

Meaningless as the phrase above mentioned appears to be, it unquestionably has a meaning for those who make use of it. Its very incoherence points to some deadlock in thought, some apparent contradictoriness in facts, that tempts to a contradiction in terms for its expression. In the preceding number of this series we examined at some length a class of phenomena that seemed to be the exhibition of the fruits of intelligence in the absence of intelligence. Instinct, we said, has all the appearance of the outcome of a well-known process, minus the process. We saw, also, that the same appearance attaches to every important organic change that is seen to be in the direction of improvement. When an animal becomes possessed of new and elaborate adaptations that make it and its descendants better able to cope with the exigencies of life, there is a strong suggestion of intelligence somewhere, but it is impossible to discover in the immediate factors any subject to whom the intelligence can be referred.

As an explanation of this difficulty, the hypothesis which we are about to examine assumes that there are two kinds of intelligence, and that the whole cause of our mystification is to be traced to the circumstance that we have not been trained to the recognition of one of these kinds. However impossible the idea of unconscious intelligence may at first seem to us, we are obliged, it is said, when we study the phenomena of our own minds, to admit that it *must be* not only a reality, but that it must be a much more common and potent factor in our history than conscious intelligence.

That our consciousness extends over only a small part of the field of intelligent operation within us is said to be evident the moment we reflect upon the nature of those so-called simple perceptions of the external world that are the material of our conscious thought and reasoning. These perceptions seem *simple* to us only because we were not conscious of the process by which they were elaborated. We open our eyes upon the world, and knowledge flows in. There is no suggestion in this experience of an elaborate antecedent process. But none the less is it certain that every one of our perceptions is a composite product that has been reached, first, through nerve processes, and, second, through sensations. And, furthermore, it is certain that something — some transforming and coördinating power — has wrought these into the unity that we call a perception. This unity is of a

psychic nature. It is a judgment, a conclusion. How has it been reached? By what means have these nerve processes been wrought into sensations, and these sensations again into those perceptions that constitute the ready-made and apparently simple elements of our conscious mentality?

There is but one way known to us by which such results can be reached; the way, that is, by which still higher results are attained in conscious mental processes. In the realm of the conscious, a conclusion is always the product of many independent perceptions that have been fused into unity by a *process of reasoning*. This is the one and only known form of mental activity by which such unity can be reached. When, therefore, we have, in what we call a simple perception, such a unity *presented* to us, we must conclude that it has been elaborated by a process of reasoning that has not entered into our consciousness, — a process that may therefore be called unconscious reasoning.

Again, it is said, we every day compass the ends of life by activities that involve a great multitude of adjustments that do not enter into consciousness. We can neither walk nor eat nor speak without making innumerable intelligently adapted movements to meet the ever-varying demands of life, yet the greater part of these are made without our bestowing a thought upon them. Unconscious adaptation, therefore, is an unquestionable reality of our experience.

And again, all thinkers are familiar with a class of phenomena to which the name of unconscious cerebration has been given. The thoughts that would not arrange themselves satisfactorily yesterday, no matter how variously we changed their relations to each other, are, after an interval of complete oblivion of their relations, revealed to our consciousness perfectly organized. What has brought about this result, if not an unconscious continuation of the mental effort that we were previously carrying on consciously?

Who can say that these are not all of them well-known phenomena, and that the inference deduced is not a natural and reasonable one? We certainly do not question the truth of the representations; but as to the inference, we have to say, first, that it rests upon a most unnecessary assumption; namely, the assumption that the intelligence that is outside of my consciousness at a given time is and always has been outside of any consciousness. This, I say, is an unnecessary assumption in view of the fact that we are not isolated, independent beings, but exceedingly dependent

beings, whose intelligence and consciousness is, in every case, intimately bound up with that of other existences. The present self-consciousness of each individual is, indeed, a thing absolutely shut up to itself. But it is continually penetrated by results that have been elaborated elsewhere, — sometimes in its own past states of consciousness, sometimes in the consciousness of other beings.

In view of these considerations, we are certainly justified in making the hypothesis that all the phenomena that are properly referred to intelligence as their cause *may be* accounted for as the results of the *conscious* intelligence of some being.

In the preceding article of this series we gave our reasons for believing that much of the appearance of intelligence in the phenomena of instinct is due to the existence of organized nerve substance; and further, that the organization of this was effected by *intelligence* at various epochs in the past history of the race. The same reasons lead us to a similar belief with regard to those perceptions that we have been considering. They are the outcome of nerve combinations that were at some time created by conscious intelligence.

Every child comes into the world with a most elaborately organized brain. It is ready to respond in a great variety of special ways to the stimuli that are sure to come to it from the external world; and the first result that reaches the child's consciousness is, though an exceedingly composite thing, at the same time a unity, — a unity that has been reached, not by any process of unconscious reasoning, but by virtue of the congenital organization of the brain.¹

This congenital organization we will for the present regard as the product of a totally unknown cause; and if organization never advanced beyond this point, we should have no special clue to its

¹ "The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the universe. And the universe which he later comes to know is nothing but an amplification and an implication of that first simple germ which, by accretion on the one hand and intussusception on the other, has grown so big and complex and articulate that its first estate is unrememberable. In his dumb awakening of *something there*, a mere *this* as yet (or something for which even the term *this* would be perhaps too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the bare interjection 'lo!'), the infant encounters an object in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all the categories of the understanding are contained. It has objectivity, unity, substantiality, causality, in the full sense in which any later object or system of objects has these things." — Professor William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii., p. 8.

cause. But it does not stop here. The first sensation of an infant leaves a permanent impress upon its brain ; and every succeeding sensation modifies it still further. At first these inflowing sensations seem to arrange themselves in some sort without any assistance from the subject of them. But ere long the legitimate ruler of the brain, the *ego*, begins to take an active part in the work. As a conscious, intelligent agent it discriminates between its sensations, it groups them, it analyzes them, it recombines them ; and many of these critically made combinations become, so to speak, fixtures in the brain. That is, they leave a definite organization of cerebral elements, — elements that all work together, and produce the impression of unity when they become active.

It may seem to the reader that we are assuming a great deal when we refer the origin of these fixtures to the *conscious* intelligence of the *ego*, since by far the greater part of the cerebral adjustments by which we live have been made so early in life that we have no remembrance of them. This is true ; but the process by which these earlier combinations have been formed is very clearly revealed to us in the new combinations that we are obliged to make in adult life as often as we encounter absolutely new objects.

I go into the house of a friend, we will say, and see on the table an object the like of which I have never seen before. It looks at a little distance like some kind of fruit. But none of my brain combinations that relate to particular kinds of fruit will have anything to do with it. They fling back the whole responsibility of the unfamiliar object upon me, the *ego*. Unless I am satisfied to remain in ignorance, it is necessary for me to do some intelligent work. I ask the question that in my childhood was so often on my tongue, "What is it?" I am told that it is a persimmon. If I never know anything more about it than this, I have gained a new brain combination ; for in the future, whenever the word "persimmon" is mentioned, the picture of this object lying on the table will come into my mind. But if I am permitted to carry my investigations further, to take this new fruit into my hand, I shall discover whether it is light or heavy, rough or smooth, rigid or yielding to the touch. If I may open it, I shall become possessed of another large class of characteristics ; and if I may taste it, of still another. And having got thus far I may go still further, to ascertain on what kind of a tree it grew, what are the conditions of its fruitage, and so on almost without limit.

All the time that I have been thus engaged I have been con-

structing in my brain a new set of nerve combinations, — *new*, but not isolated. No surgical operation is required to graft them upon former combinations. They are the outgrowth of them. My knowledge of fruit in general, and much of my knowledge of particular kinds of fruit, have participated in my construction of the persimmon annex ; and this, when completed, is not simply an extension of my former knowledge, but an organic part of it. I shall never have to do this work over again. The sight of a persimmon, or simply the repetition of the word, will bring back the whole train of characteristics in what seems to be a single perception ; and that, without any unconscious reasoning on my part. Subordinate agents, with an intelligence and consciousness that is very different from mine, stand ready, trained and waiting, to do that work for me.

The second class of phenomena, mentioned as suggesting unconscious intelligence, yields readily to the same explanation. The adjustments which are made in the performance of habitual actions are the result of the proficiency of trained subordinate agents. There may be much variety in the environment to which the adjustments have to be made, without there being anything absolutely new. These educated nerve combinations have had to deal with the very same exigencies of a varied environment many times before. The most important and difficult part of their training has been the acquisition of the power to respond quickly and appropriately to certain requirements that come upon them as suddenly as the fire alarm.

A tennis-player does not go through a process of unconscious calculations with regard to the direction and velocity of every ball that is shot at him. But by long practice he has educated certain of his faculties to work together with a quickness and precision that would be quite impossible to the *ego*. In the case of a very skillful player, little more is required of the *ego* than the persistent, never-relaxing will that shuts out every disturbing influence and pours the whole stream of nerve force into particular channels. Any calculation of the *ego* in the moment of supreme effort would be the reverse of helpful. During the time of their activity, the educated servants are as undertaking as the little camera that comes to us with the assurance, "You press the button, we do the rest." And yet there is no doubt about the origin of their skill. It has all been derived from the consciously made adjustments of the intelligent *ego*.

But now let us notice the fact that these educated servants are

not always up to the work required of them. The brain-cells of the thinker, for instance, become weary; their responses to each other's signals are not accurate; they do not make connections at the critical moment; and the *ego* finds itself obliged to relinquish for the present a task which it feels that it ought to be able to accomplish. But the despair of the night is often followed by a sudden and brilliant success in the morning. After a peaceful sleep, the wearied workers of yesterday spring to their interrupted task with the vigor of youth, they respond with alacrity to the constructive efforts of the *ego*, and the connections that could not be reached are now completed as if by magic. This, I believe, is a partial explanation of that third class of phenomena that we noticed as suggesting unconscious intelligence.

What, then, is our conclusion? We have seen that much of the brain organization that serves the purposes of intelligence can be traced to the *ego*, in its past states of consciousness and constructive effort. But what shall we say of that congenital plexus of brain elements upon which, as a foundation, all this additional work of the *ego* has been built? This question has been somewhat elaborately considered in the preceding article, and we need here only refer to the conclusion reached; namely, that the only rational way of dealing with this problem is to hold tenaciously to the true cause that we have found in that stage of the process that comes within the range of our experience, and use it analogically for the explanation of that which was prior to our experience. We saw that it was impossible to account for the infant brain by the hypothesis that it represents the organized experience of generations of ancestors. We therefore argued that we are justified in projecting our discovered cause into a higher sphere, — of postulating a superior intelligent Being with whom we are organically connected, something as the subordinate agents of the *ego* are connected with it. To this source also we must refer the unexplained part of "unconscious cerebration." The struggling *ego* is visited and assisted, at times, by the same Intelligence that in the beginning — at the origination of the species — girded it for the battle of life.

Returning now to the hypothesis of unconscious intelligence, how does the case stand? Shall we say here are two explanations, either of which accounts for the phenomena under consideration; and of these we are at liberty to take the one that seems the least improbable? I would not put it in this way. For I am convinced that the unconscious intelligence hypothesis is no explana-

tion at all. It is not simply improbable; it is just as it seemed to us at the beginning, a contradiction in terms. This is, I know, a mere assertion, and over against it may be put the assertions of those to whom unconscious intelligence is a positive reality. Is there anything more to be said? There certainly is, for we have the privilege of cross-questioning. The advocates of this hypothesis have made various applications of it, and told us many things about it. And I propose to the reader an examination of this testimony, feeling pretty sure that it will aid us materially in making up our minds whether unconscious intelligence is a reality, or a mere juggle of words by means of which those who use them unconsciously deceive themselves.

There have been two quite distinct applications of this philosophy. On the one hand is that hypothesis which locates the intelligence in the creature; and on the other, that which postulates an all-comprehensive existence, or being, who, though unconscious, is unlimited in wisdom and creative power.

A prominent advocate of the former is Mr. J. J. Murphy. Let us see what kind of an intelligence it is that he believes animals very low in the scale to be possessed of. It is an intelligence which is in one sense theirs, but in another sense not theirs, for they know nothing about it. It works quite independently of their understanding and volition. They have no more part in it than we have in the determination of our stature or the color of our hair. "The unconscious intelligence that guides the bee in building its cell is the same in kind with the unconscious intelligence that determines the formation of its mouth and its eyes."¹ But how is this kind of intelligence related to that which usually bears the name? We are simply told that it is the very same. "The intelligence that forms the lenses of the eye is the same as that which in the mind of man has discovered the theory of the lens. The intelligence that hollows out the bones and wing-feathers of the bird in order to combine lightness with strength, and places the feathery fringes where they are needed for the purposes of flight, is the same which in the mind of the engineer has devised the construction of iron pillars hollowed out like those bones and feathers."²

We can readily assimilate the idea that the intelligence is the same; but we should be glad to know on what ground it is affirmed that it is ever unconscious. Our observation of animals tells us that their intelligence is far more limited — less discursive,

¹ *Habit and Intelligence*, p. 405.

² *Ibid.*, p. 411.

to use Mr. Lewes's phrase — than that of man. But we certainly have every reason to believe that they are conscious, and intensely conscious within a certain range. Why, then, if the intelligence that guides the bee in building its cell is the same as that which guides man, should we say that in the case of the bee it is unconscious? Mr. Murphy says: "These insects, in building their hexagonal cells, are manifestly guided by intelligence of some kind; but it is *not* conscious intelligence, for we cannot think that they have any conscious knowledge of those properties of the hexagon which make that form most suitable to their purposes." Again, we ask, why not? If they have *knowledge*, why not conscious knowledge?

The only reason for denying consciousness seems to me to be that thereby the imagination is helped over a great difficulty. But what is the nature of the relief thus obtained? It is simply that which results from skillfully combining in a phrase the affirmation and denial of a given proposition. All the intelligence that is in this case predicated of the bee is denied in the qualifying word *unconscious*. By using two words for the idea under consideration, the true nature of the combination is obscured. But all that the judgment really assents to is that the creatures in question are possessed of an unintelligent kind of intelligence.

But, it may be responded, if this is the true diagnosis of the case, — if there is nothing more in the phrase *unconscious intelligence* than a contradiction of terms, — might we not reasonably expect that to some other philosopher it would seem better to use the words of our phrase in the reverse order, — to ascribe, that is, the origin of instincts and organs to unintelligent consciousness? This is certainly a reasonable suggestion. Such a philosopher we might *expect* to find, and such an one we actually do find.

The necessity of resorting to some non-mechanical principle to account for the adaptations that appear in nature is thus expressed by Dr. E. D. Cope: "It is evident that growth force is not concentric nor polar in its activity as are the physical forces, and that its determinations are antagonistic to these. Its existence in the earth has been a succession of conquests over polar force."¹ And, again: "The variations from which natural selection has derived the persistent types of life have not been general or very extensive. They have been in a limited number of directions, and the most of these have been toward the increase in perfection

¹ *Origin of the Fittest*, p. 398.

of some machine. They bear the impress of the presence of an adequate originating cause directed to a special end."¹ This cause can be no other than mind. "We are," he says, "led to the conclusion that evolution is an outgrowth of mind, and that mind is the parent of the forms of living nature."² But feeling it necessary to reconcile this belief with "the evolutionary hypothesis that mind is the product and highest development of the universe of matter and force," he hastens to explain that, "by mind, as the author of the organic world, *I mean only the two elements, consciousness and memory.*"

Of these two elements, consciousness is always the responsible partner. Memory only registers the experiences that are supplied to it. Consciousness does all the rest. It feels the pressure of environment, it recognizes the want that bars the way to organic progress, and it invents the new adjustments that will meet this want. Consciousness is, in short, at all points, the great originator and organizer. It has operated from the very beginning of organic life. It is not simply a property of protoplasm; it is not, in the last analysis, a property of anything. It is not even a product. "The nature of consciousness is such as to distinguish it from all other thinkable things, and it must be ranged with matter and force as the third element of the universe."³

As thus described, consciousness is clearly synonymous with mind. Why, then, should we not call it mind and done with it? Simply because we cannot conjure with the word "mind" as we can with the word "consciousness." Like the ogre of Puss in Boots, consciousness can change itself into the smallest of small entities, and quite disappear from our view. Thus Dr. Cope tells us that when he speaks of consciousness as modifying movement and movement as modifying structure, he uses the word "in its simplest sense, as synonymous with physical sensibility. Its lowest and most usual exhibition is the sense of touch; the special senses, taste, sight, etc., are higher forms, while thoughts and desires are the organized products of the same raw material."⁴

But we cannot pass over the fact that some of the most important — we had almost said *intelligent* — adjustments of consciousness have to be made when it is at its lowest stage. Dr. Cope has fully illustrated, and, as we believe, very justly emphasized, the principle that the origin of all new organs and forms is to be looked for in unspecialized material. That is, where con-

¹ *Origin of the Fittest*, p. 408.

² *Ibid.*, p. 230.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

sciousness is at its simplest, where it is just physical sensibility and nothing more, there it is found to be most actively and skillfully at work, taking its first and most difficult steps. In other words, we find *unintelligent consciousness* performing for Dr. Cope just the same wonders that *unconscious intelligence* performed for Mr. Murphy.

This same method — the method of separating mind into its conceptual elements, and using one or two of these as if they were the whole — has been adopted by some eminent writers of whom we should never have expected it.

Thus Haeckel, at the conclusion of an argument which he regards as a complete demonstration of the truth of the *mechanical* hypothesis, tells us that *memory* and the *power of perception* are the chief factors in the development of organisms. "Heredity," he says, "is the memory of plastidules (organic molecules), variability their power of perception. The one brings about the constancy, and the other the diversity of organic forms. In the very simple and persistent forms of life the plastidules have, so to speak, learned nothing and forgotten nothing. In highly perfected and variable organisms the plastidules have both learned and forgotten much."¹ It is clear that perception, in this scheme, accomplishes just as much as intelligence does in any other part of the universe. But it is somehow much easier to believe that organic molecules are endowed with unconscious perception and unconscious memory than to believe them possessed of conscious mind.

It may seem to the reader that we have dwelt quite long enough on this aspect of the subject. But we must entreat his patience. The idea of unconscious creation has been exploited in many ways; and we have not yet considered that development of it that has made the greatest mark and secured the largest number of adherents.

Edward von Hartmann's philosophy differs radically from the above schemes, in that it postulates an unconscious intelligence that is *all-pervasive*. It is essentially pantheistic. He himself has said that it is "the elevation of Hegel's unconscious philosophy of the unconscious into a conscious one." In it all the phenomena that we have been considering are referred, not to the unconscious intelligence of animals or molecules, but to the unlimited *clairvoyance* of an all-comprehensive existence, — "The All-One." The unerring wisdom and skill of the All-One have

¹ Quoted by W. K. Brooks, *Heredity*, p. 37.

elaborated the adapted forms of the natural world in absolute unconsciousness, with the exception of that limited and very imperfect consciousness that appears in men and animals. It is to this system of philosophy that I referred when, at the beginning of this article, I ventured the opinion that the idea of unconscious creation had contributed in no small degree to the building up of a philosophical theism. And I will say further, that it seems to me impossible for any reader of Hartmann's persuasive pages to doubt that he has grasped a unifying principle, which he has elucidated with much force and ingenuity. But it is not at all so certain that this principle is the one which he emphasizes. He has called his scheme *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*. But, in what follows, I shall try to show that its whole strength is owing to the fact that it is the *Philosophy of the Intelligent*.

From beginning to end, it rests upon the following thesis: An intelligence which is not the intelligence of the creature is everywhere at work in the world.

The evidence adduced to establish this main proposition is drawn from almost every department of our experience. He finds it in human history, he finds it in the development of the individual, he finds it in all the phenomena of growth, and in the routine life of our unconsciously performed bodily functions. The reparative power of nature is clearly intelligent. When the mutilated polyp reproduces its tentacles; when the decapitated worm forms a new head; when the hydra, cut into many pieces, develops a new whole from each fragment; and when the human organism makes all those complicated modifications of its functions which result in the healing of a wound, — it is the manifestation of an adaptive wisdom that is ready and active at innumerable points. It is a wisdom that reveals itself, first, as a "clairvoyance," a prevision of wants to be met; and, second, as an amazing ingenuity in the means selected to meet them.

To show how impossible it is to avoid the conclusion that instincts are the expression of intuitive knowledge, Hartmann refers to that class in which the working out of a most elaborate plan, through instinctive action, is shared by a number of individuals, each one of whom contributes a different kind of work. Thus, when bees build a new comb, one kind of operation succeeds another with a regularity and fidelity to plan that would do credit to the most disciplined and foreseeing man. Workers, having different duties to discharge, succeed each other, or work on opposite sides of the cells performing parts which are complemental

to each other. Each individual knows when to participate and just what to do; and the value of the work is conditioned upon the consentaneous coöperation of all engaged in it. As Hartmann remarks: "It is as if an invisible supreme architect had laid before the assembly the plan of the whole, and impressed it upon each individual, — as if every kind of laborer had learnt his destined work, place, and order of affording relief, and was informed by some signal of the moment when his turn came."

As equally convincing of clairvoyance and skill, he instances the purposive transformations that succeed each other when the embryo passes from its unicellular form by innumerable stages into the complex organism of a higher animal. Each stage is in this case the preparation for and necessary condition of all the stages that are to come after it; and each organ is developed earlier in the foetal life than it enters into use.

All these phenomena, he argues, point not to different intelligences, but to one and the same intelligence working under different conditions. The marvels of creative activity in the foetus, the adaptive energy that appears in the recuperative power of nature, and the mysterious intelligence that guides the creature in its relations to its external environment, are all related to each other. There may, indeed, be a diversity of consciousness. That is, there may be in each creature, in each ganglion, and in each cell, a specific consciousness corresponding to its specific functions. Instinct, as the willing of means, may be the conscious act of the organism as a whole, or the act of a lower nerve centre, or even of a cell. But these all point more or less directly to a supreme wisdom that has an absolute knowledge of means and ends, — a wisdom that "never errs" and "never hesitates," that "never falls ill," and is "never weary."

Up to this point, it will certainly not be difficult for any theist to agree with Hartmann. But now we have to inquire why he finds it necessary to affirm that the author of all these wonderful adaptations is unconscious.

His reason is twofold. In the first place, from a physical point of view, there is no evidence — no analogical probability — of consciousness in the All-One; and, in the second place, from a metaphysical point of view, it is inconceivable. Consciousness is dependent upon organization. The self-conscious mind of man is a *product* that has been slowly reached through a gradual development from the simplest forms of protoplasm. What vague beginnings of consciousness may exist in the polyp, or the amœba, or

the plant, we know not. But we know that this quality of mind becomes a more and more certain and conspicuous concomitant of living beings as their organization becomes more complex. And if, inverting the process, we descend the scale from one grade to another, the evidence of consciousness gradually fades till we finally reach the unconscious. "With the complete abolition of the cerebral function," Hartmann says, "the activity of consciousness is likewise abolished."

This is not the first time we have met this argument in the course of our discussion. But in the former case it was made use of by Mr. Lewes to prove the impossibility of an *anima mundi*. It is certainly clear that if it is fatal to the existence of consciousness beyond the limits of protoplasm, it is equally fatal to the existence of intelligence under the same circumstances. Our reasons for thinking it fatal to neither have been given elsewhere.

At one point in his argument, Hartmann seems to be aware that his position with regard to this matter is not quite satisfactory. He says this question may very properly be asked: "Admitting that the actions of the All-One displayed in the individual are unconscious, so far as the individual is concerned, what is the proof that they are not conscious in the All-One itself?"¹ But all we get for an answer is this; the *onus probandi* of this proposition rests on the maker of it. "It is not," he says, "for me to prove that the unconscious physical functions may not on the other side be conscious in the All-One; but those who desire to make this addition to the hypothesis have to produce the proof of their assumption, which until then must be regarded as pure assertion, and accordingly to be scientifically ignored."

Well, then, if we must defend our belief in consciousness, let us find out from Hartmann how to do it. Let us see how he establishes that part of his philosophy with which we agree. How does he prove that intelligence and will may be predicated of the All-One? If he succeeds in rescuing the ascription of these attributes from the category of mere assertion, there is hope for us.

That intelligent guidance is the true explanation of the organic adaptations of nature commends itself to his mind, first, because there is no other way of explaining the existence of a progressive employment of means to anticipated ends; and, second, because the human mind instinctively jumps to this analogy, which in its

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, by Edward von Hartmann; translated by William Chatterton Coupland, M. A. B. Sc., vol. ii., p. 245.

concrete form is at once intelligible and satisfactory. This part of his argument takes exactly the same form as that of the theist. At all times and among all peoples, he urges, the wisdom of the Creator, World-orderer, or World-governor has been the theme of admiration and of praise, and the greater part of this expression has been the announcement of a genuine conviction, — a conviction that thrusts itself already on the mind of the child as soon as it begins to comprehend the remarkable combination of means and ends in nature. He only who denies natural ends can close his mind against this conviction; and such denial is reached only by the substitution of abstractions for realities.¹

Now, is it not true that the unsophisticated mind assumes the existence of consciousness in the Supreme Being as naturally as it does the existence of intelligence? and does it not cling as tenaciously to the one idea as to the other? The denial of the former is just as much the result of substituting abstractions for realities as is the denial of the latter. Hartmann himself tells us that the idea of unconscious intelligence never occurred to the primitive understanding, — that even to this day "most educated people hold it to be absurd to speak of unconscious thinking."²

In another connection he tells us that the starting-point of his philosophizing is anthropological. In fact, he represents this as the only possible starting-point. "Only what we are able to understand by analogy with ourselves, only that are we able to understand of the world at large."³ If there were, he argues, a total want of resemblance between us and the rest of the world, all possibility of an understanding of the same would be cut off from us. But on the strength of the fact that we are "*ourselves a piece of the world*," and that our anthropological functions, like all other phenomena, have grown out of the fundamental principles of the world, "we may confidently indulge in a cautious use of this analogy."

We might suppose that this method would lead to the inclusion of consciousness as an attribute of the Supreme Being. But our author tells us that the guidance of this analogy is reliable only when we proceed critically enough in the separation of those peculiarities which distinguish us men from the rest of nature. He proceeds critically and strips off consciousness. Schopenhauer proceeds critically and strips off everything except will. Dr. Cope, with a like eclecticism, leaves us nothing except conscious-

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, vol. ii., p. 356.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 144.

ness and memory. Such a result is unsatisfactory; and the only way out of it seems to me to be indicated by a saying already quoted in these pages, to the effect that *all philosophies are true in so far as they affirm, and false in so far as they deny*. If we should reverse this proposition there would be nothing left of the anthropological argument. But holding to it we get the whole benefit of the analogy.

It is as clear to Hartmann as it is to us that any *stripping off*, except his own, weakens if it does not invalidate the argument upon which he in the last resort bases everything. He points out to us the inconsistency of Schopenhauer because he discriminates between will and the rest of the mental faculties. It is altogether inconsequent and one-sided in him to hypostatize will as individual metaphysical essence while referring the stores of memory, together with the intellectual foundations, talents, and aptitudes, to the physical constitution of the brain. "It is obvious," he remarks, "that the absolutely irrational (will without intelligence) taken as a principle must be very much poorer, much less fertile, than the absolutely rational, the idea and thought."¹ There can be no question about this. But is it not equally clear that if will, idea, and consciousness are all retained in our conception of the power that works for ends in nature, we have a principle that is not only more fertile than Hartmann's, but one that is beyond comparison more comprehensible?

How shall we explain such an exceedingly one-sided application of a great principle on the part of an author who for the most part reasons so well? The mystery is solved, at least in part, when we discover that he everywhere uses the word *unconscious* in a very peculiar sense. This appears clearly when he institutes a comparison between theism and his conception of the All-One. The advocates of theism, he seems to say, have no real ground of controversy with him, because the unconsciousness of his clairvoyant intelligence is not a pure negation, but, on the contrary, an unknown and unknowable affirmative.

"We are compelled," he says, "to designate this intelligence, which is superior to all consciousness, at once *unconscious* and *superconscious*."² This, he protests, does away with all reasonable complaint against his philosophy on the part of theists. For, to use his own words, "*if* the All-One, with all its unconsciousness, possesses a *superconscious* intelligence, all-knowing and all-wise, which teleologically determines the content of creation and

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, vol. iii., p. 150.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 249.

of the world-process, we stand here neither as accidental product of the forces of nature, nor is God dwarfed by denying Him *this* mode of consciousness."¹ Is, then, the word "unconscious," as applied by Hartmann to the All-One, only intended to emphasize the difference that must be supposed to exist between the finite, limited consciousness of man, and the unlimited, all-embracing consciousness of the Supreme Being?

There would seem to be no doubt of this when we read the following: "If one still, for one moment, tried to imagine the impossible demand satisfied that consciousness should be preserved as a form of representation, yet this form also would have to be taken as *infinitely elevated above the consciousness known to us*. And it would then be at once apparent that the infinite form is equivalent to pure formlessness, — that the absolute consciousness demanded for God must again prove to be identical with the absolutely unconscious." To do Hartmann justice, it should be said that he advertises the reader of this peculiarity of his language at an early stage of his argument. When treating (vol. i., p. 68) of those nerve centres in man which seem to be the source of complicated automatic action, he says: "The cerebral is by no means the sole, but merely the *highest*, consciousness of the animal, — the only one which in higher animals attains to self-consciousness, therefore the only one which I call *my* consciousness. That, however, the subordinate nerve centres must also have a consciousness, if of a vaguer description, plainly follows from the continuity of the animal series, and a comparison of the ganglionic consciousness of the invertebrata with that of the independent ganglia and central parts of the spinal cord of the higher animals." But immediately we are warned that this ascription of consciousness to subordinate nerve centres is only "provisional," because, "compared with the cerebral consciousness which a man exclusively recognizes as *his* consciousness, it is certainly unconscious, and it is accordingly shown that there exists in us an unconscious will, since these nerve centres are all contained in our corporeal organism, therefore in us."

It is not, then, with the intention of deceiving us, that Hartmann so persistently uses a negative word to express that which really stands in his imagination for a positive entity. It is that he deceives himself with the conceit that this negative is the determining principle of his philosophy. To accommodate his own phrase with regard to Hegel, we may say that his system is an uncon-

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, vol. ii., p. 247.

scious philosophy of the conscious. I have dwelt upon it because it is an argument that approaches the great problem from the side of natural phenomena, because it proceeds inductively from the facts of nature, and is pushed along natural lines with great persuasiveness and wealth of illustration, and because it seems to me to outline clearly the general characteristics of a conception of God's relation to his world to which we are forced by the knowledge of a creative process.

We are not taking an unfair advantage when we substitute the author's own phrase *superconscious* for "unconscious" whenever the latter is used with reference to the All-One. For although he admits it with a protest, and declares it to be only provisional, it is in fact of a superconscious intelligence that he invariably discourses when he specifies the characteristics of the Supreme Being. The All-One, he tells us, "*employs expedients*;"¹ He "*avoids difficulties*,"² He "*prefers*"³ one method to another, He "*intends*," etc. And the fact that we are carried by the argument to a conclusion not contemplated or intended by the author, but the reverse of that which he set out to prove, does not detract from, but greatly enhances, its logical value. It is one more illustration of the impossibility of explaining the world by abstractions. It is a notable witness to the necessity of using an un mutilated anthropomorphism if we avail ourselves in any degree of the human microcosm as a symbol of the greater world.

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¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, vol. ii., p. 308.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 303.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 311.

"THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH."¹

IN June and December of 1889 Mr. Andrew Carnegie published two articles in the "North American Review" under the titles, "Wealth," and "The Best Fields of Philanthropy," which, at the instance of Mr. Gladstone, were taken up by the "Pall Mall Gazette," and republished under the more striking title of "The Gospel of Wealth." The term, however, originated with Mr. Carnegie, though he had not put it to so conspicuous a use. At the close of his first article he had said: "Such, in my opinion, is the true gospel concerning wealth, obedience to which is destined some day to solve the problem of the rich and the poor, and to bring 'peace on earth, among men goodwill.'"

The course of discussion which has followed until now the republication of these articles is quite as significant as the original articles. It is especially significant for what has not been discussed. With a single exception, the discussion has been confined to the question of the charitable disposition of private wealth, without entering at all, except in the way of illustration, upon the much more serious question of the vast concentration of wealth in private hands. And yet the argument of Mr. Carnegie had challenged attention at this very point. His "gospel" rested upon the clear and bold assumption that wealth was best placed in the hands of the few; the gospel part of his message being the duty of the few to redistribute their wealth in the interest of the many. It would, of course, be unfair to the eminent men like

¹ *The Gospel of Wealth.* By Andrew Carnegie. Reprinted from the June and December (1889) numbers of the *North American Review*. (Slightly revised.)

Mr. Carnegie's Gospel of Wealth: a Review and a Recommendation. By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M. P. *The Nineteenth Century*, November, 1890.

Irresponsible Wealth. (1) By His Eminence Cardinal Manning; (2) By the Rev. Dr. Herman Adler, Chief Rabbi; (3) By the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes. *The Nineteenth Century*, December, 1890.

The Advantages of Poverty. By Andrew Carnegie. *The Nineteenth Century*, March, 1891.

Wealth and its Obligations. By His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons. *The North American Review*, April, 1891.

Wealth. (1) *The Gospel for Wealth*; by Bishop Henry C. Potter; (2) *Irresponsible Wealth*; by the Hon. Edward J. Phelps; (3) *Favorable Aspects of State Socialism*; by the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain. *The North American Review*, May, 1891.

Mr. Gladstone and Cardinal Manning, who have in the main indorsed so heartily Mr. Carnegie's scheme, to affirm that they accept the theory upon which it rests. Still they have not thought it necessary to express their dissent from it. The only dissent¹ is from the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes, whose pungent but generous criticism of this fundamental theory is made in part the occasion of a pleasant rejoinder by Mr. Carnegie, setting forth "The Advantages of Poverty."

It is because of the very general acceptance of Mr. Carnegie's gospel without questioning or apparently examining the premises upon which it rests, or the consequences which it may involve if completely accepted, that I am led to offer the following criticism. I honor the personal qualities of the author which are displayed in this essay, — independence, business sagacity, breadth of view, and generous motive. I acknowledge the great benefit to society from the gifts of the rich, from those which have been received and from those which are likely to be received. But I believe that the charity which this gospel enjoins is too costly, if taken at the price which the author puts upon it; namely, the acceptance of his doctrine of the relation of private wealth to society.

That I may not misrepresent Mr. Carnegie's position, I will quote his words (the italics are mine): —

"We start," he says, "with a condition of affairs" — referring to the present competitive system — "under which the best interests of the race are promoted, but *which inevitably gives wealth to the few*. Thus, accepting conditions as they are, the *situation can be surveyed and pronounced good*. The question then arises, — and if the foregoing be correct it is *the only question* with which we have to deal, — What is the proper mode of administering wealth after the laws upon which civilization is founded *have thrown it into the hands of the few*? And it is of this great question that I believe I offer the true solution. It will be understood that fortunes are here spoken of, not moderate sums saved by many years of effort, the returns from which are required for the comfortable maintenance and education of families. This is not wealth, but only competence, which it should be the aim of all to acquire, and which it is for the best interests of society should be acquired.

"There are but three modes in which surplus wealth can be disposed of. It can be left to the families of the decedents; or it can be bequeathed for public purposes; or, finally, it can be administered by its possessors during their lives."

¹ In the very recent article by the Hon. Edward J. Phelps, on "Irresponsible Wealth," *The North American Review*, May, 1891, attention is called to the injustice and demoralization attending the accumulation of many fortunes.

Then follow the reasons for discarding the first two modes, and for accepting the third, and then he concludes : —

“ Thus is the problem of rich and poor to be solved : the laws of accumulation will be left free ; the laws of distribution free. Individualism will continue, but *the millionaire will be but a trustee for the poor ;* intrusted for a season with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but administering it for the community *far better than it could or would have done for itself.*”

Summing up Mr. Carnegie's theory, it may, I think, be fairly stated in the following terms : —

The present economic system, which is established in individualism and worked through competition, is on the whole the best attainable system. The millionaire is the necessary product of that system ; wealth inevitably falls under it into the hands of the few. This, too, is best, for the millionaire is the natural trustee of the poor ; and he can in various ways administer wealth for the community better than the community can administer it for itself. The sole question then is, How shall the rich man fulfill his trusteeship ? Not by returning his fortune, beyond a competence to his family. Not by devising his money by will. But by distributing his fortune, during his lifetime, according to his judgment of the public need.

It is of no little value, in estimating the factors which go to make up the present economic and social situation, to have so clear, so frank, so unconscious a personal statement of the doctrine of private wealth. We are not to regard it as an altogether authorized and representative statement. Some rich men would accept Mr. Carnegie's premises who would scoff at his conclusion. While others, be it said to their honor, are carrying out his conclusion in a very conscientious and self-denying way, who are by no means able to take the full comfort of his premises, and regard themselves as the providential trustees of society. Still, for Mr. Carnegie's uses, the two parts of the argument go together. If he is to preach this gospel of wealth to the rich, he must above all things make them feel the *inevitableness* of their lot. They must be made to realize that they are the necessary product of the system to which they belong. There must needs be the very rich ; if not these, then others. Some persons cannot escape the responsibility of riches, however great at times may seem to them “ the advantages of poverty.” The inevitable factor in society is not so certainly the poor as the rich. The rich ye have with you always.

But this necessarian view of extreme riches is not so obvious to all as to Mr. Carnegie. For while he is asking, and answering with so much courage and assurance, this question about the disposal of the vast surplus of private wealth, society is taking hold in very serious fashion of the other end of the problem, and asking why there should be such a vast surplus of private wealth. Mr. Carnegie's scheme of redistribution is a most interesting one, as will be seen by examining it more in detail, and, within the limits in which it is likely to be carried out, not without direct practical benefit, but it is in no sense a solution of the great social question which is stirring the mind and heart of this generation. And my present concern is that it should not be accepted as such by ethical and religious teachers. For I can conceive of no greater mistake, more disastrous in the end to religion if not to society, than that of trying to make charity do the work of justice.¹

Mr. Carnegie's first answer to the question of the disposal of the surplus of private wealth is, that nothing above a competence should remain to a rich man's family. The chief motive urged in the assertion of this principle is the protection of the family life of the rich. "I would as soon leave to my son a curse," says Mr. Carnegie, "as the almighty dollar." Family pride calls for the retention of fortune; the family welfare demands that the children should at any cost be guarded from idleness, and from the enervating and demoralizing effect of inherited wealth. One cannot refuse his sympathy with the sentiment which prompts this advice, though much loss of social momentum would be incurred by carrying it out, and though it would involve a very careful training of children born and reared in wealth if, at the death of the head of the family, they are to be reduced to a com-

¹ At a reading of this paper the criticism was passed at this point, that justice is becoming a much over-used term, the "cant" of the disaffected, and, moreover, that it is too indefinite a term to use by itself; that practically the justice or injustice of any method depends entirely upon the way in which it is found to work.

I accept both these statements, and recognize their value, without, however, admitting their pertinence in this connection. For my single contention here is, that the redistribution of a great fortune by its possessor, and according to his choice and judgment, is altogether an accepted matter of charity; while the original distribution of the money which was involved in the making of the fortune, giving such a proportion to one man and such a proportion to another, was altogether a matter of economic justice. The whole working of the business transaction may have been just; it may have been unjust: it did not in either event come within the sphere of charity or benevolence.

petence. It should be said that the essay inculcates "modesty in private expenditure" as a part of the doctrine of public benefaction.

Mr. Carnegie's second answer is, that fortunes should not be devised by will, partly because of the uncertainty, attending all bequests, of actually reaching and accomplishing their ends, and partly because the act of bequeathing property is in itself destitute of any moral quality. Mr. Gladstone, in commenting on this last objection to giving by bequest, goes so far as to speak of its positively immoral effect, as leading to a kind of image worship, ascribing to the dead, who have given away what they could not take with them, a reputation for virtues which they may never have exercised or possessed while living. And then he adds a further and more serious objection, that the power of bequest gives to the rich man the opportunity of counteracting the free and healthy action of public opinion after his death; it amounts to the imposition of his private views upon society after public opinion may have rightfully gone out in other directions,—an objection which becomes very practical when one remembers how difficult it is to find a body of trustees who will refuse a bequest because of any conditions whatever which it may impose upon opinion or belief. Exception to this sweeping objection to giving by bequest ought fairly to be taken in behalf of two classes of rich men,—those who shun the publicity of giving, who are nervously sensitive to the notoriety which attends benevolent action; and those who, like the late Mr. Fayerweather, acquire their fortunes near the close of life, when the disposal of them is more fitly left to others.

In Mr. Carnegie's third answer he states his positive principle that all private wealth above a competence should be distributed back into society during the lifetime of the owner and maker of the fortune, and according to his direction; and then proceeds to show how this can be wisely done, specifying, as the proper objects of benevolence, universities, libraries, hospitals, parks, churches of the more costly type, and in the general those intermediate objects which enrich a community without pauperizing individuals. Mr. Carnegie is stoutly opposed to technical charity or almsgiving, believing that, of every thousand dollars thus spent, nine hundred and fifty are unwisely spent.

This is the gospel of wealth; of which it may be said, in a word, that it is an heroic remedy for the preservation of families of wealth from the corrupting power of inherited riches; that, as respects the rich man, it is a call to self-denial, not only against

the hoarding of riches, but also against the gratification of a large class of ambitions common to the very rich; but that in its relation to society it is, if *accepted as the mode of social improvement*, the gospel of patronage. Society, in its institutions of relief and of culture, in its improvements and refinements, would become the object of the bounty of the few, and rightly so, as Mr. Carnegie argues, because the rich benefactor can do better for the community than it would or could do for itself. Just as formerly it was contended that political power should be in the hands of the few, because it would be better administered, so now it is contended — I quote Mr. Carnegie's words, slightly transferring them, but not changing their meaning — that "the millionaire is intrusted for the time being with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, because he can administer it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself." This, of course, if accepted and carried out in any complete way, becomes patronage.

Probably, however, the first criticism which would be passed upon this scheme is, that it could not be carried out to any such degree as to produce any appreciable effect in the way of social relief. The preaching of this gospel might be expected to reach the consciences and hearts of the few, perceptibly increasing the amount of public benefactions, and very likely resulting in the organization of societies, like that which Mr. Gladstone proposes to revive, for cultivating the spirit of giving according to the increase of income.¹ But it would manifestly fail to reach the much greater amount of irresponsible and really dangerous wealth. It would fall upon deaf ears as it addressed itself to the ambitious, the selfish, the profligate, — the really dangerous classes in modern society.

And it is hardly to be expected that the appeal would have the same effect upon those without as upon those within Mr. Carnegie's own class of millionaires. Mr. Carnegie represents the self-made type, the type of bold, shrewd, masterful, and withal generous and public-spirited self-made rich men. Those, on the other hand, who represent inherited wealth seldom possess precisely these personal qualities, while they are usually possessed of quite different ambitions. He might have the honorable ambition to found a house. They are under conventional bonds to perpetuate their inheritance, an obligation which fails only under the incapacity to fulfill it, or under those temptations to vice which betray it.

¹ A similar society, known as the Christian Stewards' League, with headquarters at Chicago, has already been organized in this country.

But, allowing that the scheme is more practicable than it seems, then the criticism follows, to which I have referred, that to the degree in which it becomes successful it amounts to patronage; and, in the long run, society cannot afford to be patronized. It is better for any community to advance more slowly than to gain altogether by gifts rather than, in large part, by earnings. Within proper limits, the public is advantaged by the gifts of the rich, but if the method becomes the accepted method, to be expected and relied upon, the decline of public self-respect has begun. There is a public spirit to be cherished as well as a private public spirit.

But these criticisms do not reach the heart of the matter. They do not run as deep as the current thought. That, as I have intimated, is growing more and more intent upon one inquiry, Why should there be this vast amount of wealth in the hands of the few? The question is not, How shall private wealth be returned to the public? but, Why should it exist in such bewildering amounts? Mr. Carnegie's gospel is really a belated gospel. It comes too late for a social remedy. What it does accomplish is to call attention to the fact of the enormous surplus of private wealth. The honest and courageous endeavor of a millionaire to return his fortune to society, and his call to his fellow-millionaires to do likewise, brings them, as a class, before the public, and puts the public upon a reckoning of the volume of wealth in their hands. Consciously or unconsciously, Mr. Carnegie has hit upon the great object-lesson in our economic civilization. It is not pauperism, conspicuous and grievous as that is, but the concentration of wealth. The most striking, and in many ways the most startling, feature of the economic situation is, not that the poor are growing poorer, — that I doubt, except with those too low for computation,¹ — but that the rich are becoming so very rich. The question before us, be it remembered, is not that of capital, or of

¹ I believe that Mr. Carnegie is right in denying Mr. Hughes's application of the dictum of Mr. Henry George, "that, whatever may be thought of Mr. Henry George's doctrines and deductions, no one can deny that his facts are indisputable, and that Mr. Carnegie's 'progress' is accompanied by the growing 'poverty' of his less fortunate fellow-countrymen." — *The Nineteenth Century*, March, 1891, pp. 367-370.

Mr. Carnegie has, however, been grossly misled in accepting the United States Census Report for 1880 as to the number of paupers in the whole country. The estimate is ridiculously low, as may be seen by comparison with the State Reports, or with authenticated statements in the Reports of Boards of Charities and Corrections.

corporate wealth, or of ordinary private wealth, but of extreme riches in the hands of the few,—the enormous concentration of wealth.

Let me call up one or two facts as a reminder of the proportion in which wealth is held in private fortunes. The concentration of landed wealth in England has been for a long time a conspicuous fact. But it is fast losing its prominence through the increase of wealth in other interests. The income from landed property in 1862 was 60½ millions; in 1889, was 58½ millions. The income from trade, in 1862, was 182 millions; in 1889, was 336 millions. Yet, under this change in the sources of wealth, the proportion of wealth in the hands of the few remained practically unchanged. It is estimated that two thirds of the property of England is still owned by one thirtieth of the population.

Applying the same methods of computation as are in use in England to this country, with such modifications as may be gained from ascertained facts, it is estimated that two thirds of the property of the United States is in the hands of one seventieth of the population. It also seems safe to assume that more than one half of the wealth of the country is in possession of less than fifty thousand families. Calculations with reference to particular families, like those made by Mr. Thomas G. Shearman, in "*The Forum*," may be in some instances inaccurate, without affecting the general aggregate.¹

The force of this reminder of the present and increasing concentration of wealth in England and America is intensified by one or two other facts bearing upon the character and use of a portion of this immense surplus. One fact is that of the growing amount of wealth in the form of demoralizing capital. The

¹ In the general calculation which Mr. Shearman made (*The Forum*, November, 1889), based on the census of 1880, he distributed one half the wealth of the country as follows:—

200 persons or families owned 20,000,000 each.				
400	"	"	"	10,000,000 "
1,000	"	"	"	5,000,000 "
2,000	"	"	"	2,500,000 "
6,000	"	"	"	1,000,000 "
15,000	"	"	"	500,000 "

This was evidently a rough attempt to grade the private wealth of the country. But, in *The Forum* for January, 1891, Mr. Shearman claims the substantial accuracy of his estimates, affirming that errors of under-statement have been discovered which largely counterbalance all over-statements, and instancing the fact that there are at least seventy American estates which average \$35,000,000 each.

amount invested in the liquor traffic is the most evident example, of which it may be said that the whole sum is practically a corruption fund, to be used as the exigencies of the business may demand. A second fact is that of the growing amount of irresponsible wealth, wealth that is in the hands of those who are incapable of its proper management as capital, but who may control it to private ends. I refer now especially to property left in large estates to women, a large per cent. of which becomes the object of cupidity to adventurers and fortune-hunters. Some two years ago my attention was called, by an eminent lawyer who had a large knowledge of estates, to the fact that one of the chief signs which marked the corruption of the Roman Commonwealth, namely, the transfer of great fortunes to women, who became for this reason the prey of designing men, was repeating itself in a very noticeable way in this country. I attempt no comparison of the amount of inherited wealth which is passing through this medium into the hands of foreign profligates, measured by the sums devised for charitable purposes, but evidently the amount is large and increasing.

The criticism which has been offered upon the "Gospel of Wealth," viewed as a method of social relief, supplemented by the facts presented showing the concentration of wealth, may suggest to some of my readers the direct question, What do you propose? I reply at once, that the fact that I have taken issue with Mr. Carnegie's method of relief does not necessitate on my part the proposal of another gospel with like confidence and fervor. I disclaim any obligation resting upon those who criticise to construct. The desire to ameliorate the social condition, by carefully devised theories or by philanthropic efforts, belongs to us all as good citizens. But the critical function belongs especially to those who are striving to fulfill their office as ethical or religious teachers. And it is the last function to be relinquished or exchanged in times of great constructive and speculative energy like the present. The ethical test must be applied constantly and unsparingly to all social theories.

Take, for example, the attitude of moral and religious teachers towards socialism. The betterment of outward condition, the change of environment upon which socialism insists, appeals at once to the sympathy of all who have at heart the improvement of their kind. But, however sympathetic may be one's disposition, the question must be faithfully put, Is the betterment of condition

sought in the interest of character or regardless of character? The assumption cannot be too easily accepted that improved character will follow improved condition. That will depend altogether upon the insistence which is placed upon character as the end and object of changed condition. The moral result will not follow of itself. It must be provided for in the very process. The ethical questioning, therefore, which has begun to arrest the hitherto materialistic development of socialism, is thoroughly wholesome. It is in the interest of socialism. For whatever success is to attend the socialistic theory will depend ultimately upon what socialism actually holds of moral, not simply of material, improvement. Any changes which may take place from individualistic to socialistic methods will take place because they ought to, — ought, I mean, economically, which in the present instance is the same as saying ought ethically. We are not to expect that at some given date society will give individualism notice to move out with its institutions and machinery, and summon socialism to move in with its institutions and machinery. Society is too far advanced for that kind of experimentation. It is, indeed, liable to sudden movements, to some political or financial *coup d'état*, but the great social conditions of the future, whatever they may be, will come because they have earned the moral right to be. The justification of social change, the inward necessity of social progress, is the ethical principle, which in the last analysis is justice. That we must believe if we believe in progress. That we have the right to believe from the testimony of history.

But while disclaiming the necessity of advancing or of advocating any theory of social relief because of the criticism which has been ventured, I desire to call attention briefly to certain tendencies, of an ethical motive and character, which are operating to prevent the further concentration of wealth, or to recover to society so much of wealth as may now be wrongfully or wastefully in the possession of the few.

One of the most marked tendencies, which has in it the greatest promise in practical results, is the present ethical tendency of political economists. The ethical advance in political economy has been marked by the change of subject upon which emphasis has been placed, upon the change, that is, from production to distribution, and still later to consumption. The change began with the bold assertion of John Stuart Mill, that the same non-moral laws which govern production do not govern distribution,

that distribution is to a large degree governed by laws which are under human control, and are therefore moral.

"The laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them. . . . It is not so with the distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They can place them at the disposal of whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms. . . . The distribution of wealth, therefore, depends on the laws and customs of society. The rules by which it is determined are what the opinions and feelings of the ruling portion of the community make them, and are very different in different ages and countries, and might be still more different if mankind so chose."¹

The ethical progress involved in Mills's position may be estimated by noting the following questions, set forth by the latest political economist of note, Professor Alfred Marshall. These questions, many of which would have been ruled out of the discussion twenty years ago, are declared by Professor Marshall to be "problems of special urgency:"—

"Taking it for granted that a more equal distribution of wealth is to be desired, how far would this justify changes in the institutions of property, or limitations of free enterprise, even when they would be likely to diminish the aggregate of wealth? In other words, how far should an increase in the income of the poorer classes and a diminution of their work be aimed at, even if it involved some lessening of national material wealth?

"How ought the burdens of taxation to be distributed among the different classes of society?

"What are the proper relations of individual and collective action in a stage of civilization such as ours? . . . What business affairs should be undertaken by society itself acting through its government, imperial or local? Have we, for instance, carried as far as we should the plan of collective ownership and use of open spaces, of works of art, of the means of instruction and amusement, as well as of those material requisites of a civilized life, the supply of which requires united action, such as gas, and water, and railways? . . .

"When government does not itself directly intervene, how far should it allow individuals and corporations to conduct their own affairs as they please? How far should it regulate the management of railways and other concerns which are to some extent in a position of monopoly, and again of land and other things, the quantity of which cannot be increased by man? Is it necessary to retain in their full force all the existing

¹ *Political Economy*, vol. i., pp. 257, 258. See, also, *Autobiography*, p. 246.

rights of property; or have the original necessities, for which they were meant to provide, in some measure passed away?"¹

A still further advance is indicated in the recognition of the moral element involved in consumption. Consumption represents the growth of want in the individual, and this growth of want is the chief stimulus to social progress and the measure of it. Here lies the moral principle in all measures for the reduction of working time. Time is really worth more to the workingman than money. "The first condition for increasing the opportunity of the masses to develop their social character, and thereby increase their natural capacity to consume wealth, commensurate with their power to produce it, is *more leisure*."²

Another tendency, of immediate practical effect, is seen in the increased care about legislation, which may encourage or allow the further concentration of wealth. Many fortunes in the past have been due to legislation favoring private interests. Something of this legislation has doubtless been pardonable. It is difficult to see how it could have been avoided, without discouraging the material development of the country. But the time has certainly arrived when there is little necessity for bartering the national resources to stimulate the national development. And what is true of the nation is true in degree of the municipality. A city cannot afford to be wasteful of its rights in the growth of the "unearned increment." It is a hopeful sign that the old indifference of citizens in the disposal of valuable franchises is passing away. I do not say that they are not still to be disposed of, but they are no longer to be had for the asking, and they cannot be so easily gained by corruption.

Neither can one overlook the tendency to intercept wealth on its way into private hands through corporate bodies, by enlarging the economic functions of the municipality and the state. When Professor Marshall asks, "What business affairs should be undertaken by society itself acting through its government, imperial or local?" he puts a question of growing interest in all highly organized communities. The question is more advanced in England than in the United States, for here it has been held in check by municipal corruption. Birmingham,³ Glasgow, and now London

¹ *Principles of Economics*, vol. i., pp. 96, 97.

² George Gunton, *Wealth and Progress*, p. 234. See, also, by same author, *Principles of Social Economics*.

³ See article by the Hon. Joseph Chamberlain on "Favorable Aspects of State Socialism," in the *North American Review*, May, 1891.

are examples of the economic uses to which city corporations may be put. But these particular corporations do not rest upon universal suffrage, but upon a graduated system of property qualification. American cities have had too serious a struggle to guard the business interests necessarily committed to the city corporation to be eager to intrust new and more unrestricted interests to them. Still the tendency toward the use of municipalities for business purposes is beginning to show itself in this country; and it may be that the necessity for their increased use in this direction will help to their purification.¹ If the economic function of the municipality really ought to be increased, if it can naturally do a part of the business now in private hands at great gain to individuals, it is not unreasonable to expect that citizens will arouse themselves and see to it that the affairs of the city are conducted on business principles. And we may come in time to show a pride in all that pertains to municipal administration and improvement like that which characterizes the better cities of England and the Continent.

The growing disposition to apply the principle of taxation very vigorously to estates represents in a pronounced way the tendency to restrain the further concentration of wealth. This principle meets with Mr. Carnegie's unqualified approval. He refers to it as a "cheering indication of the growth of a salutary change in public opinion. . . . Of all forms of taxation this seems the wisest. Men who continue hoarding great sums all their lives, the proper use of which for public ends would work good to the community, from which it chiefly came, should be made to feel that the community, in the form of the state, cannot thus be deprived of its proper share. By taxing estates heavily at death, the state shows its condemnation of the selfish millionaire's unworthy life."

This principle has now become well established in legislation. It is recognized in England under the term "death duties." Estates above \$50,000 are taxed, and Mr. Goschen recommends that the tax be a graduated or progressive one. The same principle, under the form of a "collateral inheritance tax," is in operation in one or more of the States of the Union, and bills for its adoption are pending before several legislatures.²

¹ Two years ago I refused to sign a petition asking for legislation allowing cities to supply gas to private buyers, on the ground of the present municipal corruption. To-day I should be inclined to favor such legislation in the interest of municipal purity.

² "The bill pending at Albany to tax all inheritances over \$5,000 has been

But the theory of a progressive tax on inheritances carries with it logically the theory of a progressive income tax. There are minor differences; but there is no valid reason why a great fortune should not come under the same principle with a great estate.

Much stress cannot as yet be laid upon the actual results gained by coöperation, profit-sharing, and various other methods for effecting a better distribution of wealth while it is being made, but they all show the tendency upon which I am dwelling. And no one can forecast the possibilities which they represent. I have often thought that such a method of better distribution as profit-sharing is like a channel cut to change the bed of a river. In ordinary times it seems of little use. The overflow may fill it, but its waters are stagnant. The next flood may fill it with a rushing current, and make it thenceforth the bed of the stream. Certainly no one can foretell what one, if any, of the present experimental methods for the better distribution of wealth under production will yet be adopted, but they all have a certain capacity, and above all else they evince a certain sense of obligation or necessity to effect the end they seek to accomplish.

It has been my object in this article to call attention to the moral significance of great fortunes, to show the ethical bearing

made the subject of loud oburgation and protest, as though it were *primâ facie* an act of spoliation. We are accustomed to consider the estate of every deceased person as the rightful property of his next of kin, and hence to conclude that the state has no more right to help itself to a portion of the property than to seize arbitrarily the earnings of a living person. But the fact historically is that it is the state, and only the state, that enables surviving relatives, even children, to enjoy the possessions of the deceased. Without the state, *i. e.* organized society, all property is the prey of the strongest, and most especially property whose owner no longer has any need of it. It is the state that enables the owner to make disposition of it after his death. The question whether the state should take some portion of it for its own uses is one of detail, and not of abstract principle. Most civilized communities recognize the fact that the death of the father or mother leaves the family in a worse position than it was before, since it is deprived of the earnings and care that it formerly received, and hence that the estate, so far as concerns the direct heirs, should not be the subject of a special tax. Most communities, New York among the number, consider the property of decedents passing by will or inheritance not in the direct line as property subject to a special tax. The tendency and drift of enlightened opinion at the present day is towards the special taxation of large inheritances both in the direct and the indirect line. Of course, such taxation may be perverted and made an instrument of gross injustice, but it is not to be classed as spoliation *per se*."—New York Nation, March 19, 1891.

of the amassing of private wealth. I have not cared to enter the field of the methods of social relief and reform. Methods belong to economists and legislators. The concern of moral and religious teachers is with principles. They have to do legitimately with the ethical factor which is put into, or which is left out of, all proposed reforms. They are bound to test all theories which are offered in aid of society, and to test them all the more if they are offered with moral earnestness and under religious names. They have the right to ask of any new scheme whether it will leave society better or worse in the end for its adoption. My criticism of Mr. Carnegie's scheme has been that, to the degree in which it is organized and made the ruling method of adjusting wealth to society, it becomes a vast system of patronage, than which nothing can in the final issue create a more hopeless social condition. And further, that the assumption upon which it rests, that wealth is the inevitable possession of the few, and is best administered by them for the many, begs the whole question of economic justice now before society, and relegates it to the field of charity. But charity, as I have claimed, cannot solve the problems of the modern world. And the point is reached at which this claim is seen to be valid, whenever any scheme is proposed for the redistribution of wealth through charity, leaving the question of the original distribution of wealth unsettled, or settled only to the satisfaction of the few. What the ethical question of to-morrow in the economic world may be I know not. But the ethical question of to-day centres, I am sure, in the distribution rather than in the redistribution of wealth. I would hinder no man's gifts in the largest charity; I would withhold no honor from the giver; but I would accept no amount in charity as a measure of the present social need, or in settlement of the present economic demand.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

EDITORIAL.

"CHRISTIANITY IN ITS LOWEST TERMS."

THE phrase we have quoted as a caption is suggestive. As employed by its author, it discriminates Christianity in its constant factors from Christianity in its variable expressions. As a Japanese Christian, he pleads for a Japanese Christianity, and who can say him *Nay*? It should be a first principle in foreign missionary work so to introduce and propagate Christianity that it shall strike its roots into the soil in which it is planted. It can only flourish as a tree of life.

The phrase has other commendable applications. It expresses a desire, very general and strong at the present time, to apprehend Christianity in its simplicity and purity. The motive is mainly practical. Large bodies or classes of men are more or less alienated from Christianity in any of its highly developed forms,—from its elaborate creeds, its rituals, its organizations. Men are suspecting or concluding that the gospel is too much weighted with human additions, with metaphysical theories concerning God, with narrow-minded and narrower-hearted beliefs concerning man, with priestly pretension or pietistic ignorance, with traditionalism and institutionalism, to do its proper work in this stage of human history. It must be stripped of these encumbrances, set free from manifold restrictions, inspired with the power of its universal truths, preached to the universal mind and heart of man. Such an endeavor is only to be encouraged and promoted. The ultimate success of Christianity must be the triumph of a pure Christianity. What is not Christian may serve it, but cannot represent it nor do its work. All that is essentially foreign to it is hostile to it. It can possess all things, but only as it masters all things, everywhere infusing and perpetuating its own pure and uncompromising spirit.

There is also a powerful intellectual, rational, scientific interest in this task of ascertaining and understanding what the gospel is in its purity. The instinct for knowledge was never keener than now. It is equipped with improved instruments of investigation, with new or better understood tests of results; it has a wider outlook and clearer vision. Discrimination between what is temporary or local and what is general and permanent, estimates gained by multiplied observations, comparisons, eliminations, reductions, attempts to discern general laws and constant forces and real unity in phenomenal diversity, are as natural to modern Western thought as contemplation to a mediæval mystic, or fantasy and allegory to an Oriental theosophist. Christianity must needs be analyzed to its last element, studied in its phenomena, traced to its origins, set in relation to all other religious phenomena, assigned its place in human development. Deeper and more fascinating, though not always discriminated, is the inquiry, What is it? than the question, How it arose? And

as one tradition after another, however pious, is discredited by a better knowledge, it becomes a necessity of Christian faith itself to search out and seize upon what is permanent, essential, and vital.

As expressive of these discriminations and endeavors, the phrase "Christianity in its lowest terms" is as laudable as striking. It may, however, suggest methods of dealing with Christianity which are misleading or harmful. Some of these we will briefly notice.

1. *The method of reducing Christianity to what is common to it and other religions.* This was a favorite process with the English deists. One writer found five truths which constitute the essence of all religions. Another reduced everything to one principle, — the Moral Law followed as the will of God. The same method has often been tried. Philosophical Ebionism resorted to it in its effort to offer a Jewish resistance to the early progress of Christianity. It accepted Jesus as a religious teacher, and put Him in a line with Moses and Adam. It sought to combine paganism, Judaism, and Christianity in one universal religion. So, still later, Neo-Platonism, in the interest of heathenism, tried to defeat the triumph of Christianity by a philosophical combination and reduction of religious systems. What is noticeable in respect to each and all these attempts is, not merely that neither type of religion — the Jewish, the Græco-Roman, the Christian — was preserved in this way, but that the whole endeavor was a failure. Nothing came of it, however repeatedly tried. Each religion lost in the process its characteristics. The result was characterless. A religion which can fulfill other religions cannot be merely the sum of their common qualities, or these with some additions of its own. It must bring to perfection their distinctive excellences. It must unite them in something higher and better. It must be more than superior to each or to all; it must comprehend them all, and be the whole of which they are only fragmentary parts; and in this conception and realization of totality and unity there is something distinctively its own which cannot be found by a mere reduction of all to what is common. Neither Judaism, nor heathenism, nor Christianity, as we have said, came to its rights in any of the historic eclectic religious types to which we have alluded. Each lost its distinctive excellences. Reduction to the lowest terms was an elimination of the highest and best.

2. *The method of reducing Christianity to what is common to the various modes in which it has been professed.* Man is distinguished from other animals by his generic characteristics. Yet it is not from the average man, or from man reduced to his lowest terms, that we obtain our truest conception of humanity. Rather we study humanity in its best specimens. We select representative men. When we find a personality that exhibits human nature at its best, we say, There's a man. The greatest men, indeed, are entitled to this honor, not by reason of peculiarities which separate them from others of their race, but because they permanently exhibit qualities which belong to their race. They

are great, because they have so much of what is common to man, and in so high a degree. The more they have of the common quality, the greater they are. Their profoundest thoughts are capable of becoming universal maxims. Their highest imaginations draw all men upwards. Their best life is capable of the widest influence. It is so with communities, particular races, and nations. The more perfectly each represents humanity, the greater it is. Yet it does not follow from this representative character that in such manifestations of humanity we are simply discovering what is essentially necessary to humanity. We are rather more and more clearly discerning what is most truly, most perfectly human, — not merely what there must be in order that there may be a man at all, or the rudiments of a social order, but what there must be in order that there may be the truest and best man, and the most perfect human society. It is the same thing in learning what Christianity is. We need to contemplate it in its most adequate expressions. Catholic Christianity at any given time may not be so true and exemplary a Christianity as some contemporary provincial Christianity. Within the apostolic age the doctrine common to all the apostles is not so adequate and effective a representation of the Christian faith as is Paulinism, and there are elements of this faith more perfectly exhibited in the writings of St. John than in those of any other apostle. Apostolic Christianity reduced to its lowest terms is a saving faith; but it is not so Christian nor so truly the power of God unto salvation as apostolic Christianity in its highest terms. Athanasius was a provincial theologian before he became an ecumenical leader. Western theology was shaped by a fervid son of Africa, who never became Bishop of Rome, nor led a general council. The Reformation was provincial and local. Its special doctrine — the one that had in it the germ of development whose fruits are borne to-day wherever civil or religious liberty is real or assured — never before had found organic expression and a suitable field for its beneficent triumphs. It would not be possible to know to-day as much of Christianity as every student of the Pauline Epistles and every reader of the Bible may know, if it had not been for Martin Luther and John Calvin, and their provincial reformations. One does not best learn what sculpture is by collecting specimens from many lands, but by studying what has come down to us from one very limited country whose artists lead all others. Painting reduced to its lowest terms, — what would it give us? Certainly not the pictures that lovers of art cross seas and continents to behold.

3. *The method of recurrence to the Christianity of some past time as exclusively normal.* No one can question the advantage of comparing the Christianity of to-day with that of other times. No one can doubt that the nearer we draw to the companies of primitive disciples, the more clearly we can discern that many things which pass for Christianity are unessential to it, or incongruous with it. We are not dis-

crediting a comparative study of religious experiences and achievements. What we would oppose is the attempt to set up the Christianity of some past age as the standard for to-day, because it exhibits to us Christianity in its simplicity and integrity. Some thus exalt the Nicene age; others, the Ante-Nicene; more, the apostolic. The method is faulty. It misconstrues Christianity; makes it a code or a catechism, instead of a principle of life, a schoolmaster for one generation rather than the master of all the generations, a copying of patterns and models, and not an inspiration to all true knowledge of God and holy and beneficent living. The centre and circumference of the Christian revelation is a Person, to be known in the events of his life, the revelations of his character, the disclosure of his mind and will, the work of his Spirit. In all his offices He lives and works through all the generations. He is the perpetual Prophet, the ever-living Priest, the enthroned King. No age has been bereft of his presence. No century has passed but has revealed something of his purpose. Scripture, indeed, is sufficient for its end, and cannot be superseded. As a revelation of Christ it is normative to the end of time. But it does not exclude other revelations; on the contrary, it prepares for them and pledges them. We may not disunite what is thus divinely connected. Neither have we any right to overlook or condemn or disregard the constant and present revelation, and thus fail to enrich and enlarge our conception of Christianity and our understanding of its claims upon us. If we mistake not, no Christian doctrine now needs more attention, both in the pulpit and in theological lecture-rooms, than that of the Spirit's testimony through the church, — a testimony not restricted to the past, but ever augmenting in fullness and power, and discernible in every age by those who are of a spiritual mind. Through such a ministration Christianity is revealed, not in its lowest terms, but in increasing measures.

4. *The method of reduction to some single element of Christianity.* Sometimes, as in a recent paper by Dr. Momerie, in the "Forum," the reduction is to righteousness; at other times, faith has been equally exalted, or dogma, or submission to authority.

The true method we believe to be the historic, including under this the conception of divine as well as human factors, and recognizing, as involved in the history and necessary to its correct understanding, the primacy, the originating and life-giving power, of the divine. In history, we are not dealing with an abstraction, but with a given divine reality, manifesting itself within the order of human life and action, and operating in accordance with the conditions and laws there prescribed. We know Christianity under its historic forms, that is, as doctrine, life, and organization, each having its part in the development, neither capable of being thought away or eliminated from the process without the subject of the process being essentially changed and another substituted in its stead. Historically, there never has been a Christianity without these

elements. If we remove either, we get, not Christianity in its lowest terms, but a fancy of our own invention, — “another gospel which is not another.” Assuming these three elements, vouched for and attested in sacred Scripture and by the whole history of the church, we would press the thought that what is everywhere most needed, by whatever steps it shall be reached, is not Christianity in its lowest terms, but in its highest. That is, men need the gospel in its fullness; not in meagreness, not in a simplicity which really means emptiness and incapacity of a rich development, but in its power to take possession of the individual soul in all its activities, and of society in all its functions and spheres. It is enlargement that is now needed, not restriction; comprehension, not reduction and exclusion. We do not mean that whatever the church has gained through the centuries is to be thrust at once upon untutored minds, nor that it is to be imposed at all. There are rudiments of Christian science, as of all other knowledge. We have already recognized the duty of the foreign missionary to implant Christian truths as living germs, and to look for their growth according to their environment. We expect no uniformity in doctrine, life, or polity. But everywhere, in Japan as in America, on missionary ground as where Christianity has formed society for generations, men are to be encouraged and helped to find Christ in the fullness of his power to redeem and make alive. Christ, as Staupitz taught Luther, is a real Saviour for real sinners. There is nothing fictitious about Him, or small or limited, save as He became poor that we might be made rich. If we might say a word to our brethren in Japan, whose doubts and struggles are so vividly depicted or suggested in the paper that has occasioned these remarks, it would be but to repeat the word of that versatile, wide-looking, early convert to Christianity who was one of its first teachers at Alexandria, that meeting-place of all nations and religions, especially those of the East, — the significant word: “*We must cast ourselves into the greatness of Christ.*”

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RECENT EPISCOPAL ELECTION.

It is quite too late at the time at which we go to press to write in a merely congratulatory vein upon the election of Dr. Phillips Brooks as Bishop of the Diocese of Massachusetts. Our congratulations, though necessarily late, are hearty and respectful toward all immediately concerned in the election: to Dr. Brooks upon the spontaneous and widespread tribute to his character and influence; to Trinity Church upon its noble spirit of sacrifice in surrendering so ungrudgingly its private claim to the general desire; to the Convention upon the willingness of the minority to subordinate questions of polity, and even of dogma, to the advancement of a common Christianity. But as time passes it becomes evident that the event calls for something more than congratulation, how-

ever hearty and appreciative. The event is an object-lesson, the significance of which ought not to be overlooked or underestimated by any communion within the Christian church.

The opportunity has come first to the Episcopal communion, through its possession of a rare personality, to recognize and honor, in a representative way, the coming type of Christian power, namely, the power of Christian personality. We do not mean that the various denominations have not sought to make use of fit men for their public service; but the fitness has usually consisted in their capacity to emphasize a special form of dogmatic faith, or of ecclesiastical polity, or of executive energy. When character has been in any way conspicuous, it has been introduced as the ground of compromise. Good men have been chosen when strong men could not be agreed upon. Doubtless there is public worth in this kind of available mediocrity, but the resort to it in emergencies is a very different thing from the original choice of a man for his abounding Christian personality. Dr. Brooks was no compromise. He came into the field representing a distinct type of power, as distinct and commanding as that of a great ecclesiastic, or theologian, or organizer. And the type is one, as we have intimated, for which, in our judgment, there is to be an increasing demand and place. Other types are not to be displaced, but this is to take its place beside them with equal dignity, and with a new and timely influence. The possession of Dr. Brooks was to the honor, as it will be to the advantage, of the Episcopal Church. It gives to that church the immediate benefit of the new kind of leadership. But it will be to the profit of all branches of the church, — directly, because whatever is to the good of a part is to the good of the whole; indirectly, because it will inspire, if not compel, other communions to make use of their best men in representative places. Under this example of the Episcopal Church, the day of compromise candidates for official place ought to be over. The denomination that now resorts to them will do it at its cost. And whatever sect unduly exalts dogma or machinery will inevitably suffer. The public religious demand for leaders is for men of a wide and lofty humanity, filled with the *Christian* faith and purpose. The characteristic of Dr. Brooks, and the source of his public influence, is not simply that he is a great man, but that he is a great Christian man. We cannot conceive what reductions would have to be made in his stature in the absence of his peculiar Christian faith and enthusiasm. But we consider that the loss would be far greater with him than with many men having the equivalent of his intellectual force. Certainly it does not seem too much to say that Dr. Brooks is far greater as a preacher than he could have been as a general orator, and that no sphere of activity could have offered to him such intellectual growth and expansion as the Christian ministry.

It is absolutely sure that under the administration of such a man all interests in the church, whose affairs he directs, will be safe. Intolerance,

partisanship, favoritism, are out of the question. The high-churchman will doubtless find that he gains more in the end than would have been possible under the strenuous exertions of a bishop of his first choice. And the same result may confidently be expected in those matters in which Dr. Brooks has not been so conspicuously concerned as have some others. There are social questions, for example, in which we could have wished for a greater personal interest on his part, but we feel sure that these will be advanced by his broad and inspiring views far more than they could be by the special advocacy of any reforms we have most at heart. Great men in influential places, *whose greatness has breadth and elevation*, can be trusted. They will not be diverted from their main business into controversies. They cannot be indifferent to any social condition. They insure a broad sympathy for men from those whom they influence. They conserve the strength, the peace, the progress of the church.

We have not seen as yet in the public prints the moral drawn from the election of Dr. Brooks, but it is so plain that he who runs may read. It is not at all the triumph of one party over another, of radical over conservative, of broad over high. It is, positively, the recognition of the incoming type of leadership in the man of the great Christian personality. It is, negatively, a rebuke of littleness, narrowness, management, in all high places.

The Episcopal Church may not repeat this lesson at its next election of a bishop. It may indeed neutralize, so far as possible, its present action, and introduce a man of mediocrity or of partisanship into the House of Bishops. Still the lesson has gone out, and its application will be felt quite as much without as within its own communion. And nowhere, we believe, will it be more carefully heeded than by the younger men in that ministry which has for generations held the unquestioned supremacy in New England. The election of Dr. Brooks is at once an inspiration and a challenge to the Congregational Church of New England. The "church without a bishop" is not without its places of leadership, in its boards of missions, its colleges and seminaries, its influential pastorates. The type of its present leadership is now on trial. Has it the full equivalent to offer to the broad, progressive, and inspiring leadership which has now been assured to the Episcopal Church? No weak imitation is wanted. No traditions of abiding worth are to be ignored. No obligation of inheritance or of present opportunity is to be betrayed. Until the church is formally one by a greater necessity than that which now gives form to its separate parts, each part must maintain the principles and fulfill the duties which gave it existence. And the advantage will inevitably fall to that part which best illustrates the common Christianity. No part of the church, nor the church as a whole, can grow and prosper without the confidence and respect of the great community in which it does its work. Society, we are to remem-

ber, does not ask the church to be less Christian, but more Christian, to hold its faith nearer to the mind and heart of Christ, and to show its faith by its works. And the test which at present affects the public mind, more than any other, is the kind of men to whom a church intrusts its leadership. The type of personality which is produced, utilized, trusted, counts for more than dogma or organization.

We have nowhere seen a more truthful or striking assertion of this fact than in the closing words of a sermon preached by Dr. Brooks in Westminster Abbey on Sunday, July 4, 1880. The sermon had led the way to the challenge which one nation may rightly give to any other in the cause of a common humanity. Change the thought from the nation to the church, and his words are prophetic of the present demand of each communion in the church of Christ upon every other:—

“Not by the traditions of its history, nor by the splendor of its corporate achievements, nor by the abstract excellencies of its constitution, but by its fitness to make men, to beget and educate human character, to contribute to the complete humanity, the ‘perfect man’ that is to be,—by this alone each nation must be judged to-day. The nations are the golden candlesticks which hold aloft the candles of the Lord. No candlestick can be so rich or venerable that men shall honor it if it holds no candle. ‘Show us your man!’ land cries to land.”

AN INCONSISTENT AND USELESS PROCEDURE—THE TRIAL OF PROFESSOR BRIGGS.

FOR several years the Presbyterian Church of this country, in common with that of Scotland, has been profoundly agitated over its standards. The agitation here has taken the direction of revision. The discussions in the various Presbyteries, culminating in the vote to bring the matter before the General Assembly, have been at times very spirited. The shortcomings of the Confession, at the points where it fails to represent the scope and spirit of Christianity, have been set forth unsparingly. At the last meeting of the General Assembly the machinery for revision was set in motion; and at the present session further action may be expected, unless other issues throw this general subject into confusion.

On the eve of the meeting of the Assembly, action for heresy has been begun in the New York Presbytery against the chief advocate of revision,¹ and various Presbyteries have overtured the Assembly to forbid him the exercise of his office as a professor in one of the seminaries of the denomination. The peculiarity of the situation is that the New York Presbytery was by far the most outspoken advocate of revision among the Presbyteries, and sustained its utterances by a decisive vote. And when we look to see what has produced so sudden a change of heart

¹ Technically, Dr. Briggs is opposed to all revision, preferring to leave the Confession untouched, and to adopt a new creed for the working uses of the church.

in that body, we are surprised at the meagreness of the cause so far as it appears in the charges submitted against Professor Briggs. They have to do, nominally, with the sources of religious authority, the errancy of Scripture, and the theory of the progressive sanctification of believers after death. The view of Professor Briggs on the sources of religious authority is easily and fairly reconcilable with the theory of the supreme authority of the Scriptures, and is so maintained by him; his view of the errancy of Scripture cannot be at variance with the Confession, unless that is interpreted as denying the right of textual criticism; and his view of the progressive sanctification of believers after death, though contradictory to the immediate language of the Confession, is so evidently a question of interpretation and opinion that only a literalist would care to elevate it to the dignity of a heresy, unless the Presbyterian Church proposes to take a position in this article contrary to the whole end aimed at in revision. If the article in the Confession about the immediate sanctification of believers after death is to be interpreted against Dr. Briggs, then it ought, in consistency with the general object of revision, to be revised; otherwise the plain intent of revision in other articles will be to that degree neutralized. But the evident inconsistency of the present action lies in the conspicuous fact that this advocate of revision is put on trial while the standards by which he must be tried are passing through so serious a change. Not that there should be a suspension of discipline at all points while the process of revision is going on. The Confession holds good for discipline at points untouched, directly or indirectly, by the general theological purpose of the revision. But the spectacle of a man really on trial upon the same large question upon which the Confession itself is on trial, is as confusing as it is painful.

The peculiar infelicity of the trial of Dr. Briggs at this time aside, the serious question remains, What good can possibly come of it? How can such a procedure settle the issue? The issue is drawn around subjects of Biblical Criticism. But these subjects lie altogether in the region of fact. They are not primarily concerned with theories of inspiration, but with matters of history. Eventually the truth will be ascertained to the satisfaction of the church, and the attempt meanwhile to arrest earnest and reverent and loyal Christian scholars in their investigations, by ecclesiastical violence, is nothing short of supreme folly. The attempt to suppress inquiry within the realm of speculative theology has proved to be utterly futile; much more, the attempt to restrain inquiry within the realm of historic fact. Must the orthodoxy of the Presbyterian Church, in its inherited views, be vindicated? There is but one way in which orthodoxy can vindicate itself, — through the truth. No wiser words have been uttered by an ecclesiastical body than were uttered by the Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland in 1880 in dismissing the charges (for the first time) presented against Professor Robertson Smith: "The Free Church, in declining to decide on these

critical views by way of discipline, expresses no view in favor of their truth or probability, but leaves the ultimate decision to future inquiry, in the spirit of patience, humility, and brotherly charity." Deciding on critical views "by way of discipline" has never yet accomplished its end, and it seems strange that each new generation must learn this lesson for itself. The prosecution of Dr. Briggs, if carried on to the conclusion of heresy, can have no other result than schism. The Presbyterian Church can of course depose him, but only, as it would appear, at the cost of the integrity of the body. Dr. Briggs represents two things which cannot be dealt with "by way of discipline," — the rights of reverent Christian scholarship, and the enlargement of Calvinism to the measure of Christianity. He may have personal methods of urging these claims. Every positive man has like methods. They do not affect the main question. In the providence of God, Dr. Briggs has become one of the chief representatives in the Presbyterian body of that movement for the readjustment and enlargement of faith which is going on in all the great evangelical bodies. The moral necessity for the movement is too apparent, the principles on which it is carried forward are too well established, its Christian purpose is too thoroughly assured, for its supporters (and they are daily increasing) to succumb to any cries or charges of heresy. We are not surprised at the protests in behalf of Dr. Briggs from all classes in the ministry of the Presbyterian Church, — from pastors, missionaries, and professors in other seminaries as well as from his own colleagues. One of the most touching protests is from the former pupils of Professor Briggs, and general students of his works, showing the spiritual effect of his teaching.

"We regard," they say, "Dr. Briggs as a man possessed not only of exceptional learning, but also of rare piety and consecration. Instead of bringing reproach upon the Bible, as has been asserted, he has, we think, a special power of imbuing his students with an earnest love for the inspired word of God, and with a comprehensive insight into its profoundest truth, thus training them for a more skillful use of the 'sword of the Spirit.' Hence we earnestly protest, for the sake of the peace and the prosperity of the great Presbyterian Church, against any action which seeks to undermine the confidence of the church in Dr. Briggs, or to remove him from his position of valued influence."

We believe, as the language of the protest suggests, that the "peace and prosperity of the Presbyterian Church" are involved in action which it may take in the present case. And we think that it will become more and more evident, as the trial of Professor Briggs proceeds, — for we assume that it must go on, — that it is really the Presbyterian Church which is on trial.

As we are writing, the following paper, by one of the most accomplished Biblical scholars in the Presbyterian Church, has come under our

notice. We are happy to be allowed by the writer to publish it in connection with this editorial. It is in part a plea against any attempt of the General Assembly at its present session to prejudge the case of Dr. Briggs, but rather to allow it to take the course of an orderly trial. Our readers may know what the Assembly does, or declines to do, before this number of the "Review" reaches them; but the general argument of the paper is of permanent value:—

"It is clear from the action of a considerable number of Presbyteries that a strong effort will be made to have the General Assembly interfere to prevent Professor Briggs from taking the chair of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Seminary, to which he was recently appointed. I heartily agree with Professor Green,—though I should, perhaps, give his words a different application,—that 'questions which should be settled by calm, scholarly discussion ought not to have been forced upon ecclesiastical tribunals.' But it is manifest that they will be; and it is important that we should clearly understand what the issue is which is thus raised. It is a simple one, and one much larger than the immediate occasion which has brought it up. The discussions in the Presbyteries and in the press, and the form of many of the resolutions which are to be sent up to the Assembly, show plainly enough that the real question is not the individual opinions of Professor Briggs on subjects of Biblical criticism or otherwise, but whether there is room in the Presbyterian Church for men who are constrained by faithfulness to the Bible itself to take toward the Scriptures the attitude which is occupied to-day by many Christian scholars in all our churches. There is only one way in which this question can be decided. Let the Presbytery of New York proceed against Professor Briggs in the way prescribed in the Book of Discipline; the case can then be taken, in due course, to the Synod and the Assembly, and thus a valid decision reached. Meanwhile the Assembly may have the power to veto the appointment of the Professor; but it would be obviously improper for it to prejudge in its executive capacity a case and a question which it may very likely have to pronounce upon judicially. Not to speak of the embarrassment which such action might hereafter create for the Assembly itself, a *præjudicium* of this sort, seeming to be the verdict of the whole church, could hardly fail to affect most injuriously Professor Briggs's right to an impartial trial in his own Presbytery. This consideration, if there were no other, should make the Assembly slow to yield to the clamor for immediate intervention. I regret, therefore, to see Professor Green take the ground (Evangelist, April 3), that the way in which the issue has been raised leaves the church no discretion, but compels it to face the alternative of indorsing or refusing to indorse the sentiments of Professor Briggs's Address. To begin with, I do not see how the Assembly, in acquiescing in the appointment of a professor in a theological seminary, or even in confirming his appointment, if that were necessary, indorses his sentiments. A few years ago the chair of Systematic Theology, in one of the seminaries popularly supposed to represent the strictest sect of our religion, was filled by a scholar whose views in eschatology were at variance with those of the great body of our church, if not with the Confession of Faith itself. He had zealously promulgated these views, to which he attached a very exaggerated importance. But nobody ever supposed that the Assembly indorsed his opinions because it did not veto his election. And if this is true ordinarily,

still less could it be construed as an indorsement of Professor Briggs's views if the Assembly should decline to take any action which might even appear to prejudge his case. The less the Assembly sympathizes with his opinions, the more careful it should be to preserve not only the rights but the proprieties of the case.

"It is a very singular argument that Professor Green employs when he says that to take no action in this case is not only to indorse the opinions of Professor Briggs, but to suffer them to become the ruling policy in the seminaries of the church for all time to come. For if the views of Professor Briggs are so convincing that if left to themselves they will prevail in the seminaries for all time to come, the veto of the General Assembly will not prevent their spreading, and one who had somewhat of the spirit of Gamaliel might well hesitate lest, in a hasty condemnation of them, we should be proved by the event to have opposed the truth.

"There is another side of this business which deserves attention. Those who are working to have the General Assembly veto the appointment of Professor Briggs do so not so much for the sake of preventing him from taking his chair as of securing in this way the condemnation of certain views in regard to the Bible, or a certain attitude toward the Bible, and of committing the church to their own position on this point. That is, they propose to have the Assembly promulgate a new dogma concerning the Scripture. I say advisedly a new dogma. Let us take, for example, the question of 'inerrancy.' We know very well what the Confession says. The Old Testament in Hebrew, and the New Testament in Greek, being immediately inspired by God, and by his singular care and providence kept pure in all ages, are therefore authentic. The men of the seventeenth century knew what they wanted; not a Bible that had been infallible, but one that is infallible. They therefore affirmed not only its immediate inspiration, but its inerrant transmission, so that the Hebrew and Greek in our hands are 'authentic.' Here Protestantism found an authority to oppose to that of the church, a Word of God which was the end of all controversy. We know how textual criticism in the hands of Catholic scholars like Morin was regarded on both sides as undermining the Protestant position; how the first Protestant critics who denied the antiquity of the Hebrew vowel-points, and resorted to the ancient versions to emend the Hebrew text, were assailed as the enemies of the faith. Slowly but surely textual criticism has made its way. The work of Tischendorf, Tregelles, Westcott and Hort, is now extolled by some of those who are most hostile to the Higher Criticism. Yet these critics have shown that the doxology of the Lord's Prayer is a liturgical formula; that the end of the Gospel of Mark is not genuine; that the story of the woman taken in adultery is no part of the original Gospel of John; that the verse about the three heavenly witnesses is a late interpolation, etc. We have a vastly better text of the New Testament than the Westminster men, one far nearer to what the inspired authors wrote; but we got it, not from those who denied that there were errors in the received text, but from critics who frankly recognized the existence of errors, and employed the means which critical science commands to eliminate them and recover the original reading. The fears which the beginnings of textual criticism aroused have not been realized. No important fact or teaching of the New Testament has been shapen by criticism; nor does men's faith rest on a less sure basis because we know that in many cases the choice between two

readings depends on considerations so slight or so subtle that certainty and unanimity are unattainable. This being the state of the case as regards the text of the Bible, no one would think of reaffirming the language of the Confession of Faith in its obvious and historical meaning. Our friends who conceive themselves to be the representatives of confessional orthodoxy propose, therefore, a new statement. It is that the original autographs of the Hebrew Old Testament and the Greek New Testament, being immediately inspired, were without error, but that they have been subsequently exposed to all the ordinary accidents of transmission. Inerrancy is not to be affirmed of the Bible which we have in our hands, and by which we have to guide our lives; but of certain long-perished manuscripts, which no man has seen for thousands of years, or will ever see again. This is seriously proposed as a substitute for the confessional doctrines, and, what is more amazing, those who desire to make an article of faith of it are apparently not aware how completely it surrenders the confessional position. Of what use, I think I hear a consistent, old-fashioned theologian say, to have a Bible that was once without error, if we are to admit that there are errors in it now? For if there are errors, only criticism can tell what, and where, and how many, and how great; and the critics cannot agree, and the common man can never know what he is to believe. The authority of Scripture is destroyed! And the critic, for his part, must say that, if all the discrepancies and errors which exist in the Old Testament are to be charged to the blunders of scribes, the text, so far from having been kept pure in all ages, must be regarded as corrupt to a degree and in a way which the rashest of critics have never assumed. And as these difficulties are largely of a sort with which textual criticism is not accustomed to deal, and with which its resources and methods do not fit it to deal, its already difficult task would thus become impossible. The practical result of this new doctrine, if it could be put in practice at all, would be to render futile all efforts critically to restore the text of the sacred autographs.

"But there is a feature of the movement, which seeks its expression in this new dogma of the inerrancy of the autographs, which cannot fail to excite more apprehension than the dogma itself. It is its un-Protestant spirit. This is most naively expressed in the resolutions of the Presbytery of Cincinnati, which approve of full and free critical study of the Scriptures, provided it be for the purpose of vindicating the truth as held by our church. That is the Roman Catholic position about the relation of science to dogma, pure and simple. And it is in antagonism — all the more dangerous because ignorant — not only to the Confession of Faith, but to the fundamental principle of the Reformation.

"In the face of the obvious spirit and trend of this movement, the question has become a vastly larger one than whether or not Professor Briggs shall teach Biblical Theology in New York. It is whether a new dogma shall be promulgated by the Assembly, and new and unwarranted tests imposed; whether science and criticism shall be muzzled by a new syllabus."

A COMMUNICATION — CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM.

THERE is a current saying to the effect that every reform has three stages: first, it is said to be impossible; secondly, it is said to be contrary to the Bible; and thirdly, its opponents during both of these stages declare that they have always held the reformer's opinions.

It is evident from Miss Anna L. Dawes' article in the "Andover Review" for April, entitled "Mr. Bellamy and Christianity," that nationalism has reached its second stage. So far as Mr. Bellamy is personally concerned, he may be left to make his own explanation or defense. It is not with his individual views that the writer proposes to deal, but with the broader question. Is nationalism opposed to Christianity? — a question which Miss Dawes answers in the affirmative. It is true that she has identified Mr. Bellamy with nationalism, apparently without reflecting that the cause is apt to be larger than the outlook of its most zealous advocates.

Now, since there are those who claim that nationalism *is* working squarely upon Christian lines, it may be well to consider why this latter view seems tenable; and if so, what are some of the mistakes into which the writer of "Mr. Bellamy and Christianity" has fallen. Her argument seems to be this: nationalism holds that better material conditions are aids to moral progress. Better material conditions mean happiness. Therefore nationalism holds that happiness is essential to moral progress.

It does not seem to the writer that the above argument is altogether sound: if it is, the case of nationalism is not worth pleading. But *do* better material conditions necessarily involve happiness? They make happiness probable in a majority of cases, but that is a very different thing from saying that they insure it. And, granting for the sake of the argument that they do, is it logical to say that, because nationalism asserts them to be *aids* to moral progress, that it also declares that either they are essential or the happiness which is their outcome is *essential* to moral progress? It is not only hazardous to hold that material well-being is necessarily productive of spiritual well-being, — it is impossible. Theory and practice both prove that such a position is untenable.

Miss Dawes also declares that "the fundamental question for us is, What is the best environment for developing moral strength?" She objects to any scheme which makes goodness unavoidable by excluding all possibility of choosing evil, — and well she may! Her anxiety on this point is unnecessary, however. So long as any creature possesses freedom of the will, there will always be the possibility of choice, and no exterior surroundings will make the choice of goodness irresistible. It is written that Satan fell from Heaven.

Assuming for the sake of the argument that the development of moral strength is the end to be sought, it is easy to see that the mere existence of obstacles to be overcome is not the means of reaching it. We do, indeed, press the earth firmly about the roots of a plant, but we do not pound it down as though we were laying a street pavement, — much less do we cover it with concrete. We do not refuse a child his proper school-books as a means of encouraging in him a desire for knowledge. We do not expose young people to all the temptations of life (it may be feared that we *do* expose them far too much for their own good, here in America) in order that they may become morally strong. Briefly, it is possible

that obstacles, in place of being incentives to effort, may crush out the capacity of development, or seriously arrest it, at least.

But here one may join issue with Miss Dawes. Is "What is the best environment for developing moral strength?" our "fundamental question"? Is it not, rather, What is the best environment for developing goodness? For, after all, strength — physical, mental, or moral — is a means rather than an end. The pursuit of physical strength as an end defeats itself, — professional athletes are seldom long-lived or well-rounded men. Mental strength which exults in its own prowess is apt to run into mere logic-chopping. Moral strength, cultivated for its own sake, has often an outcome in the Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men are.

Those who oppose nationalism on the ground that the present social condition is, by reason of its deprivations, a blessing, since these deprivations are a help to spiritual living, ought to understand that the exact opposite of a false proposition is by no means certain to be the true one, — though it is a favorite argumentative short-cut to assume this to be the case. Because better material conditions, whether they involve happiness or not, do not insure moral progress, it does not follow that obstacles to material progress are blessings. These opponents of nationalism would shrink from proclaiming asceticism as the cure-all for the ills of society, and yet asceticism is the logical outcome of their premises.

If we leave methods and look only at results, what do we find to be the result of asceticism? What we do *not* find is that social state which the word "civilization" suggests to our minds. St. Simeon Stylites on his pillar is not on a par with the North American Indian of the sixteenth century, so far as the comforts of civilization are concerned; nor is his spiritual ideal much higher. His

"Thrice ten years,
Thrice multiplied by superhuman pangs,"

seem to us not so much the outcome of the "glad tidings" of Christianity as of the pagan idea that the gods are appeased by voluntary human suffering, *per se*. And just here we may venture to point out the difference between suffering for a selfish aim — which is asceticism — and suffering in the performance of duty, which is self-sacrifice. "The world's saints from Moses onward" have been those who never flinched from their duty, cost what it might, — not those who have chosen suffering for the sake of some extraordinary supposititious benefit to themselves. It is Buddha's yearning to help the world (not to take, for the mere purposes of illustration, the supreme Sacrifice) that gives his renunciation of all that men hold most dear its power to thrill us with a sense of dignity and pathos; while our pity is largely mingled with contempt for those Yogis whom he meets, who

"Stake brief agonies in game with gods
To gain the larger joys."

On the other hand, the social reformers of Rousseau's school (who were certainly not ascetics) preached a return to nature as the cure for the evils of society, and we know to what *that* doctrine leads in the average man. At best, it is a flight to some enchanted island where — the social problem being reduced to its lowest terms — a select community can live in a selfish seclusion from the world at large; a result which is simply a begging of the question. At its worst, it substitutes instinct, appetite,

and passion for reason and self-control, and here, so far as results are concerned, the extremes of asceticism and self-indulgence meet. Civilization, which always involves coöperation, is impossible to either. The great brotherhood of man breaks up into small and selfish coteries, which are much more anxious to achieve their personal ends than they are to bring in the kingdom of God here upon earth. Unquestionably "the kingdom of God is within you," but is it not one of the certainties of life that what is within a man will, yes, *must*, make itself felt upon the things which surround him? Does this exclude the other proposition, — that the character of the things about a man will influence him for good or evil? There is no need of argument: we know that there is truth in both propositions.

It would seem, however, that those who oppose nationalism on the ground that it will make life too easy for the moral welfare of humanity have dwelt so much upon the first of the foregoing propositions that they have not given the latter its due weight. "It is the law of physical evolution," Miss Dawes declares, "that the strongest survive and the weak disappear. This is the law of social evolution also." The objection to this statement is that it does not cover the facts of the case, since it takes no cognizance of the possible difference in environment. A delicate plant, placed in good soil and properly watered and cared for, will live and flourish, while a much stronger plant will dwindle and die if set out in the sand under a burning sun.

The law of physical evolution is not the survival of the strongest, but the survival of the fittest. This is "the law of social evolution" as well, — yes, of all evolution; physical, social, or spiritual. The world's history is full of that great teaching, — that the lower is fulfilled in the higher. It is the glory of Christianity that she takes all of the good that ever existed in the past, and carries it on to greater perfection. She is the most vital of all seeds, — yes! But she is also the most fitting medium for the fullest expression of all that is best in humanity; and the more fully that best is developed, the higher grows the ideal. Her progress is the progress of true freedom, — of the liberty which is not license. She looked upon Judaism, and the ceremonial of the law passed away, while all that was most useful to man's spiritual nature — the conception of an all-holy God — was quickened into a new meaning under her gaze. Once again, in the sixteenth century, she broke the bonds of ecclesiasticism when they had ceased to be needed as a protection from the heathen round about her, and fulfilled the old order in the conception of the direct communion between every man and his Maker. In the eighteenth century, the consolidation of political power in the hands of a few, which had done its work in bringing about a rough form of political union, gave place to the loftier conception — which was, in reality, an outcome of man's spiritual emancipation — of a state in which the rulers should be the people; and social union, in theory at least, became possible.

Man, under the guidance of Christianity, has freed himself from ecclesiastical and political tyranny, — he looks forward to the time when he shall be free from industrial tyranny as well. This is the message of nationalism. Is it not on Christian lines? Nationalism does not claim to be an improvement upon Christianity, as some of its opponents seem to imagine. Christianity is her own fulfillment, — she contains the Alpha and Omega of human progress. But nationalism *does* hold that a proper

environment is a help even to Christianity ; and it holds that loathsome tenement-houses, wretched food, starvation wages, — all, in fact, which makes it probable that a man or woman must seek diversion in the gratification of the lower nature, since they are effectually barred out from what decent people mean by happiness, to say nothing of holiness, — does not give that environment which is best adapted for the welfare, physical, social, or spiritual, of mankind.

It is the American idea, as it is the nationalistic, that opportunity and not obstacle is the key to improvement. In theory at least, every man has a right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." We have not as yet abandoned the principles of the Declaration of Independence. There are hospitals for the sick. There is relief for the poor, and, better than any mere dole, there is the beginning, at least, of an industrial education which shall aid the poor to help themselves. There is the system of free schools, that no boy nor girl may be under disadvantage in making the most of inborn talents. Our prisons are no longer regarded as cages for the confinement of criminals, — they are viewed more and more as reformatories.

Here we touch upon a new motive. — new in its direct application, but as old as Christianity in its conception, — which has its source in the feeling that it is not for the sake of some abstract thing called "society" that all this is done. That the individual existed for the state was the sentiment in ancient Rome ; and we can see into what errors in practice this theory led. So far as the state is concerned, it might be well enough if the feeble and vicious should die, and, as Scrooge remarked, "decrease the surplus population." The feeble were permitted — one might say, encouraged — to die in ancient Rome ; and infanticide was one of the methods. Vice was sternly repressed under the Republic, it flourished under the Empire ; the question of *reformation* did not enter into its consideration to any extent under either. Christianity proclaimed the right of the individual to protection and reformation. Society was considered as existing for the sake of the individuals who composed it. Cain's question was answered in the affirmative ; each man *was* — and *is* — his brother's keeper.

As Protestantism was the Christian protest against spiritual slavery ; as democracy was the Christian protest against political slavery, — so nationalism is the Christian protest against industrial slavery. It works on the same lines with Christianity, and makes the same assertions.

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BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

CAN THERE BE NO DAVIDIC PSALMS IN THE PSALTER ?

THERE was a time when even some, who ought to have known better, ascribed the whole Psalter to David as its author. Critical opinion has now for some time been tending towards the opposite extreme. Several eminent scholars have already published their conviction that there can be no Davidic compositions in the present Book of Psalms, and many more undoubtedly assent to their view. So far as I know, no one doubts

that David was a lyric poet of note in his day; and though some question whether he ever wrote hymns, this is not necessarily to be assumed of all. It is enough for me to know that they agree with the opinion that he cannot have written any of those now found in the Psalter. It is this position, and the grounds on which it is made to rest, that I propose to examine. And it may serve to place what I have to say in a stronger light, if I state at once that my interest in the question lies almost wholly in its bearing on what is called Old Testament theology, that is, to speak more correctly, the history of the religion of Israel. The Psalter is what it is, whether David is one of its authors or not; but the construction of the history of the Old Testament religion must be materially influenced by the answer given to this question.

Among the latest critics who deny David any share in the Psalter, the best-known and most eminent are Kuenen and Reuss. I proceed, therefore, to give in brief the arguments on which they base their conclusion. To combine and state them in one word, they amount to this, — that the religious and ethical plane of David and his age is below that which comes to view in the Psalms. Kuenen's sketch of David and his time, as given in his "*Hist.-Kritisch Onderzoek*," vol. iii., p. 265 ff.,¹ and somewhat more fully worked out in his "*Godsdienst*" (i. 317 ff.), may be summarized under three heads: 1. The Jahvism of David's time is far from pure. It conceives of Jahveh as a tribal deity, whose worship is tied to the land of Canaan, and from whom the crossing of the boundary line separates the worshiper. It is described by the critics as what I may venture to call a species of territorial henotheism, in contradistinction from polytheism on the one hand and from universalistic monotheism on the other, and is said to manifest morally unworthy conceptions of God and gross superstition. 2. The ethics of the age, and David's in particular, allow of inhuman cruelty towards conquered enemies, treason and deceit towards the unsuspecting and defenseless, vengefulness, and rude dissoluteness in sexual relations. 3. The historical books give us no right to expect "chiefly religious poems" from David, whose proficiency and fame in music and poetry cannot reasonably be questioned. The points adduced by Reuss, in his "*Geschichte d. heilige Schriften Alten Testaments*," sections 155–159, add nothing to the foregoing, but are urged with a vehemence of expression which is more honorable to the moral energy of the man than assuring of the judicial impartiality of the critic.

In considering these positions, it should be borne in mind that they involve two questions: First, whether they are well taken; and secondly, if well taken, whether they carry the conclusion drawn from them.

Is it true, then, I ask, with reference to the first position, that in David's time Jahveh was conceived of as a tribal or national god, whose power was limited to his own land, and who was only one among many other similar deities? The principal passage brought to support this view is 1 Samuel xxvi. 19, where David, determined to escape constantly threatened death by leaving Saul's dominion, says, "They have this day driven me out, so that I cannot abide יה בְּיָדָם (in or with the possession of Jahveh), thereby saying, Go, serve other gods." It is evident from these words that David regards exile as condemning him to serve strange gods; but the question is, why he so regards it. Now, if the expression יה בְּיָדָם denoted the land owned by Jahveh and in-

¹ The first edition; the second is not out yet.

habited by Israel, it would be natural to infer that Jahveh's presence and power were conceived of as territorially limited and confined. Kuenen, at least, seems so to understand it.¹ But in that sense the phrase is comparatively rare. I can find but six clear instances of it, or what is equivalent to it: Jeremiah ii. 7; xii. 14; xvi. 18; Exodus xv. 17; Psalms lxviii. 10; lxxix. 1; and possibly Jeremiah l. 11.² We read innumerable times of Jahveh's land, or the land which he gives to Israel, but the word is אֶרֶץ or אֶדְמָה; cf. 1 Kings viii. 36; Hosea ix. 3; Leviticus xxv. 23. On the other hand, נְחִלָּה is found at least twenty-five times, in Deuteronomy, the Prophets, the Psalms, and the historical books, of Israel as the possession of Jahveh. Four instructive instances, besides the present one, occur in the books of Samuel: in 1 Samuel x. 1 Samuel says to Saul, "Has not Jahveh appointed thee to be a prince over his נְחִלָּה?" in 2 Samuel xiv. 16, a woman comes to David with the feigned petition that he will save her and her son from being cut off from among the נְחִלָּה of Elohim; 2 Samuel xx. 19, the wise woman of Abel says to Joab, "Thou seekest to kill a mother city in Israel; why wilt thou swallow up the נְחִלָּה of Jahveh?" and in chap. xxi. 3 David asks the Gibeonites, "What shall I do for you, that ye may bless the נְחִלָּה of Jahveh?" The tribal gods of primitive peoples were undoubtedly domiciled in the land of their worshipers, — hence David could say, "Let me not fall (die) far away from the face of Jahveh," that is, in a foreign land, 2 Samuel xx. 20, — but they were no more hemmed in by territorial boundaries than the people themselves. It is they who give victory to their servants when they invade the lands of other tribes, and march at their head when they emigrate to more promising regions. The very passage which at first view seems to make them a species of divine *adscripti glebæ* — I refer to 2 Kings xvii. 26, containing the complaint of Sargon's colonists in Samaria that they suffer from lions because they understand not the requirements of the "god of the land" — on further consideration rather shows the contrary. For not only had these colonists, coming from various localities, brought their old gods with them away from their own lands, but they would have been furnished with the means of propitiating the local deity before they entered on his domain, if it had been the common belief that the gods were first of all gods of the soil, and continued to dwell in their lands even after the people that served them had been removed. It may be rationally conjectured that the land of the ten tribes was supposed by the newcomers to have been wholly depopulated, and consequently to be godless. But in fact many of the lower classes of Israelites still remained, organized into clans or communities of such form as they could compass, and worshipping their ancient God as best they could (cf. 2 Kings xxiii. 15–19; Jer. xli. 5). The "god of the land" was there, because fragments of his people were still there. And Sargon's command to send one of the deported priests to instruct his new colonists in the proper ritual of the Israelitish deity, rather than to let the gods and their tribes fight it out among themselves, may have been but a shrewd move to promote, by means of religious syncretism, that peaceable amalgamation of the native remnants and the newly introduced population, which seems to have actually occurred.³ No doubt it was the ancient belief that the

¹ *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 68.

² In Jeremiah xii. 7–13, "my possession" seems to be used with a double sense to denote both (and primarily) "my people" and "my land."

³ Since writing the above, a friend called my attention to a statement in the

gods clung to their lands, and fought to retain them, just as their peoples did, and as long as they did. And as they wrought and fought through their people, the only visible instruments of their power, and were thus naturally credited with the peculiar aptitudes and weaknesses of their people, it can easily be understood how some should be considered gods of the hills and others gods of the plains, without recourse to the assumption that they were regarded as unable to change their abodes, and without power anywhere else.

Now, if this be true of ancient heathen peoples, — and that it is true a point to be presently brought forward seems to me to confirm, — what reason is there to suppose that David and David's age conceived Jahveh to be helplessly bound to that part of Canaan inhabited by his people? But then how account for David's feeling that exile necessarily involved the service of other gods? Here recourse must be had to primitive ideas concerning the mutual relation of the gods and their tribes. Robertson Smith (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 33) describes this relation, as anciently conceived, by the term "solidarity." He might with perfect consistency with himself have termed it natural, in contradistinction of covenanted, artificial solidarity. The gods and the tribe formed, as he expresses it, "one organic society," and that because of blood-relationship. The god was the Father or Patriarch of the tribe in the most literal, realistic sense of the word (see p. 42). He was its ancestor. And, like a merely human father, he was likewise the master and ruler of his tribal family in all the affairs of life, while they were all and severally his servants and worshipers. The connection was indissoluble, except as a diseased individual member of the body may drop off through the gangrene of treacherous desertion, or be cut off by the knife of patriotic surgery. It was so complete that the enemies of the tribe were, *ipso facto*, enemies of their god, and the enemies of the god were enemies of his tribe.

From this fundamental conception two inferences may be safely drawn: First, that the relation of the god was in the first instance a relation, not with his land, but with his people, and with the land only secondarily, through them or on their account. This was the point to which I alluded a moment since as confirming the contention that, if the sphere within which the gods could act was regarded as restricted, it was not because they were hampered by territorial limitations; and that, therefore, if David thought that the crossing of a boundary separated him from Jahveh, the reason thereof is not to be sought in any physical or local disabilities of Jahveh. The second inference is that, on the contrary, the true reason of the separation is found in the fundamental idea of the relation between the tribal god and his people. The ancient tribe had no room for any who did not acknowledge its divine ancestor and ruler; still less for one who, while he enjoyed the family benefits, insisted on doing homage to another god. It was not chiefly what we call religion that produced this intolerance. Filial piety, patriotism, and above all the instinct of tribal self-preservation and well-being, imperatively demanded it. Kindred clans might coalesce into a larger communal organism, and individuals might be grafted into the tribal stock; Sargon Cylinder-Inscription, which indicates that his action in this instance may be regarded as part of his settled policy. See Lyon, *Keilschrift-Texte Sargon's*, p. 39, lines 72-74. The statement is repeated in two other of his inscriptions.

but to live in the family and yet not be of it was impossible. That was the difficulty that stared David in the face. His enemies drove him out from among his own people. To live without tribal connection, even with six hundred valiant men at command, was not permanently practicable; to make a new tribe could not enter his thoughts, for tribes are born, not made; the only alternative that seemed to remain was to enter into organic union with some other tribe and serve its gods.

Viewed in this light, what does the passage prove? Nothing more than that David knows that he cannot cast in his lot with Moabites, Philistines, or any other tribe, and yet continue to serve Jahveh. If it be said that it indicates that he knows no difference between the external ritual acts of worship and the internal service of the spirit, I answer that the contrary may be more plausibly inferred from the course he subsequently takes, when he seeks safety with Achish, the king of Gath. Yet he is confessedly an enthusiastic servant of Jahveh. It is that that makes Saul, the "Anointed of Jahveh," sacred in his sight, and that induced later generations to designate him by the title of highest honor, — the Servant of Jahveh. How can such a man be conceived to hesitate between death and apostasy, dishonorable even in the eyes of men, unless, like the Syrian captain of a subsequent age, he already distinguishes between external acts of homage and internal loyalty? The passage under review affords no clue whatever to David's thought concerning Jahveh's nature, power, or relation to other gods, nor as to those other gods themselves, whether he regards them as real entities or as mere nothings. Nor can information on these points be extracted from the fact that one of his sons bears the name *בְּנֵי־יָדָע*, Baal knows (1 Chron. xiv. 7). Reuss observes, with reference to this name and the names Ishbaal and Meribbaal, borne by sons of Saul, that they may be accounted for by supposing that Baal was "in those times a neutral designation of the Deity" (p. 177).

The passage thus far considered furnishes at best none but purely negative evidence for the defectiveness of David's Jahvism, and cannot support any positive conclusion. But other and really more positive indicia of David's religious ideas are offered. Let us ask whether they necessarily bear the interpretation put upon them. In the first place, his reverence for the ark and attachment to it is held to indicate unspiritual conceptions of Jahveh and his worship (O., p. 268). To say nothing of the superstition that looked upon Uzzah's death as wrought by the ark, or of the dread which after this calamity induced David to postpone its introduction into his capital city, there is said to be other evidence that it was considered to hold Jahveh himself. Reuss (p. 163) thinks it probable that originally the ark contained an image of Jahveh; Kuenen (Godsd., i. 232), that it held a stone, the dwelling-place proper of Jahveh, of which the ark was merely the repository. "Nothing," he says (i. 324), "is clearer than that David thinks that with the ark he also brings Jahveh into his capital." This opinion once adopted, on whatever grounds, it is no doubt easy to find much that seems to fall in with it. The men of Beth-Shemesh, after a dreadful experience with the ark (as to the cause of which the Hebrew text is obscure, but made clearer by the different reading of the Septuagint, 1 Sam. vi. 19), exclaim, "Who can stand before Jahveh, this holy God, and unto whom shall he go from us?" In an ancient Jahvistic fragment, Numbers x. 29 ff., we read that when in a march the ark, at the head of the host, began to move, Moses

would say: "Rise up, Jahveh, and let thine enemies be scattered!" and when it came to a halt, "Return, Jahveh, to the myriads of the tribes of Israel!" But are we to understand such expressions of Moses as we should be obliged to understand them if uttered by a tribe of African fetichists? Are we quite ready to agree that the great leader, whose most characteristic name for God is Jahveh, which is still most plausibly interpreted, He who is, — the Existent One, — that Moses, who is at all events the inaugurator of an historical movement that developed into the monotheism of the prophets, believed that he carried his god about with him shut up in a chest? and that four hundred years later David and his contemporaries still believed it? If they did, with what amazing rapidity must illumination have proceeded after their time, seeing that two hundred years later not a trace of the old superstition remains! Not one of all the prophets even mentions the ark save Jeremiah, and he but once (chap. iii. 16), while the Deuteronomist already speaks of it, not simply as "the ark," but "the ark of the covenant," a name which excludes the view attributed to David. Moreover, consider the well-authenticated facts given in the books of Samuel. For twenty years the ark is left in the house of Abinadab. Neither Samuel, Saul, nor anybody else, appears to trouble himself about it. Meanwhile, sacrifice and prayer are offered to Jahveh at Mizpah, Ramah, Gilgal, or wherever occasion arises. David consults Jahveh through prophets and priestly oracles wherever he happens to be; and, what is even more to the point, whatever public or private solemnity be observed, in whatever place. it is habitually spoken of as done "before Jahveh" (1 Sam. vii. 6; x. 19; xi. 15; xxiii. 18; 2 Sam. v. 3; xxi. 9, etc.). When fleeing from Jerusalem before Absalom, David orders the loyal priests who bring the ark to him beyond the Kidron to restore it to its place in the city. Is that an act to be looked for from a man whose life is in danger; from a patriotic king whose people are threatened with sore disaster, and who believes that by that act he leaves his god behind him? Are not all these facts more readily reduced to congruity upon the assumption that the ark is regarded as a sign or symbol of Jahveh's presence, not as the real presence itself?

But the teraphim. We find one in David's own house (1 Sam. xix. 13 f.); "have we the right to consider David's religion as elevated above the use of such images?" (O., p. 268). We know little about the teraphim or their use. They are probably to be regarded as household gods, penates, who protected the family and its fortunes. Samuel places them in parallelism with divination (1 Sam. xv. 23), which seems to justify the inference that they served as oracles. That Michal had one proves the use of it by David as little as Rachel's theft proves Jacob a robber. But suppose he did: is it not possible, and even probable, that they were regarded as mere images of the god whom the family worshiped, and from whom it sought direction and assistance? The man Micah, of whose private sanctuary and teraphim we read in Judges (chaps. xvii., xviii.), was a worshiper of Jahveh. Nor can we suppose anything else of Michal, the daughter of Saul and wife of David. Now, I am not concerned to clear David and his age of superstition; and I do not forget that Samuel (1 Sam. xv. 23), when he would characterize the sin of stubborn disobedience to God, compares it with what he calls "teraphim-wickedness." But was the use of teraphim more inconsistent with high conceptions of the spirituality of Jahveh than the use

of crucifixes and images is among Christians; or, to draw a parallel in some respects more close, than the practice of soothsaying by means of the Bible? If absolute freedom from superstition must precede the idea of one, only, spiritual God, without body or parts, and absolutely independent of time and space, I fear that few persons now living could be reckoned pure monotheists.

Another proof of the low religious plane occupied by David and his age is found in the narrative concerning the Gibeonites and the sons of Saul (2 Sam. xxi. 1-14). On the occasion of an extraordinary drought, lasting three successive years, David inquires after the cause of it. The oracle ascribes it to bloody wrongs inflicted by Saul on the Gibeonites, a Canaanitish clan who had secured a sort of covenant adoption into Israel. To the question, what satisfaction they require, the Gibeonites reply, Give us seven sons of him who wronged us, that we may crucify them (if that be the right word, which is very doubtful, cf. Dillm. on Num. xxv. 4) unto Jahveh, which was done. This the critics put to David's account as an act of human sacrifice (Reuss, sect. 159, cf. p. 168; Kuenen, *Godsd.*, i. 237). Now, that in earlier times the Hebrews, like all other Semitic tribes, offered human sacrifices, especially children, is beyond question. The Old Testament proves it. The practice continued, in connection with Baal-worship, far into historical times, both in the Northern kingdom (2 Kings xvii. 17) and in the Southern (2 Kings xvi. 3; xxiii. 10; Jer. xxxii. 35). If Hosea xiii. 2 speaks of *human* sacrifices offered to the *Jahveh*-calves of the Northern cult (which I do not believe), the practice must be looked-upon as the revival of ancient but long-disused custom, resorted to, perhaps, by the priests in order to compete on more equal terms with the worship of Moloch. However that may be, there is no evidence whatever, unless it be in this story of the Gibeonites, that after the period of the Judges human sacrifices ever entered into the worship of Jahveh as carried on in Judah. The passage Micah vi. 7, referred to by Kuenen (*Godsd.*, i. 236), standing alone as it does, is most naturally understood as alluding to what was customary in other cults. As for the Gibeonite story, the only features of it that can be made to suggest a sacrifice are, first, the expression, "unto Jahveh" (v. 6), and, secondly, the manifest construction of the slaying as affecting a propitiation of Jahveh. The first indicates the person to be affected, the second the effect to be produced on him. In short, Jahveh is to be propitiated. But every effort to propitiate is not a sacrifice in the ordinary sense of the word. Phinehas turned away the wrath of God, and stayed the pestilence, by slaying a pair of sinners; but no one would speak of that act as a sacrifice. In a wider sense, it is true, the acts of both Gibeonites and Phinehas might be called sacrifices; but in that sense, every infliction of the death penalty, performed with solemn, conscious reference to the supreme moral will of the universe, is a sacrifice. Hence the כִּנְיָן, the exterminating ban, and the execution of blood-revenge, partake to a certain extent of the sacrificial character. But a true sacrifice, that in which one offers up his purest and dearest, his Isaac or Iphigenia, this slaying of the sons of Saul is not; the victims are not even captives or slaves, substituted for persons more precious. They are viewed as red-handed murderers, not as personally guilty, to be sure, but by virtue of family and tribal solidarity, which knows no individuals. And they who execute, or, if you please, sacrifice them, are not their family, not David or the nation, but the

Gibeonites. There is here a complication of circumstances. Saul had incurred blood-guiltiness toward the Gibeonites. Had they been an independent tribe, the law of blood-revenge would have gone into action. It would have been their bounden duty to slay Saul, or such of his family, tribe, or nation, as they could lay hands on. But they were not independent. Their position resembled in some respects that of the Spartan Helots. Whatever rights were accorded them, that of blood-revenge against members of the master tribes can scarcely have been among them, to say nothing of the fact that in this instance the offender was king. Thus the crime went unpunished. Even the nation was powerless against the royal authority. But that the national conscience was not unmoved is clearly shown by the interpretation placed upon the three years' drought, as put into words by the oracle. Nor can there be a doubt that David faithfully reflected its voice when he offered whatever satisfaction the Gibeonites might demand. Then the wronged clan asked for that which alone could still the cry of blood wrongfully shed. The nation's part ended with the surrender of the seven sons of Saul's house. Under ordinary circumstances, the final act of the Gibeonites would have been a simple execution. But as Jahveh had intervened with a severe infliction in order to right their wrongs, and as both king and people had obediently followed his intimations, they proceed with unusual religious solemnity. "On the mount of Jahveh," that is, the bamah of Saul's own city, Gibeah; "before Jahveh," that is, under the open sky, in Jahveh's sight; and "unto Jahveh," that is, with direct reference to him, — they shed the expiating blood, thus notifying, so to speak, the King of Kings that his people has righted their wrongs, and that his punishment has produced the salutary fruit of repentance and righteous dealing. If this be a human sacrifice, it is wholly unique. The offerers are not those who make the expiation, but those who have no expiation to make.

In view of David's action in the matter of the Gibeonites, however, Kuenen finds it quite in character that he should have thought and spoken as represented by the writer of 1 Samuel xxvi. 19: "If Jahveh have stirred thee up against me, give him to smell an offering; but if men, accursed be they before Jahveh." Passing by the energetic expression of resentment, there are two points left to be considered. The first is, that Jahveh is conceived as possibly inciting man to wrongdoing. But this conception is also found long after the time of David, not only in the older parts of the Pentateuch, but likewise in Ezekiel (xiv. 9) and the second Isaiah (lxiii. 17). Divine action of this nature is always viewed as the result and punishment of sin. The present instance forms no exception. David's thought perhaps connected the idea with the "evil spirit from Jahveh" that had come upon Saul, of which calamity it suggested the explanation. Probably, however, the chief offense for the critics lies in the advice, "Give him to smell an offering." But it can hardly be found in the anthropopathic implications that would result from taking the verb "to smell" in a crassly literal sense; for the expression, "a grateful smell unto Jahveh," is a standing technical phrase of the priestly codex, which, though ritualistic, is certainly not grossly anthropopathic. It must lie in what may be supposed to be the ethical presuppositions concerning the Deity contained in the advice. The language may be supposed to imply that, though God be so displeased with a person as to urge him on in wickedness in order to destroy him, yet a

mere external ritual act will appease his anger and win his favor. But is this the necessary interpretation of the language? Is it not possible that David mentions an offering simply as the recognized symbol of penitent confession and prayer for forgiveness, in order to convey in a veiled form a serious warning to Saul, which his reverence for the "Anointed of Jahveh" did not permit him to utter more openly? The critics not merely admit, but strongly maintain, that the Jahveh of David is a holy and righteous God, who makes ethical demands and knows how to maintain them by severe judgments. That being so, the question becomes one of psychological probability: Was David, as his life reveals him, the man to combine such conceptions with faith in the magic of external ritualism? It seems to me that, whatever else he might be or do, he could hold no dead creed.

The last specification against the purity of David's Jahvism that I shall notice is, that it is grossly superstitious. "On the authority of priests and prophets," says Kuenen (O., p. 267), "he assumes that famine and pestilence are manifestations of Jahveh's wrath against sins of Saul, or of his own." Similarly, Reuss (p. 186): "This pure and attractive insight into religious duty, this renunciation of ritual formalism, which express themselves in the Psalms, — are they in accord with the superstition of the robber chieftain who seeks counsel of the soothsayers before he sets out on his adventures?" As the contrast here reasoned from is not that between David's religion and his freebooting life, but between his alleged dependence on external ritual acts, his faith in prophets and oracles, and his view of natural calamities as divinely sent chastisements on the one hand, and the pure Jahvism of the Psalms on the other, no lengthy discussion is called for. If every poet has always lived on the level of his highest inspirations, the world has had a great many more perfect men in it than is usually supposed. It is possible, therefore, that some of those psalmists, who in moments of exaltation least valued ritualism, nevertheless occasionally used it when they found themselves in more every-day moods. Indeed, something of regard for ritual observances is not wanting in the Psalter itself. Thus in Psalm xx. the poet says: ¹ —

"Jahveh answer thee in the day of trouble,

Send thee help from the sanctuary
And uphold thee from out of Sion;
Remember all thine offerings,
And find thy burnt sacrifice fat."

And in Psalm lvi. 13–15 we read: —

"I will go into thy house with burnt-offerings;
I will render unto thee my vows,
Such as escaped from my lips,
And my mouth did utter, when I was in straits.
Burnt-offerings of fatlings will I offer unto thee
With the sweet savour of rams;
I will sacrifice bullocks with goats."

And if none who looked upon such calamities as famine and pestilence as punishments for sin, or placed faith in prophets and oracles, could write any of the Psalms, I confess I cannot see in what period of Israel-

¹ The quotations here and further on are from Cheyne's version, except that twice Jahveh is substituted for Jehovah.

ish history they could possibly have originated. Of providential punishments the Psalter itself speaks often enough. Prophets, apocalyptic prophets, flourished well into the Christian era; and oracles in some form, the lot, signs and omens, have never ceased to find believers. The inexplicable thing to my mind is, that such a point should be raised by such critics.

Upon the whole, I must conclude that the evidence adduced is insufficient to warrant the opinion that David and his age knew Jahveh *only* as a tribal deity. I do not doubt that Jahveh was conceived to stand in relation to Israel as Chemosh stood to Moab, and Dagon to the Philistines. But there is nothing to show that he was held to differ from them only or chiefly in power, as one king is stronger than another, — no conclusive evidence even that other gods were regarded as really existing. I admit that the historical documents that treat of David and his time furnish no clear, positive proof that the Jahvism of that period was, strictly speaking, pure monotheism.¹ But might not the same, *mutatis mutandis*, be said of many of the Psalms? Take, for instance, Psalm iii.; read Chemosh instead of Jahveh, and ask what of *theistic* grounds it affords for saying that it cannot have been composed by King Mesha? But if, so far as this criterion is concerned, Mesha might be its author, why not David?

I turn to the statement of the critics that David's ethical principles and character do not rise above his time, and are incompatible with the ethics of the Psalms. He is allowed to have had many admirable and lofty qualities. The nobility of his conduct toward Saul is cheerfully admitted. His friendship for Jonathan was ideally beautiful and constant. His chivalrous regard for his comrades in arms, according to Reuss (sect. 159), "moves even the uninterested heart." But they are accompanied by others of dreadful darkness. He is culpably weak in the treatment of crimes committed by his sons, or by others whom he fears to touch. Of his ingratitude and thirst for revenge a repulsive exhibition is given when on his death-bed he charges Solomon to destroy Joab, his most faithful servant, and Shimei, whom he had pardoned. But is it quite certain that this charge is rightly formulated? The parental weakness, though a vice, has its root in a virtue. And may it not be that the advice to Solomon concerning Joab and Shimei sprang from no lower motive than solicitude for the state and the new king? We know too little of the situation to decide confidently; but of David, I think, we know too much to make it seem probable that he was actuated by the mean spirit of revenge. Joab was a miracle of constancy and loyalty; but he was also a prodigy of arbitrariness and self-will, whom a hand so strong as David's could not control. His loyalty bears all the marks of attachment to a brilliant warrior-king of unequalled prowess and fame, without a trace of interest in the high calling of Israel, for the realization of which alone that king waged his wars. What was to be expected of that restless and apparently still vigorous spirit, in the peaceful reign for which the time was ripe? As for Shimei, let him pass. David's real error was in not punishing him more promptly.

To proceed. By the side of his chivalrous friendship, says Reuss (sect. 159), there stood "his wild lust after women, that did not hesitate

¹ I ignore 2 Sam. vii. 22, because it is critically suspected by Kuenen, *Onderzoek*, p. 273, and therefore, as against him, not available.

to stride with bloody feet over honor and right." This is dreadfully true as to form; and yet the deeds were not those of an habitual, premeditating voluptuary. There have been Christian kings, with philosophically higher and more spiritual ideas of God than the people of the Old Testament ever reached, who sinned more deeply and more frequently. Nor should we forget that, if the prompt rebuke of Nathan the prophet gives a fair index to the best sentiment and feeling of the nation, David's sincere and ready repentance shows that he himself honors the same high standard. While I agree with those who hold that Psalm li. probably originated in the exile, I see no reason in David's moral character why he could not have written it.

Further: according to Kuenen, treason and deceit are not considered unallowable. This is said of David's time, to be sure; but it is supported by references in which he himself figures, and which are designed to exhibit him as the "child of his time" (O., p. 268, n. 4). As applied to David, I admit the deceit, with qualifications, but decline the treason. There is no treason in his nature, and none appears in his career.¹ Treason can be predicated only of acts by which one deliberately turns the confidence reposed in him into a means of inflicting injury. The nearest approach to it in David's life is his treatment of Uriah through his wife. But there was no deliberation in that outburst of passion. It was the unreflecting act of a man maddened by sensual desire. That does not take away its sinfulness; but it does take it out of the category of treason. As for deceit, he used it on various occasions, but always in the character of the *Nothlüge*. As a defense in war, its practice is and always has been so universal that truth would now be the best means of deceiving an enemy. And as a means of warding off danger from one's self or others, the *Nothlüge* has been used from the time of Abraham to that of St. Peter in Scripture, and by all mankind out of Scripture, even by English-speaking peoples, although their dictionaries have no proper word for it. If hymns and sacred songs could be written by none but persons who never said one thing while they thought another, the size and number of hymn-books would be small.

Finally, wars were carried on with inhuman cruelty. So they were. The wholesale massacres of the conquered Moabites, Ammonites, and Edomites, aggravated in the instance of the Ammonites by the methods employed, fill us with horror. The same must be said of the total extermination of the clans against which David's earlier freebooting expeditions were directed, in order to deceive Achish as to the identity of the sufferers from those raids (1 Sam. xxvii. 8 ff.) To say that like atrocities were also practiced by other tribes, would merely be to admit what the critics assert, — that in this respect David was not better than his age. But does it therefore follow that he did not and could not have composed any of the Psalms? I need not appeal to the records of Christian nations. The cruelties of the Inquisition, the barbarities of the Spanish conquerors of South America, the butcheries of St. Bartholomew's night, the Black Hole of Calcutta, and the horrors of the slave-trade and slave-ship, — were they not permitted, if not actually perpetrated or approved, by men who, whatever other qualities they might lack for writing psalms, were not without high and pure conceptions of God

¹ To infer from his relations with Achish, King of Gath, that he must have been ready, when occasion came, to act against his own people, or turn upon his Philistine suzerain, would be an entirely gratuitous proceeding.

and spiritual religion? But, not to dwell on that, is the Psalter, taken as a whole, entirely free from the spirit of what to us would be rude cruelty? Is there not a flavor of the soldier's camp in Psalm ii. 9:—

“Thou shalt break them with a mace of iron;
Thou shalt shiver them like a potter's vessel.”

Or in Psalm iii. 8:—

“Arise Jahveh, save me, O my God!
For thou hast smitten all mine enemies upon the cheek-bone,
The teeth of the ungodly hast thou broken.”

And in Psalm lxviii. 22-24:—

“Surely Elohim will shatter the head of his enemies,
The long-haired crown of the head of him who goes on in his sins.
The Lord said, I will bring them back from Bashan,
I will bring them back from the ocean-gulfs,
That thou mayest wash thy foot in blood,
That the tongue of thy dogs may have its portion from the enemies.”

Psalm cxxxvii. 8, 9:—

“O daughter of Babylon, thou doomed one,
Happy he that pays thee back
For what thou hast wrought on us.
Happy he that takes and dashes
Thy children against the rocks.”

Historical science, if it is to reach truth, cannot guard too carefully against idealizing David; but it should be equally watchful against idealizing the compositions of psalmists concerning whose lives we know nothing. And I am strongly persuaded that no historical criterion could be more unreliable and misleading than the psychological one which would determine what a person's religious conceptions and emotions and his ethical principles can or cannot be, from what he does under stress of great emergencies. Our thoughts of God and right, our emotions of adoration, praise, and wonder, are freer, and can therefore rise higher, than our actions, which are traversed and coerced by innumerable opposing forces. Many of the bulls and bears of the exchange are by no means the ruthless egoists they appear to be on a “Black Friday.” If this be true of ordinary men, oppressed by little more than ordinary dangers, how much more of a great heroic king, in whose heart the best life of a nation came to a focus, in a time of terrible battle-crises on which the fate of his people depended?

The last point of the critical summary may be briefly met. It asserts that we have no reason to suppose that David the poet produced chiefly religious lyrics. Thus stated, no great importance attaches to it. Whether he composed more secular or more sacred poems is a matter of indifference. What we would know is whether he wrote psalms. That he wrote secular poems is not questioned. Elegies of his on Saul and Jonathan, and on Abner, have been preserved; and from the allusion in Amos vi. 5 it may be inferred that he was also considered a master of joyous, convivial song. Nor is this anything improbable in itself. But concerning his activity as sacred poet, no statements are made in the historical books, except that in 2 Samuel, chaps. xxii. and xxiii., there are two psalms expressly ascribed to him. The question of

their genuineness is far too difficult to be now gone into. Although a cause defended by Ewald, Hitzig, and Dillmann cannot be considered so hopeless as Kuenen thinks, I must dispense with the testimony of these chapters. This leaves nothing but general grounds on which to build.

First, then, it is antecedently probable that a poet of such great gifts, and of such warm enthusiasm for Jahveh and his service, as David is allowed to have been, would consecrate his powers in part to religious compositions. Indeed, when we reflect on the intimate connection of ancient public and social life with religion and religious observances, this probability almost rises into certainty.

Secondly, it scarcely admits of a doubt that in the so-called Schools of the Prophets, established by Samuel, sacred song was cultivated. Now, we know from 1 Samuel xix. 18 ff. that David visited Samuel at the school in Ramah, and tarried some time. Such a contact with enthusiastic young men could not leave him uninfluenced. Is it too much to surmise that, if he had not previously composed psalms, he must on that occasion have received a strong impulse to attempt it? Nor can it be regarded as unlikely that long-continued, intimate association with the prophets Nathan and Gad acted as a steady stimulus in the same direction.

Finally, how can it be explained that in after times David's name became almost a synonym for psalmist? Such a repute cannot spring out of nothing. Tradition extends and embellishes, but it always starts from fact. Moses having been a great organizer and legislator, posterity could ascribe to him much that originated by imperceptible accretions and transformations during the course of centuries; but it could never have invented the story of his life, or ascribed to him all the legislation of the Pentateuch, without large and vigorous germs of true history. So the great celebrity of David as a psalmist must have had a basis of fact. It could scarcely have grown out of his secular songs. Nor can it reasonably be supposed to have sprung out of designed or accidental errors in ascribing to him psalms whose real authors were unknown. That might be done after his fame as psalmist was established, but not before. When the memory of David and his age was still fresh in the popular mind — and Eastern memories are tenacious — it was impossible to credit him with psalm-writing which he had never done. And though the lapse of time gradually destroyed the life of memory as such, and changed it into its more pliable successor, tradition, it made the difficulty of introducing a baseless fabrication constantly greater.

The character of the age of David, or any other in Israelitish history, must of course be determined in the first instance by means of the direct evidence at command. But if the evidence be scanty, or susceptible of more than one interpretation, that interpretation of it is certainly to be preferred which tends to give to each age its duly graded and chronologically proportioned place in the history as a whole. Now, it seems to me that the more recent historiography of Israelitish history, and especially of the age of David, labors under one great difficulty induced by neglect of this rule. It must assume, as I have already intimated, a greatly accelerated rate of religious progress in the short period that separates David from the great prophets. And the acceleration falls in a time concerning which the historical books of Kings tell us nothing

that can give a clue towards its explanation. It is not a time of steady religious direction by good kings, strongly imbued with the spirit of Jahvism. The good alternate with bad and indifferent. And yet the development towards pure monotheism must be going on as it never did under David and Solomon. And notwithstanding this marvelous onward movement, the prophets are prone to look back with regretful eyes to the past of David's time, or with longing to the future when a greater than David, but of his house and spirit, shall bring in the perfect day. Have we no ground here for suspecting that the Davidic age is placed much too low in the scale of progress, that the labors of Samuel are greatly underestimated, and that the darkness of the period of the Judges is much overdrawn?

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SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.

PART III. PAUPERISM.

TOPIC III. THE CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND THE CHARITIES OF THE CHURCH.

1. CHRISTIAN CHARITY.

Christian charity was not originally a method, a scheme, a system; it was simply one of the natural expressions of Christianity. It was Christianity acting appropriately in the presence of poverty and suffering. Charity, in the sense of almsgiving, was not a chief end of Christianity; it was only an incident in its progress. The term which expressed its simpler and larger purpose is "redemption," meaning by it the regeneration of the individual and the renovation of society. Keeping this fact in mind, it is seen why the beginnings of Christianity were not precisely what might have been expected in the exercise of a technical charity. Charity was not the chief agency relied upon for the spread of Christianity. It did not introduce itself through an effort in behalf of the "submerged tenth" of Rome. It did not attack the problem of pauperism any more than that of slavery. Its immediate and constant appeal to the world was a religious appeal.

Neither did Christianity manifest or develop at once any *overpowering* sense of suffering. The contrast in this respect between Christianity and Buddhism is very striking. The doctrine of Buddha was comprised in the "four sacred truths" of suffering, of the origin of suffering, of the removal of suffering, of the way of the removal of suffering.

See Pfeleiderer, "Philosophy of History," vol. iii., pp. 67, 68.

Christianity did not grow morbid in the presence of suffering, or passive in the contemplation of it. Where Buddhism was pessimistic, Christianity was optimistic; and for two reasons. Christ identified suffering with sacrifice. Instead of renunciation, consecration. And the Christian conception of immortality gave relief to the thought of the suffering

of this world. For these reasons Christianity did not formulate itself at once into a system of philanthropy. It declared itself through a new principle or *quality* of action. Christianized love was a very different thing from any kind of love which the world had made use of as a working principle.

1. *The Quality of the Christian Charity.*

(1.) The Christian charity was a passion, an enthusiasm for humanity. The golden rule was not the full expression of it. It was more than a finer justice.

(2.) The Christian charity was more than pity. It had insight. It took account of the possibilities in men; it saw the man in the beggar.

(3.) The Christian charity wrought through sympathy, by perfect identification with the sufferer. It was founded on the principle of the Incarnation.

See "Ecce Homo," p. 178.

(4.) The Christian charity was universal. It was impartial and without limit.

2. *Characteristics of the Christian Charity in its First Manifestations.*

(1.) Its sense of the sacredness of life. It did away with the so-called natural reliefs of poverty like infanticide, exposure of children and of sick slaves. It introduced another law than that of the survival of the strongest.

(2.) Its insistence upon personal thrift. "When we were with you we commanded you that, if any would not work, neither should he eat." 2 Thes. iii. 10.

"Blessed is he that giveth according to the commandment, for he is guiltless. Woe to him that receiveth: for if any one receiveth having need he is guiltless; but he that hath not need shall give account wherefore he received and for what, and coming into close restraint he shall be strictly examined concerning what things he hath practiced, and shall not come out from thence until he have paid the last farthing. But take note, even concerning this hath it been said, Let thine alms sweat in thine hands until thou shalt have come to know to whom thou shouldest give." Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, chapter i.

(3.) Forbearance in the exercise of right and in resentment. Paul's letter to Philemon.

(4.) Vicariousness, the willingness to risk life for friends and enemies. This characteristic made specially prominent in times of pestilence and epidemics. Neander, "History of the Christian Religion and Church," vol. i. pp. 257-259.

2. THE CHARITIES OF THE CHURCH.

The charities of the church belong to the period from Constantine to the Reformation, the period of the power and wealth of the church. Previous to this time, the outward history of the church is to be studied with reference to the effect of persecution, and also of asceticism, upon charity. The two tendencies in the church, which Neander describes as "the world-resisting and the world-appropriating tendencies," are to be traced to their practical results. Special attention should be given to the practical effect of Montanism.

For condition of the Roman world at time of ascendancy of Christianity, see Schmidt, "The Social Results of Early Christianity," or Ulhorn, "Christian Charity in the Ancient Church." See, also, secular histories covering this time.

The methods of the church in its charities may be divided into three periods, according to the use which it made of different instrumentalities:—

1. THE PERIOD OF THE DIACONATE.

The diaconate flourished under the organization of the church covering an entire city. Deacons and deaconesses were multiplied at all the centres, except at Rome, where the original number of seven was maintained, though subordinates were there employed to render an equivalent service. Diakonia, or houses of relief, were established in all cities. The support for these homes, and for the charitable work of the church under this system, came chiefly from the offerings made at the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

2. THE PERIOD OF PRIVATE BENEFICENCE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE BISHOPS.

This is the period of institutional charity. The special charity was the hospital. The doctrine of almsgiving was greatly amplified and elaborated. Legacies and special gifts from the rich were encouraged; and gifts in remembrance of the dead, which gave rise to the practical working of the dogma of purgatory.

3. THE PERIOD OF THE MONASTIC ORDERS.

Two types of orders were developed, — the anchoritic or hermit type; the cenobitic or social type; the one of the East, the other of the West.

The history of this period is best studied by studying the history of the different orders, — the Benedictines, the Franciscans, the Dominicans, and later of the Sisters of Charity.

William Jewett Tucker.

. ANDOVER.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

DIE APOLOGIEN JUSTIN'S DES MARTYRERS, herausgegeben von LIC. DR. G. KRUGER. Pp. x, 84. J. C. B. Mohr: Freiburg, 1891. Mrk. 1.50.

This convenient little pamphlet is the first number of a series of selections from the sources for the study of church history and of the history of doctrine, which is to be issued under the guidance of Prof. Gustav Krüger, of the University of Giessen, with the design of furnishing in suitable form and at a small price material for the use of students in the *Seminarien*. In the preface the editor alludes to the fact which the experience of every instructor has revealed, that texts of single writings, even the most important ones, of the Fathers — with the exception perhaps of "Augustine's Confessions," and a few writings edited by Lindner — are impossible to be obtained. The purchase of a complete copy of one of the great critical editions for the sake of one writing, and of several such in the course of a winter's work, is more than can be

expected of the student. And the possession of a number of such copies by the library, to be loaned to the student, does not satisfy the need. Nothing can really take the place of the ownership on the part of the student of the work which he is using, the freedom to use it as he will, and the privilege of referring to it in the progress of his studies, and even after his seminary life has closed. If these things are true in Germany, they are still more true in this country. To be sure there are many institutions which get on without anything resembling seminar instruction. But even that state of things is not wholly responsible for the fact that many a student graduates without having even so much as seen the text of one of the Fathers, much less having set himself to work through one of the typical and world-famous of their writings. Even the use of a translation to read one's self into the spirit of a man or of a time is a thing which is only just beginning to be understood. But no such use of translations can take the place of the mastery of the text of even a very few of the great writings of Christian antiquity. The miserable zeal for keeping current with all the lucubrations of wise men of modern times absorbs many a man. If one could only make it clear that that is a thing which in a measure he will be compelled to do by and by, and that meantime the student years afford possibly the only opportunity of making a student-like acquaintance with the master spirits of the ages! And yet the difficulty in the past has certainly been augmented by the terror produced by the array of Migne, or of this or that *Corpus Patrum*, and the impossibility of owning and carrying about with one the scrap on which the student was at work. It is therefore matter of congratulation that this difficulty at any rate is to be removed. Indeed, it is intimated that the effort is not necessarily to be confined to the works of the Patristic period, but may be extended to those of the Middle Age and of the Reformation time, if the interest manifested shall appear to justify that course. The text of Justin used is that of Otto. All departures from that text are noted in an appendix. There is a brief introduction, with bibliography. The footnotes are limited to references, and a Greek index makes the work thoroughly available.

Edward C. Moore. *

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Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston and New York. James Freeman Clarke. Autobiography, Diary, and Correspondence. Edited by Edward Everett Hale. Pp. 430. 1891. \$1.50. — The Odyssey of Homer. Translated by George Herbert Palmer, Alford Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University. Pp. vi, 387. 1891. \$2.00. — Japanese Girls and Women. By Alice Mabel Bacon. Pp. ix, 333. 1891. — As it is in Heaven. By Lucy Larcom. Pp. 156. 1891. \$1.00. — King's Chapel Sermons. By Andrew Preston Peabody, D. D., LL. D., Preacher to Harvard University, and Plummer Profes-

sor of Christian Morals, Emeritus. Pp. vi, 340. 1891. \$1.50. — The American Revolution. By John Fiske. In Two Volumes. Vol. I. Pp. xxi, 344. Vol. II. Pp. xii, 305. 1891. \$4.00 a set. — American Religious Leaders. Charles Grandison Finney. By G. Frederick Wright, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Oberlin Theological Seminary, Ohio. Pp. 329. 1891. \$1.25. — The Change of Attitude toward the Bible. A Lecture given under the auspices of the Boston Board of the American Institute of Sacred Literature, February 17, 1891. By Joseph Henry Thayer, Professor in Harvard University. Pp. 69. 1891. 50 cents. — Fourteen to One. By Elizabeth Stuart Phelps. Pp. 464. 1891. \$1.25. — Who Wrote the Bible? A Book for the People. By Washington Gladden. Pp. 381. 1891. \$1.25.

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